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Introduction 
Samuel Beckett has long been known as a philosophical author. His work has attracted 
response from numerous philosophers, from Battaille and Blanchot to Deleuze and 
Badieu. Jacques Derrida once said that he cannot write about Beckett because “he 
writes—in my language, in a language which is his up to a point, mine up to a point”.1 
This affinity with contemporary philosophy stands in stark contrast to Beckett’s own 
philosophical taste. The language he shared with 20th-century philosophers is rooted in a 
canonical and conservative interest in philosophy which rarely extends beyond the 19th-
century – his great philosophical heroes are Heraclitus, Democritus, Geulincx and 
Schopenhauer. When Beckett embarked on a study of the history of philosophy as an 
aspiring young writer he invested most of his effort in Greek philosophy, especially the 
pre-Socratics, and gave up the project when he reached Nietzsche.2 20th-century 
philosophers represented in his library after his death include only Mauthner, 
Wittgenstein (whom he may not have read), Bachelard, Sartre, Adorno, and Cioran who 
was his friend.3 The question then arises how did Beckett create from such an 
inauspicious philosophical ‘diet’ the haunting images and intricate texts that are felt by 
later philosophers to express so well their own questioning of the foundations of Western 
thought. This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of Beckett’s reworking 
of early modern philosophy by examining how Beckett engages with the work of the 
18th-century philosopher George Berkeley. It will show how Beckett directs 
contemporary questions at the religious and often conservative thinking of the Good 
Bishop, whom deliberately misreads in creative ways. In the Preface to his Principles of 
Human Knowledge, Berkeley writes that some passages of his work may be liable, when 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Asja Szafraniec, Beckett, Derrida, and the Event of Literature (Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007) 2. 
2 Matthijs Engelbert, et al., eds. Notes Diverse Holo: Catalogues of Beckett’s Reading Notes and 
Other Manuscripts at Trinity College Dublin, with Supporting Essays (Rodopi: Amsterdam & New York, 
2006) 87. 
3 Dirk van Hulle and Mark Nixon, Samuel Beckett’s Library (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 157-169. Henceforth Beckett’s Library. 
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read out of context, “to be charged with most absurd consequences”.4 It is exactly the 
kind of consequences, I willl argue, that Beckett draws from his works. 
The relation of Beckett to Berkeley calls for particular attention because it covers a 
long stretch of time, with direct references made in such diverse works as the 1936 novel 
Murphy and the 1964 Film and Berkeleyan themes appearing throughout his work. Direct 
references to the philosopher appear very early in Beckett’s writing, beginning with 
Murphy where Berkeley is alluded to multiple times, and his idealism is an important 
point of reference in the novel, as I will argue in Chapter 2. Berkeley’s name also crops 
up in Lucky’s speech in the English language version of Waiting for Godot, replacing the 
name of Voltaire in the original French version.5 Beckett’s latest, and arguably most 
important, theoretical essay on aesthetics from 1949 – Three Dialogues between Samuel 
Beckett and George Duthuit takes its title from Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous, a philosophical dialogue expounding Berkeley’s views. As will be 
shown in Chapter 3, there are close structural and conceptual connections between the 
two texts. The latest direct reference to Berkeley in Beckett’s work is in the opening 
remarks to the script of his only movie – Film written in 1963, which takes Berkeley’s 
famous dictum Esse est percipi as a precept that shapes the plot of the film.6 
As will be shown in Chapter 1 which deals with archival evidence, Beckett spent 
time and effort on reading Berkeley and secondary materials about his philosophy, even 
though in interviews and letter the name of the philosopher is not mentioned as an 
                                                 
4 For the sake of accuracy in treating Berkeley’s text, I’ll be using a the commonly accepted editions 
by Luce and Jessop as a source for Berkeley’s texts: George Berkeley, “A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge,” Philosophical Works including the Works on Vision, Eds. A. A. Luce 
and T. E. Jessop (London, Edinburgh, Paris, Melbourne, Toronto and NewYork: Thomas Nelson and Sons 
Ltd, 1949) 3. Henceforth PHK. 
5 Samuel Beckett, “Waiting for Godot,” Complete Dramatic Works (London and Boston: Faber & 
Faber, 1990) 43. Compare with Samuel Beckett, En attendant Godot (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1952) 
57. The name of Voltaire in the original French was rendered as Samuel Johnson in the Faber and Faber 
edition of 1951 and then altered to Bishop Berkeley in the second British edition of 1965. See Daniel 
Albright, Representation and the Imagination: Beckett, Kafka, Nabokov, and Schoenberg (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 43-4. 
6 Samuel Beckett, “Film,” Complete Dramatic Works (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1990) 323. 
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important influence. Whatever the reason for Beckett’s silence on his interest in the good 
Bishop, themes and images taken directly from Berkeley’s writings regularly appear in 
Beckett’s texts across different media, from the 1930s to at the late 1960s and beyond. As 
I will show throughout the thesis, these contents are reinterpreted against the grain, with 
Beckett consistently ignoring the spiritual realm in Berkeley’s view of the world and 
reading him in a paranoid and pessimistic manner. What Berkeley advances as a praise of 
God, Beckett renders as a threat from hostile forces. In Frederik Smith's succinct phrase, 
Beckett “reads Berkeley cruelly”.7 
My hypothesis in this thesis would therefore be that Beckett’s engagement with 
Berkeley was more extensive than has been previously recognised, and that tracing this 
influence across the oeuvre can help illuminate how Beckett transposes Berkeley’s 
arguments into a hostile environment that makes them take on a dangerous and 
malevolent aspect. 
State of Research  
Research into Beckett’s philosophical sources has been an important subject right from 
the beginning of Beckett criticism. Significant early works include Ruby Cohn’s 
“Philosophical Fragments in the Works of Samuel Beckett” (1964);8 John Fletcher’s 
“Beckett and the Philosophers” (1965);9 and Edouard Morot-Sir, “Samuel Beckett and 
Cartesian Emblems” (1976).10 This early research was mostly based on textual evidence 
from Beckett’s work, including quotes, allusions and more or less direct references to 
various philosophers. What is common to these essays and other research published at the 
time is the identification of Beckett’s thinking with a Cartesian stance, relying on Hugh 
Kenner’s influential 1961 essay “The Cartesian Centaur”11 which claimed that Beckett 
                                                 
7 Frederik N. Smith, “Beckett and Berkeley: A Reconsideration,” Samuel Beckett Today/ Aujourd'hui 
7 Beckett vs. Beckett, eds. Marius Buning, et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998) 334. 
8 Ruby Cohn, “Philosophical Fragments in the Works of Samuel Beckett,” Criticism 6:1 (1964): 33-43. 
9 John Fletcher, “Beckett and the Philosophers,” Comparative Literature 17:1 (1965): 43-56. 
10 Edouard Morot-Sir, “Samuel Beckett and Cartesian Emblems,” Samuel Beckett: The Art of Rhetoric, 
eds. Edouard Morot-Sir, et al. (Chapel Hill: U.N.C. Dept. of Romance Languages, 1976) 25-104. 
11 Hugh Kenner, “The Cartesian Centaur,” Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study (New York: Grove Press, 
1961) 117-132. 
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was committed to the Cartesian division of body and mind, and that his work can be seen 
as an attempt to bridge this division. Both Fletcher and Morot-Sir mention Berkeley as a 
relevant source within a broader philosophical tradition. For Fletcher, Berkeley is a 
sceptic who is responsible, together with Hume, for casting doubt on the nature of 
language, a questioning that is most powerfully expressed in Watt.12 Morot-Sir sees 
Berkeley as a post-Cartesian, “an idealist… whose ‘esse est percipi’ is a direct 
consequence of the Cogito.”13 These early indications of Berkeleyan influence on Beckett 
are, unfortunately, much too cursory to form a convincing argument. They lack empirical 
evidence to substantiate their claims on the one hand, and extended textual and 
philosophical analysis on the other. We can thus take them as a point of departure for 
further exploration. 
Samuel Beckett’s interest in Berkeley has since become common knowledge in 
Beckett studies, backed by archival materials, direct allusions and the occasional mention 
in the critical literature. The publication of James Knowlson’s Damned to Fame in 199614 
marks the beginning of an era of intensive archival research that brought to light 
materials that were previously only available to a small number of researchers. The 
wealth of new information has had a tremendous impact on the study of Beckett and 
philosophy by providing details on what philosophical sources Beckett was familiar with, 
his engagement with different thinkers, and his evaluation of them. It is important to note 
that Knowlson does not mention Berkeley in his biography, presumably because he did 
not consider him to be a major influence, an attitude that seems to be shared by other 
critics working on the philosophical sources of Beckett’s writing. The more recent 
publication of Beckett’s letters15 and the catalogue of his library at the time of his death16 
testify nonetheless to Beckett’s sustained interest in the Irish philosopher. 
                                                 
12 Fletcher 55. 
13 Morot-Sir 69-70. 
14 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press, 1996). 
15 The first volume of Beckett’s correspondence contains direct references to Berkeley, see Martha 
Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois More Overbeck, eds. The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 154 and 318-9. Henceforth Letters 1. 
16 Beckett’s Library 133-7. 
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This general silence, aside from a few articles which will be discussed below, can be 
explained by several factors. First, Beckett himself never mentioned Berkeley as an 
important source of inspiration. When asked about possible sources for interpreting his 
work, Beckett chose on two separate occasions, in 1956 and 1967, to single out Geulincx 
and Democritus as two “foci… where a commentary might take its rise.”17 Furthermore, 
references to Berkeley, such as the rejection of idealist tar in Murphy, are often hostile. 
The negative attitude is also apparent in the correspondence, where Beckett’s only 
substantial comment about the philosopher is that he read “Berkeley’s Commonplace 
Book… which is full of profound things, and at the same time of a foul (& false) 
intellectual canaillerie, enough to put you against reading anything more.”18 He also 
compares him unfavourably with Geulincx, who “does not put out his eyes … as 
Heraclites did & Rimbaud began to, nor like the terrified Berkeley repudiated them.”19 
And yet Beckett did read something more of Berkeley and the traces left by this reading 
are apparent in many of his works, as will be shown in this thesis. 
There have been several attempts to provide an account of Beckett’s engagement 
with Berkeley, unfortunately opting for the short forms of magazine articles or single 
book chapters, which can only touch on a limited aspect of this complex subject. Anthony 
Uhlmann's chapter “Beckett, Berkeley, Bergson, Film: The Intuition Image” in his book 
The Philosophical Image20 is perhaps the most extended attempt to take Berkeley 
seriously in trying to develop a significant theoretical framework for understanding 
Beckett's work in general. Uhlmann approaches Berkeley through Bergson to develop a 
concept of the image that results from an attempt to express an initial inexpressible 
intuition, and applies it to an interpretation of Film. Chapter 5 will draw on Uhlmann’s 
argument to develop further aspects of the image in Beckett’s work, as well as look into 
images in a wider variety of his texts. Branka Arsić also takes a philosophical approach to 
                                                 
17 David Tucker, Samuel Beckett and Arnold Geulincx: Tracing a Literary Fantasia (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2012) 38-9. 
18 Letters 1 154. Letter dated 23 April 1933.  
19 Letters 1 319. Letter dated 2 March 1936. 
20 Anthony Uhlmann, Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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her reading of Film in The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley,21 a book-
length study of Berkeley’s philosophy sub-titled “(via Beckett)”. Her research looks at 
Berkeley’s philosophy of vision and perception from a Beckettian perspective but offers 
little analysis of Beckett’s work itself. 
An early article by Jean-Michel Rabaté attempts to position Beckett’s interest in 
Berkeley within the context of Irish modernism, as reflected in its title – “Berkeley entre 
Joyce et Beckett”.22 He points out that both Joyce and Beckett, the great figures of 
modernism, were interested in the Irish philosopher, and that he was instrumental to their 
endeavour to create a new kind of Irish literature in opposition to the Yeatsian revival. 
Inevitably Rabaté’s attempt to cover such a broad scope in a single article results in an 
overview that is insightful yet brief. In a more focused article, “Beckett and Berkeley: A 
Reconsideration”,23 Smith proposes that Berkeley’s short notes and aphorisms in the 
Commonplace Book24 have influenced Beckett’s mode of writing in the Trilogy of novels 
– Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable as well as the later novel How It Is. 
Fascinating as Smith’s suggestions are, the biographical foundations for his reading are 
not well substantiated. For example, he dates Beckett’s interest in the philosopher to his 
years at Trinity whereas Beckett only began to get interested in Berkeley after he left 
university, as I shall show in Chapter 1. Moreover, the stylistic similarities he draws 
between Berkeley’s Commonplace Book and Beckett’s How It Is seem tendentious and 
fail to consider more likely sources for Beckett’s fragmentary style and absence of 
punctuation, e.g. Finnegans Wake and other modernist texts. A more reliable account of 
Beckett’s familiarity with Berkeley can be found in Steven Matthews’ “‘The Books are in 
the Study as Before’: Samuel Beckett’s Berkeley”,25 which reviews the archival materials 
                                                 
21 Branka Arsić, The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett) (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
22 Jean-Michel Rabaté, “Berkeley entre Joyce et Beckett,” Études Irlandaises 10 (1986): 57-76. 
23 Smith 331-348. 
24 I follow Beckett’s name for the text. Today it is more common to call it The Notebooks since 
Berkeley used them to organise materials in preparation for writing his books rather than as a collection of 
unrelated materials which the term ‘Commonplace Book’ implies. 
25 Steven Matthews, “‘The Books are in the Study as Before’: Samuel Beckett’s Berkeley,” Sofia 
Philosophical Review Special Issue: Beckett/ Philosophy 1:1 (2011): 146-168. It was later reprinted in 
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available at the time. Its contribution, as well as shortcomings, will be discussed in 
Chapter 1 of the thesis. Finally, Dan Watt’s short essay “Esse est Percipi: Beckett and 
Berkeley’s Silent Conversation”26 touches upon several key Berkeleyan themes that will 
be developed in more breadth in this thesis, including the connection between existence 
and perception, as well as blindness. 
In addition to these works, Berkeley’s name appears in the critical literature in 
connection with individual texts by Beckett which mention Berkeley explicitly. A 
comprehensive overview of these texts can be found in the The Grove Companion to 
Samuel Beckett.27 Such research will be referred to throughout the thesis as relevant to 
the subjects and texts under discussion. 
Structure and Methodology 
The thesis is divided into six chapters that follow Beckett’s life and work in a roughly 
chronological order, beginning with Beckett’s studies of philosophy in the early 1930’s 
and proceeding to his literary works in the early, middle, and late period. It will address 
works in multiple media and genres, including prose, theatre, radio, and film, as well as 
Beckett’s theoretical publications. The first chapter studies the archival evidence 
currently available regarding Beckett’s interest in Berkeley, his reading of specific works 
by the philosopher and of secondary sources. The second chapter builds on this basis to 
offer an extensive interpretation of the early novel Murphy which is often read as anti-
Berkeleyan. Chapter 3 analyzes Beckett’s writing on aesthetics in order to demonstrate 
the emergence of a specifically Berkeleyan strand in his thinking about representation, 
while Chapter 4 endeavours to trace the impact of this aesthetic position on Beckett’s 
artistic practice, focusing on the Trilogy. Chapters 5 and 6 cover seminal aspects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Matthew Feldman and Karim Mamdani (eds.) Beckett/ Philosophy (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2015) 211-234. 
References will be made to the later edition. 
26 Dan Watt, “Esse est Percipi: Beckett and Berkeley’s Silent Conversation,” Beckett Re-Membered: 
After the Centenary, eds. James Carney et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2012) 74-88.  
27 C. J. Ackerley, and S.E. Gontarski, eds. The Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett (New York: 
Grove Press, 2004), 105-7. 
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perception and vision in Beckett’s later work, the former examines Beckett’s 
development of images and their affinity with Berkeley’s theory of perception, whereas 
the latter is devoted to sight, blindness, and blind figures in both Beckett and Berkeley.  
The question of methodology in studies of Beckett and philosophy has become a 
subject of debate since the publication in 2006 of Matthew Feldman’s “Beckett and 
Popper, or, ‘What Stink of Artifice’: Some Notes on Methodology, Falsifiability, and 
Criticism in Beckett Studies”.28 Feldman distinguishes between empirical studies of 
sources that may have contributed to Beckett’s writing based on archival materials, and 
subjective-evocative association of ideas that appear in Beckett’s texts with those of other 
philosophers and writers. It is only the first, Feldman argues, that makes a significant 
contribution to our knowledge about Beckett since they are falsifyable, i.e. can be proven 
to be wrong, whereas subjective associations cannot be conclusively tested. Feldman’s 
early position seems too extreme, its allowed field of research too exclusive, and its 
demands on the critic too strict to become the exclusive approach in the study of 
literature. Nevertheless, the underlying demand to base criticism on available archival 
materials, or at least take them into careful consideration when looking into possible 
connections between Beckett and other thinkers, remains valid and useful to this day. 
This thesis therefore opens with a review of archival materials regarding Beckett’s 
engagement with Berkeley, and evidence collected from Beckett’s notes, letters, 
annotations, and interviews will be constantly used to substantiate claims of his 
familiarity with specific arguments and ideas. 
The archival research in itself, however, can only give us part of the picture, since 
Beckett’s achievement as a writer results primarily from the playful, thoughtful or 
subsersive use he makes of the philosophical and other sources he was drawing on. In an 
answer to Feldman’s article, Garin Dowd writes that “the temporal model underpinning 
Feldman's position is such that only the direction backwards to Beckett's notes… is valid. 
In order to write up the results of the excavation, however, the reverse journey is 
                                                 
28 Matthew Feldman, “Beckett and Popper, or, ‘What Stink of Artifice’: Some Notes on Methodology, 
Falsifiability, and Criticism in Beckett Studies,” Samuel Beckett Today/ Aujourd’hui: Notes Divers Holo: 
Catalogues of Beckett's Reading Notes and Other Manuscripts at Trinity College Dublin, eds. Matthijs 
Engelbert, et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006) 373-391. 
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required.” 29 It is unnecessary to rehearse here all of Dowd’s theoretical objections to 
Feldman, but this insight that the value of the identified sources can only be appreciated 
through subsequent study of Beckett’s work informs the textual analysis and close 
readings that will be employed throughout this thesis. In the words of Morot-Sir, “the 
actual problem is not whether philosophy is a possible part of literature, but just how its 
intervention or interference comes about.”30 The emphasis in most of this thesis will 
therefore be laid on integrating the factual evidence with new readings of Beckett’s 
writing that will allow us to appreciate his artistic achievements. It will attempt to play 
with what Feldman later described as the “two sides of the ‘Beckett and Philosophy’ 
coin”,31 namely looking forward to Beckett’s sources, and then forward at Beckett’s work 
using the Berkeleyan perspective. 
Archival research and textual analysis will be complemented by references to 
philosophical interpretations of Berkeley’s work, an element that is often lacking in 
studies of Beckett and Berkeley. My approach here is to treat the project as a multi-
disciplinary study that pays as much attention to the complexity of Berkeley’s 
philosophical position and his relation to the Western philosophical tradition, as it does to 
Beckett’s challenging work. A better understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy will 
contribute to the precision and nuance of the arguments presented in this thesis. The 
issues raised by Beckett’s use and misuse of Berkeley’s philosophy often address subjects 
that have been neglected or understudied by philosophers, thus opening new lines of 
questioning in Berkeley studies as well. His ability to bring new questions and 
perspectives to bear on Berkeley’s philosophy can explain the fascination his work holds 
for contemporary thinkers.  
                                                 
29 Garin Dowd, “Prolegomena to a Critique of Excavatory Reason: Reply to Matthew Feldman,” 
Samuel Beckett Today/ Aujourd’hui: Des éléments aux traces: Elements and Traces, eds. Matthijs 
Engelberts, et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008) 384. 
30 Morot-Sir 28. 
31 Feldman, Matthew. Falsifying Beckett: Essays on Archive, Philosophy, and Methodology in Beckett 
Studies (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2015) 91. 
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1: Profound Things and Foul Canaillerie: Beckett Reading 
Berkeley 
In Falsifying Beckett Mathew Feldman advocates a methodology that in its minimal form 
amounts to a preference for “theorising from a position of empirical accuracy”.32 This is a 
more moderate position compared with his previous pronouncement but it retains the 
crucial insistence on using archival materials to substantiate claims of Beckett’s 
familiarity with various sources that have shaped current studies of Beckett and 
philosophy. The aim of the present chapter is to establish such an empirical basis for the 
study of Beckett’s engagement with Berkeley by reviewing biographical and archival 
evidence about Beckett’s interest in Berkeley, his knowledge of individual works, and the 
interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy that he was familiar with. It will examine 
references to Berkeley in Beckett’s letters and interviews, the notes he took on 
philosophy,33 and reading marks he left in the books in his possession at the time of his 
death.  
Steven Matthews’s 2011 article “’The Books are in the Study as Before’: Samuel 
Beckett’s Berkeley”34 is a useful starting point for this research, since it reviews some of 
the most pertinent archival materials with regards to Beckett’s interest in Berkeley, 
namely the published letters, the Philosophy Notes, and the titles of books in Beckett’s 
library. The following discussion will review some of the same materials, as will be 
indicated by footnotes, but it will differ from Matthews on two important issues. First, it 
will expand his account with new materials that have recently become available, as well 
as further research. Second, the reading notes left by Beckett in his books of Berkeley’s 
philosophy reveal, as will be shown later, a pattern of partial reading. This calls for a 
more careful approach to Beckett’s knowledge of Berkeley and his contemporary critics, 
in contrast to Matthews’ reliance on texts for which we have no proof that Beckett read, 
                                                 
32 Feldman, Falsifying Beckett 19. 
33 The notes, referred to as the Philosophy Notes, are kept at Trinity College Dublin, TCD MS 10967. 
34 Matthews 211-234. 
 18 
especially Hone & Rossi’s book on Berkeley, and Berkeley’s own A Theory of Vision, as 
well as extensive parts of the Commonplace Book. 
Getting to Know Berkeley 
In “Beckett and Berkeley: a Reconsideration” Frederik Smith claims that Beckett’s first 
encounter with Berkeley was as a student in Trinity College: 
Beckett’s awareness of the eighteenth-century philosopher was sparked at Trinity 
College, where entrance examinations held students responsible, oddly enough, 
for a section of Berkeley’s “Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain”. 
More significantly, Beckett’s assigned tutor upon his matriculation in 1923 was 
none other than A.A. Luce, Berkeley’s modern editor; and although students at 
this time were not required to take courses per se, the young man met with his 
tutor on a fairly regular basis, and, therefore, it would not seem rash to speculate 
that in these meetings some Berkeley rubbed off. 35 
Smith does not specify which part of Berkeley’s “Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin 
of Great Britain” was assigned, but the essay as a whole is concerned with the moral, 
political and social arrangements that will foster economic growth in Britain – a subject 
unlikely to attract Beckett’s attention, beyond the compulsory reading.  
It may be natural to assume that Beckett first became interested in Berkeley at Trinity, 
which numbered the famous philosopher among its prominent faculty and, as Smith notes, 
assigned Beckett to the supervision of one of the foremost Berkeley scholars of the 20th-
century. The evidence for such early engagement are, however, slim. Beckett did not take 
any courses under Luce, but it has long been assumed that he discussed the work of 
Berkeley, the philosopher with whom he is now so closely identified, with his young 
student. There are, however, strong reasons to doubt this scenario. The main obstacle is 
that Luce’s intensive work on Berkeley dates from the 1930s onwards, beginning several 
years after Beckett stopped having regular supervision meetings with him. Just before 
Beckett began his studies, in 1922, Luce published a study of Bergson – Bergson’s 
                                                 
35 Smith 332. 
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Doctrine of Intuition.36 This was followed by an eight-year hiatus without a single article 
on Bergson, Berkeley or any other topic. The quiet spell was finally broken in 1931 with 
Luce’s first Berkeley-related publication: “Berkeley’s Description of the Cave of 
Dunmore”, which appeared four years after Beckett earned his BA degree from Trinity. It 
is conceivable that Luce was interested in Berkeley prior to this publication, but there is 
nothing to suggest that he did any important work on the Irish philosopher when Beckett 
was under his tutelage, or that he discussed him with his students.  
Moreover, Beckett himself denied that he was introduced to Berkeley by Luce. In 
response to an inquiry by David Berman about a possible interest in Berkeley through 
A.A. Luce, Beckett sent a short letter on 26 May 1983 to flatly deny such a connection – 
“No, I was not influenced by Dr. Luce’s work on Berkeley”.37 The very brevity of the 
letter is striking. Beckett’s general attitude towards factual questions from academics was 
usually much kinder and expressed a willingness to help which is completely lacking 
from his answer to Berman. To take but one example, a few days before he wrote to 
Berman, on 18 May 1983, he answered a similar question from Roger Little about 
whether he knew Dante through Thomas Rudmose-Browne, who taught Beckett at 
Trinity and had a strong influence on him at the time.38 Beckett responds that he was not 
introduced to Dante through Rudmose-Browne but unlike the letter to Berman, he 
helpfully adds that he studied the poet on his own “with the help of my Italian teacher, 
Bianca Esposito.”39 No such willingness to correct an erroneous perception transpires in 
response to the question about Berkeley. This seems to indicate a certain nervousness 
around the subject, possibly due to a personal dislike of Luce, or at the very least a 
reluctance to discuss his knowledge of Berkeley. As the rest of this chapter makes clear, 
there was much that Beckett could have added to this single sentence.  
                                                 
36 Details about Luce’s publications are taken from David Berman, “A Bibliography of the Published 
Writings of Dr A. A. Luce,” Hermathena 123 (1977): 11-18. 
37 George Craig et al., eds. The Letters of Samuel Beckett: Volume 4, 1966-1989 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016) 613. Henceforth Letters 4. 
38 Knowlson 63-6. 
39 Letters 4 610. 
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From Beckett’s letters we now know that the person who encouraged him to read 
Berkeley’s philosophical work was in fact Joseph Hone, an acquaintance of Beckett and 
the co-author of Bishop Berkeley: His Life, Writings, and Philosophy. Hone (1882-1959) 
was an Irish historian, biographer, and writer and a well-know figure in Dublin 
intellectual circles.40 Hone knew Samuel Beckett’s father and befriended the son as well. 
In a letter to Thomas MacGreevy from 23 April 1933 Beckett reports that he was reading 
“Berkeley’s Commonplace Book, which Hone recommended as a beginning, and which is 
full of profound things, and at the same time of a foul (& false) intellectual canaillerie, 
enough to put you against reading anything more.”41 This recommendation was almost 
certainly given when Beckett dined with the Hones on the last day of 1932.42 The 
conversation around Berkeley should be viewed against a background of renewed interest 
in the Irish philosopher in Dublin of the 1930s which resulted in the publication of a new 
and revised edition of the Commonplace Book in 1930 which Beckett owned,43 A. A. 
Luce’s scholarly work Berkeley and Malebranche in 1934,44 and the more popular work 
on Berkeley by Hone himself and Mario Rossi, Bishop Berkeley: His Life, Writings, and 
Philosophy in 1932.45 The appeal of Berkeley was also apparent in literary circles. W.B. 
Yeats referred to Berkeley as a prominent thinker in the poems “Blood and the Moon” 
and “The Seven Sages”46 and wrote the introduction to Hone & Rossi’s book, while 
James Joyce refers to Berkeley in both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake.47 Beckett’s first 
encounter with Berkeley, therefore, was not in an academic setting but rather as one of 
                                                 
40 Letters 1 699. 
41 Letters 1 154. See also Matthews, esp. 211, 215-217. 
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Macmillan, 1989) 237, 241. 
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the subjects widely discussed in the literary and intellectual circles of 1930s Dublin. In 
this context, Berkeley’s Irishness formed a large part of his appeal, as Matthews writes: 
“That there was a national immediacy to Beckett’s interest in Berkeley is everywhere 
evident in both Beckett’s allusion to him, and in the context out of which that reading 
derives.”48 
Talking about Berkeley: Letters and Interviews 
Beckett’s documented pronouncements about his interest in Berkeley are few and far 
between, mostly in personal correspondence. As shown above, we know that he was first 
encouraged to read Berkeley by Joseph Hone and his impressions were mixed.49 Another 
letter to MacGreevy further strengthens the contention that his initial interest in the Irish 
philosopher was embedded in Dublin intellectual life. In a letter from 9 January 1936 
Beckett criticises an article by Padraic Colum on “Berkeley and the Modern Artist” 
published in The Saturday Review of Literature in June 1935.50 Colum was one of the 
regulars at Jack B. Yeats’ ‘at home’ events, where various artists and intellectuals used to 
gather, including the young Beckett who admired the painter and developed a warm 
friendship with him.51 Beckett writes to MacGreevy that “As I have been reading rhe[sic] 
sacré évèque I was alive to the badness of Colum’s attempt in the last D.M. to relate him 
to the artist. Colum makes him make perception an act of will. Berkeley is at pains, in the 
Principles and Dialogues, to insist on the contrary.”52 The objection to Colum reveals, 
first of all, that by early 1936 Beckett was already familiar at first hand with both The 
Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 
This conclusion is supported by another letter to MacGreevy dated 31 December 1935 
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which states that “I read Philonous”53, referring to one of the main characters of the Three 
Dialogues. As for the substance of Beckett’s objection to Colum, it is probably directed 
at the following assertions: 
Being is in being perceived—this is Berkeley's main principle, and it is a principle 
which every artist actualizes. If things exist only in their being perceived, the 
more we give ourselves up to perception the more things will reveal themselves to 
us. Perception to Berkeley is an act of will. To perceive, to will to perceive with 
more and more energy, should be the human function. The deeper our perception, 
the richer is the reality of the thing perceived —this must be the corollary of the 
principle. This, then, is where Berkeley gives the artist a discipline and a 
support.54  
For Colum, the importance of Berkeley’s idealism for writers is that the richness and 
intensity of the world depends on the perceiving subject. He is certainly correct in 
highlighting that the mind for Berkeley is characterised by its active will. The connection 
he draws between the will of the perceiver and the richness of reality, however, borders 
on solipsism – “The extreme consequence of believing that knowledge must be founded 
on inner, personal states of experience, and then failing to find a bridge whereby they can 
inform us of any thing beyond themselves.”55 As Beckett points out, Berkeley was indeed 
careful to protect himself against such a charge, an issue that seemed to have occupied 
Beckett himself while he was reading, as will be described later in this chapater. 
Beckett’s criticism of Colum can be linked to his own reservations about Berkeley 
expressed to MacGreevy in a letter of 5 March, 1936. In this letter he compares Berkeley 
unfavourably with Geulincx whom he was reading at the time, and allows us to glimpse 
his view of Berkeley’s idealism: 
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I have been reading Geulincx… the work [is] worth doing, because of its 
saturation in the conviction that the sub specie aeternitatis vision is the only 
excuse for remaining alive. He does not put out his eyes on that account, as 
Heraclites did & Rimbaud began to, nor like the terrified Berkeley repudiate them. 
One feels them very patiently turned outward, &… turned in-ward.56 
David Tucker clarifies the contrast sketched here between Geulincx and Berkeley 
(and others): “According to Beckett’s comparisons, Geulincx’s eyes are able patiently 
and with discipline to face the vicissitudes of an outward world without turning away or 
closing, in awareness too that an inner world offers little real refuge.”57 Berkeley is 
criticised for turning away from the external world by denying its existence and 
attempting to lead a separate existence, a solution that Beckett rejects. He seems to have 
retained this understanding of Berkeley albeit in a more sympathetic manner when he 
talked to Lawrence Harvey in 1970 about “being absent and… living existence by proxy”, 
adding that he “made an association between this feeling and the idealist philosophy of 
Berkeley. Perhaps it is an Irish thing, basically a skepticism before nature as given, 
complicated by a skepticism about the perceiving subject as well.”58 This scepticism can 
be compared with Beckett’s earlier statement that Berkeley denies his eyes, a denial that 
can be seen as the end result of the act of sceptical questioning. It is important to note that 
while in the letter to McGreevy Beckett portrays Berkeley as denying only the external 
world, in the conversation with Harvey he extends his scepticism also to the internal 
world of the subject, a mirroring of doubt that will become crucial for Beckett’s writing 
on aesthetics, as will be discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
Further mentions of Berkeley in the letters are few and unenlightening. In the 
correspondence with Alan Schneider about the production of Film Beckett uses the 
Berkeleyan terms percipi and percipere almost as technical terms, although they are 
taken from the philosophical motto that opens the script - Esse est percipi. In these letters, 
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Beckett calls percipi the area of the protagonist’s field of vision, which the camera is 
attempting to avoid, while percipere is the area being watched by people or the camera. 
For example, in the moment when the camera confronts the protagonist from an open 
angle “beyond which he will enter percipi” and induce anxiety in the protagonist, 
whereas the people in the first scene are “all contentedly in percipere and percipi.” 59 
Beckett does not elaborate, however, why those terms have been chosen and how the film 
relates to Berkeley’s philosophy as a whole, leaving room for interpretation which will be 
taken up in chapter 5. In order to learn more about Beckett’s understanding of Berkeley 
find evidence of the works that influenced his interpretation of the Good Bishop. 
Situating Berkeley: The Philosophy Notes 
A crucial source for Beckett’s encounter with Berkeley are the Philosophy Notes, a 
manuscript held in the Trinity College Dublin library. Beckett compiled the notes in the 
early 1930s in an attempt to improve his knowledge of the history of philosophy as 
described in the introduction to the catalogue: 
Beckett responded to an inquiry form Deirdre Bair that ‘because he had not taken 
a philosophy course at Trinity College, which he felt was a serious defect in his 
education, he set out on what he thought was a systematic schedule of readings’... 
Clearly [the philosophy] notes are the result of that ‘systematic schedule of 
readings’ but pinpointing when he made them remains a matter of conjecture.”60 
The editors suggest that Beckett started working on the notes in 1930 or 1931 but the 
main work was undertaken in 1932 when Beckett lived in London.61 The notes 
encompass Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Nietzsche but the treatment of 
different periods in philosophy is uneven. Beckett began with great enthusiasm, 
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collecting materials from multiple sources and typing his notes on the pre-Socratics. 
Later periods are treated less extensively, rely on Wilhelm Windelband’s History of 
Philosophy62 as the main source, and are hand-written. The section of the notes dealing 
with the 18th-century occupies 25 folio pages of 162 x 203 mm (194-219), similar to the 
number of folios devoted to the middle ages or the philosophy of the renaissance. This 
should be contrasted with over 100 folios devoted to Greek philosophy, from the pre-
Socratics to Aristotle.63 Within the notes on Enlightenment philosophy Berkeley is 
mentioned on eight hand-written folios - 194r, 194v, 196r, 196v, 202v, 207r, 207v, and 
208r. 
The catalogue editors claim that Windelband’s History of Philosophy was 
“Beckett’s… sole source of notes after fol 145” but in some cases Beckett supplements 
the information furnished by Windelband with additional details taken from an 
unidentified source, possibly an encyclopaedia. The use of an additional source is easiest 
to discern in the lists of central thinkers and their main works provided for each period, 
where Beckett sometimes adds information like book titles and short explanations that do 
not appear in the original list. A notable example is the entry for Jeremy Bentham which 
is significantly longer in Beckett’s notes compared to Windelband’s text. Beckett’s entry 
mentions an additional title, the Pan opticon with a short description of its content in 
parenthesis and then appends a short explanation of the concept of utilitarianism. 64 In the 
entry for Berkeley, Beckett similarly adds two titles: The Querist and Siris. The mention 
of Siris is significant since it suggests that Beckett was aware of the work and Berkeley’s 
praise of tar water directly, an issue that will be discussed in context in Chapter 2.  
Aside from these small additions, Beckett follows the textbook closely. 
Windelband’s exposition of Enlightenment thought begins with a general introduction to 
the period followed by a list of main thinkers, then moves on to discuss specific problems. 
Windelband structures the history of philosophy around broad themes and questions that 
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were discussed by various thinkers, not as a list of discrete systems developed by 
individuals. Berkeley is presented as a follower of Locke and Descartes who elaborated 
the sceptical elements in their work. His sceptic stance then becomes a stepping stone to 
Hume’s more devastating critique. Beckett’s notes cover most of the text touching on 
Berkeley, skipping a few explanations, and sometimes rephrasing or summarising 
Windelband’s elaborate prose.  
The section on the Enlightenment in Windelband is divided into two chapters: 
Theoretical Questions and Practical Questions. Berkeley is discussed under two sub-
divisions of the first chapter that deal with Innate Ideas and Knowledge of the External 
World. The first question is concerened with whether we are born with some ideas before 
we have any experience of the world. Locke, Berkeley’s direct predecessor, denied that 
we have any knowledge of the world that is not acquired by experience. He does allow, 
however, that we create new objects of knowledge through reflection, called abstract 
ideas, that are purely intellectual and have no relation to sensual impressions (450-2). In 
contradistinction, “Berkeley not only declared the doctrine of the Reality of abstract 
conceptions to be the most extraordinary of all errors in metaphysics, but also — like the 
extreme Nominalists of the Middle Ages — denied the existence of abstract ideas within 
the mind itself.” (452) Knowledge for Berkeley, therefore, is always grounded in direct 
sensual experience.  
The discussion of the second question — how the mind acquires knowledge about 
the material world which is fundamentally different to it — contains a more sustained 
description of Berkeley’s philosophy of idealism, from page 469 to 472. Berkeley’s main 
contribution to the vexed relation between body and mind is essentially negative – “He 
demolished the conception of corporeal substance.” (469. Emphasis in the original.) 
Windelband explains how this position relies on a critique of abstract ideas, developing 
Locke’s empiricism while at the same time turning against him by denying the existence 
of substance that carries the qualities we perceive. Windelband then goes on to review 
some of the questions raised by this doctrine. First, the difficulty of differentiating 
between impressions received from external reality and those we attain through memory 
and imagination. This problem is solved by stating that all ‘real’ ideas exist in the mind 
of God, while ideas born from imagination and memory are only in the mind of man. 
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Beckett’s criticism of Colum is thus in agreement with Windelband’s account since the 
perception of the individual artist does not change the world. The second objection is that 
placing all knowledge within the mind may lead to solipsism, which is quickly disposed 
of by stating that “the solipsist refutes himself by beginning to prove his doctrine to 
others.” (471) The very fact of writing a philosophical treatise proves that berkeley had 
faith in the existence of other people who will become his readers. 
The final paragraph of this discussion passes a negative judgment on Berkeley’s 
philosophy in terms that might have appealed to Beckett’s love of intellectual paradox: 
Thus, following in the train of the Meditations, in which Descartes recognised 
self-consciousness as the rescuing rock in the sea of doubt, the result was finally 
reached which Kant later characterised as a scandal to philosophy; namely, that a 
proof was demanded for the reality of the outer world, and none adequate could 
be found. The French materialists declared that Berkeley's doctrine was an insane 
delusion, but was irrefutable. (472) 
According to Windelband, Berkeley’s philosophy thus leads to complete disbelief in 
the external world. As Beckett writes to MacGreevy – he denies his eyes.65 
Matthews pointed out that Beckett’s summary of Windelband’s discussion of 
Berkeley sometimes diverges from Windelband’s phrasing, suggesting an earlier 
familiarity with Berkeley’s philosophy. A case in point is Windelband’s formulation of 
Berkeley’s key idea - “bodies are just exactly what is perceived, no more and no less.” 
(470) which Beckett renders as “the esse of body is its percipi”.66 Matthews traces this 
phrasing to two possible sources: Hone & Rossi’s book about Berkeley, or the Principles 
of Human Knowledge where Berkeley writes about unthinking things that “their esse is 
percipi”.67 The Latin form of this sentence – esse est percipi has subsequently been used 
as a shorthand for Berkeley’s philosophical position and Beckett adopts this phrasing in 
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the script for Film. Beckett’s variation on the phrase can thus be equally attributed to 
Berkeley’s writing as to a secondary source. 
It should also be noted that the terms percipi and percipere need not be exclusively 
associated with Berkeley. The Dream Notebook, a collection of material Beckett prepared 
before writing Dream of Fair to Middling Women, contains the following quote taken 
from Jules de Gaultier’s discussion of Schopenhauer in From Kant to Nietzsche (1900): 
“Curiosity focused on relation between the object & its representation, between the 
stimulus & molecular disturbance, between percipi and percipere.”68 This sentence is 
repeated almost verbatim in Belacqua’s musings in the novel itself – “the desire to bind 
for ever in imperishable relation the object to its representation, the stimulus to the 
molecular agitation that it sets up, percipi to percipere”.69 Nevertheless, it would seem 
more likely to assume that Beckett was familiar with this terminology through reading 
Berkeley’s work before or at the same time he was compiling the Philosophy Notes. 
Based on the letters, we know that Beckett was reading the Principles of Human 
Knowledge prior to September 1935. The date for the section on Berkeley in the 
Philosophy Notes is unknown but according to Frost et al. Beckett kept on working on 
them until 1936, 70 which would make direct contact with Berkeley’s text the most likely 
source for Beckett’s formulation. 
                                                 
68 The phrase is quoted and discussed in Erik Tonning, “‘I am not reading philosophy’: Beckett and 
Schopenhauer,” Beckett/ Philosophy, eds. Matthew Feldman and Karim Mamdani (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2015) 
93. 
69 Dream 134. 
70 Notes Divers Holo 21. 
 29 
Reading Berkeley 
The marks and notes Beckett made when reading the books in his possession are an 
invaluable resource for understanding the extent of Beckett’s first hand knowledge of 
Berkeley and dating his readings. A wealth of information is currently available through 
the Beckett Digital Library, an online resource which creates “a digital reconstruction of 
Samuel Beckett's personal library, based on the volumes preserved at his apartment in 
Paris, in archives (Beckett International Foundation) and private collections”. 71 The 
assertion made by Dirk van Hulle and Mark Nixon in the book that accompanies the 
project: “The lack of access to the library has so far been a missing link in terms of 
understanding Beckett’s intellectual heritage as well as his cultural milieu”72 is definitely 
true for Beckett’s interest in Berkeley. The publication of the library makes it possible to 
appreciate the extent of Beckett’s reading of Berkeley, as well as highlight some of the 
issues that occupied him while he was reading the Good Bishop.  
At the time of his death, Beckett had two books by Berkeley in his library — 
Berkeley’s Commonplace Book published in 1930 and A New Theory of Vision and other 
Selected Philosophical Writings published in 1926. The fact that Beckett kept the books 
is significant, since in his old age he gave away many of his books to friends, and 
therefore he probably had a special connections with the ones that he chose to keep.73 
Berkeley’s Commonplace Book is a stand-alone edition of the notes Berkeley took as he 
was preparing to write his most important philosophical works: New Theory of Vision 
(1709) and The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). They were first discovered in 
Trinity College Dublin by A.C. Fraser who edited and published them in 1871.74 The 
edition owned by Beckett, edited by G. A. Johnston, is revised to reflect the original 
chronological order of Berkeley’s notes and correct mistakes in Fraser’s edition. The 
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second volume Beckett kept is a collection of Berkeley’s major works, including A New 
Theory of Vision, The Principles of Human Knowledge, and Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous. Taken together, these two volumes contain all of Berkeley’s 
important works from the early and most influential period. Marginal annotations by 
Beckett alongside the texts testify to a sustained reading of the majority of these texts. 
The marginal annotations include markings next to multiple passages in these 
volumes, and a few comments. While these notes cannot be considered to exhaust all of 
Beckett’s knowledge of Berkeley, or even indicate all the passages that are pertinent to 
his writing, they provide positive evidence about what Beckett read that is highly 
valuable. The Commonplace Book is a case in point, since it contains a small numbers of 
marks which only appear in the first few pages of the book — up to page 10. The absence 
of marks in the rest of the volume should be correlated with Beckett’s writing to 
MacGreevy that the “intellectual canaillerie” of the text made him unwilling to read 
anything more.75 The reading marks thus raise the possibility that Beckett did not pursue 
his reading of The Commonplace Book until the end of the volume at the time that the 
marks were made, presumably 1933. Other possibilities are that he found nothing to 
comment about or maybe paid less attention to his reading from a certain point onwards. 
This means that if we want to rely on passages that appear later in The Commonplace 
Book it will be necessary to provide additional evidence, such as direct quotes, to support 
the interpretation. In any case, the marks allow us to assert that Beckett was indeed 
familiar with the text and found at least some of the propositions interesting enough to 
note for possible future use. 
The marks and notes in A New Theory of Vision and Other Selected Philosophical 
Writings present a similar situation of partial annotation. There are no marks of any kind 
in the introduction and the first work collected in this volume, i.e. A New Theory of 
Vision. As will be explained in the chapters concerning vision, it is plausible that 
Beckett’s knowledge of Berkeley’s optical theories is derived from secondary materials 
and Berkeley’s own recounting of them in other works. The first mark in the book 
appears on page 128 alongside clause 32 in the Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
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Human Knowledge. In this case it seems safe to assume that Beckett started at the 
beginning and therefore also read the first 40 pages of the book which are unmarked. The 
marks continue almost to the end of the text, indicating that Beckett read the work in its 
entirety. The pattern in the next, and last, text collected in the volume is similar. Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous begins on page 197 but Beckett’s first mark 
appears on page 245, in the middle of the second dialogue. The marks continue almost 
until the end of the text, the last one appearing on page 282, leaving about 20 pages until 
the end of the dialogue unmarked. The distribution of marks reinforces the evidence from 
the letters and enables us to confidently assert that Beckett was familiar at first hand with 
the two most important expositions of Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy.  
The letters allows us to pinpoint a date of reading for two out of the three works that 
Beckett left reading marks in: The Commonplace Book in 1933 and Three Dialogues in 
1935. Since Beckett did not mention in a letter that he was reading the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, its dating is less certain. Having said that, the material traces he left 
on the margins of the books provide tantalising clues that can lead to a tentative dating. 
The marks in the book margins were made with pencils of different colours, one grey and 
one green. In addition to the colour, the ‘style’ of the marks is different. The grey pencil 
is used to create straight, continuous lines, while the green marks are undulating and 
often a series of short lines spans a whole paragraph rather than a single long line. The 
green pencil was also used to make the two marginal notes in the book, on pages 146 and 
189. The same green pencil was used in The Commonplace Book, suggesting that they 
were made around the same time, thus dating the reading of the Principles to 1933.76 The 
grey marks, on the other hand, are similar to those used in Three Dialogues, which 
Beckett was reading in 1935. Although impossible to prove conclusively, the 
combination of marks does suggest that Beckett read the Principles of Human Knowledge 
on two different occasions in two years – if true, this is a strong indication of the 
importance of Berkeley’s philosophy for the young writer. The other possibility is that 
Beckett read the Principles only once, maybe making some of the notes later, or else 
changing pencils half-way through a single reading. Even if the pencil marks are not 
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correlated with those made in the two other works, Beckett’s reading of he Principles of 
Human Knowledge must have taken place between 1933 and 1935. Even the absence of a 
precise date, the overall picture is of a sustained engagement in the first half of the 1930s.  
The marks Beckett made in the three works touch upon various subjects. In The 
Commonplace Book Beckett marked four propositions, all of them concerned with 
different aspects of perception. The first expresses the conviction that we cannot separate 
the thought of existence from the thought of being perceived even when dealing with 
mathematical abstractions: “M 36. When we imagine 2 bowls v.g. moving in vacuo, ‘tis 
onely conceiving a person affected with those sensations.” (4) That is, although we talk 
about objects moving in empty space, we see them in our mind’s eye and thus necessarily 
assume perception. The second is one of a series of propositions that prove the 
heterogeneity of sight and touch. Beckett marks the second one “49 2nd. One made to see 
that had not yet seen his own limbs or anything he touch’d, upon sight of a foot length 
would know it to be a foot length if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea, sed 
falsum id ergo et hoc.” (6) This proof is very similar to the Molyneux problem, which 
appears in the very next line and will become important for Beckett, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 6 that deals with vision and blindness.  
The next mark is concerned with self-perception, a crucial issue for Beckett: “84: 
Men die or in a state of annihilation oft in a day.” (9) In the margin Beckett added a note: 
“esse est percipere”. Taken together, the note and the marked proposition present the 
problem Berkeley is contending with here – if the existence of the mind is felt as a 
succession of impressions and thoughts and the being of the subject is the act of 
percipere, what happens when it stops perceiving, for example in sleep? Berkeley’s 
proposition can be understood either as a consequence that he is willing to accept, or a 
reduction ad absurdum of a false conclusion. Whatever the case, its appeal to the creative 
imagination is undeniable. More than that, Proust, Beckett’s early study of the French 
modernist published in 1930, contains a sentence that is very close in its formulation: 
“The subject has died—and perhaps many times—on the way.”77 This sentence refers to 
the role of memory in shaping the self, with every day changing the subject so that what 
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we hoped for yesterday cannot satisfy us today. Despite the different contexts, the 
striking similarity between Berkeley’s proposition and what Beckett himself wrote only 
three years before reading the Commonplace Book may have been responsible for 
Beckett’s special attention. The last mark in this volume relates to God’s perception: “94: 
qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 
years rather than a 1000 years a day?” (10) Like the previous marked proposition this 
question takes a line of thought to its extreme, opening new possibilities for thinking 
about time.  
The marks made in the Principles of Human Knowledge are too numerous to be 
discussed individually here and will be quoted as relevant to the context throughout the 
thesis. Most of these marks can be grouped under several main topics: causality, 
affirmation of external reality, the limitations of the human mind, and the nature of spirits. 
The importance of causality is evidently tied with Beckett’s interest in Geulincx, 
probably through Windelband’s account of the Belgian philosopher as the apex of 
occasionalism.78 Beckett marks effectively the whole of Berkeley’s argument against the 
occasionalists, from proposition LXVI next to which he wrote in the margin “against 
Geulincx?” through to proposition LXXII.  
Beckett also marks many of Berkeley’s repeated clarifications that his denial of 
matter does not amount to a solipsistic denial of external reality and that his system 
concurs with the naïve view that the world exists independently of our mind. For example, 
proposition XXXV clarifies that “I do not argue against the existence of any one thing 
that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes 
and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.”79 The 
source of the confusion, Berkeley claims, are distinctions made by philosophers who 
complicate things unnecessarily, and Beckett duly marks proposition LI which contains 
the famous statement: “in such things we ought to think with the learned, and speak with 
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the vulgar.”80 These marks are a crucial proof that Beckett knew that Berkeley was aware 
of the dangers of solipsism and explicitly refuted it, especially important since Matthews 
assumes that Beckett followed Hone & Rossi in regarding his philosophy as advocating 
the solipsistic position.81 
Beckett is also interested in passages that deal with what he called in his conversation 
with Harvey “skepticism about the perceiving subject”82, such as proposition LXXXVI: 
This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shown to be a most groundless and absurd 
notion, is the very root of scepticism ; for so long as men thought that real things 
subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as 
it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could not be certain that they 
had any real knowledge at all.83  
Although Berkeley affirms that his system overcomes such doubts and allows us to 
have complete confidence in our perceptions and knowledge of the world, his expression 
of the state of ignorance are convincing enough to be attractive to Beckett’s own sceptical 
outlook. In this context it is also interesting to note the last mark Beckett made in the 
book next to proposition CLII which justifies the shortcomings of the created world: “We 
should further consider, (1) that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without 
their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the 
rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more 
enlightened parts.”84  
Some of the most important marks in the Principles of Human Knowledge are made 
towards the end of the book, where Berkeley discusses the nature of spirits. As already 
mentioned, they serve to demonstrate that Beckett was aware of Berkeley’s distinction 
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between passive ideas and active spirits as two separate and incommensurable types of 
entities: 
CXXXVII: That an idea, which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in 
being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsiding by itself, 
seems to need no other refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by those 
words. 
CXXXVIII: For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and 
perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If, 
therefore, it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented 
in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.85 
The fact that Beckett treats people as perceivable ideas in some of the most 
‘Berkeleyan’ moments of his work would thus be the result of a wilful subversion of the 
philosophical principle rather than ignorance or lack of attention.  
The marks made in the next work in the volume, Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous, show a consistent purpose in clarifying the relation between perception and 
existence. For example, Beckett marks the passage where Philonous insists that perceived 
things do not exist outside the mind in another argument that targets the occasionalist 
position: “For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be 
perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their 
being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not.”86 Philonous and the 
occasionalists agree that all things are perceived by God. The difference between them is 
that for Philonous this perception is a good enough guarantee of existence, while the 
occasionalists allow to material objects an independent existence that does not rely on 
God’s perceptions.  
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One of the longest marked passages again confirms that we can absolutely rely on 
our senses, and explains optical illusion in an original manner. Hylas brings up the 
illusion that an oar appears crooked when it is in the water as a proof that our perceptions 
are sometimes misleading. To which Philonous answers: 
Thus in the case of the oar, what [a man] immediately perceives by sight is 
certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that 
upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness, or 
that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do, in that he is 
mistaken.87 
In other words, what makes the appearance illusory is not a mismatch between what 
we perceive and the real nature of the oar, but our expectation that our visual impression 
at one point in time will agree with the visual perception of the same object at another 
time, as well as with the sense of touch. According to Philonous here, the oar is both 
crooked and straight, depending on the circumstances and the sense that we employ to 
perceive it. This explanation is certainly counter-intuitive and works against Berkeley’s 
claim to “speak with the vulgar”, yet its crooked logic does not escape Beckett’s attention. 
Taken together, the  passages marked by Beckett in all three of Berkeley’s 
works can be said to encompass the central tenets of Berkeley’s philosophy. It is also 
evident that Beckett paid special attention to the refutation of the occasionalist position, 
which he identified particularly with Geulincx. Beckett’s personal predilections towards 
ignorance, scepticism and paradox seem to have found ample material in the writings of 
the Good Bishop. 
Reading about Berkeley 
The final source of knowledge about Berkeley that requires consideration here are the 
various interpretations of his philosophy that Beckett may have been familiar with, in 
addition to Windelband’s History of Philosophy which was discussed above. Matthews 
assumes that Beckett had read Hone & Rossi’s book on Berkeley, together with the 
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introduction by Yeats, but there is in fact no evidence that Beckett ever read the book. He 
was certainly aware of the publication, because he calls Rossi “the Berkeley better half” 
in a letter to MacGreevy from 5 January 1933.88 As already mentioned, Beckett was 
acquainted with Hone and had discussed Berkeley with him. He may have also talked 
about the philosopher with his so-called better half - Mario Rossi. Yet this friendship was 
not close enough to assume that Beckett would feel an obligation to read the book they 
wrote together. Similarly, it would seem unwarranted to assume, as Matthews does, that 
Beckett was interested in, or sympathised with, W.B. Yeats’ introduction to the work 
which co-opts Berkeley into the celebrated poet’s own poetics, of which Beckett was 
highly critical at the time. In the 1934 article “Recent Irish Poetry” he disparaged Yeats’ 
attitude as antiquarianism, writing that he was: “delivering with the altitudinous 
complacency of the Victorian Gael the Ossianic goods.”89 Beckett’s understanding of 
Berkeley, therefore, may have been influenced only by Hone’s general understanding 
conveyed through conversation rather than through the details of the published work. It is 
therefore meaningful to sketch in broad outline what Hone and Rossi considered to be 
Berkeley’s main achievement, as well as his weaknesses.  
Hone & Rossi’s assessment of Berkeley’s thought revolves around what they call the 
“New Principle” – a phrase they adopt from the Commonplace Book to describe 
Berkeley’s new insight into the nature of cognition: 
Fundamentally, the New Principle is the negation of all substance, i.e. of all 
underlying ground to our sensations or ideas, as Berkeley called them, which 
cannot in itself and for itself be immediately known. Esse est percipi, to be is to 
be perceived — such is the celebrated axiomatical expression: but it can easily 
lead to confusion. Berkeley meant that we have no means of going further than 
our mental contents: our knowledge extends only to what we are aware of, and 
therefore what we call ‘being’ is only what we can know and experience 
directly.”(36-7) 
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This presentation limits Berkeley’s idealism to epistemology alone – it is our 
knowledge that can go no further than appearances, and it does not entail a view about 
the nature of the world which in this interpretation becomes unknowable. In the authors’ 
opinion, Berkeley’s denial of matter in the ontological sense is a “not entirely justified 
expression” (37) that can even be described as “provocative” (60). The most serious 
objection they raise against Berkeley is that his philosophy leads to solipsism: 
Idealism starts with the affirmation of spirit as sole reality and then strives to 
reduce to this first truth… all forms of being… It could also go further and apply 
the same criticism to the mind, ending with the denial of the spirit: the way Hume 
went. 
On the road of the New Principle it is then impossible to avoid the peril of 
solipsism, i.e. of affirming that our mind, and our mind only, is real. (61-2) 
It has already been indicated above that Beckett was attentive in his reading to 
Berkeley’s clarifications that his system did not lead to solipsism. Consequently, 
although Hone had induced Beckett to read Berkeley, they may have interpreted him in 
different ways. 
Another possible source of influence on Beckett that should be considered are the 
introductions to the two books by Berkeley in Beckett’s library – the Commonplace Book 
and the collection of Berkeley’s main works. As noted earlier, neither of them show any 
sign of reading, which leaves open the question of whether Beckett actually read them or 
not. Even so, the availability of these introductions to Beckett calls for a brief review of 
their contents. The introduction to the Commonplace Book by G. A. Johnston reviews the 
history and editing of the text and offers little by way of interpretation. 90 On the other 
hand, A. D. Lindsay’s introduction to the volume Theory of Vision and Other Writings by 
Bishop Berkeley offers a critical overview of Berkeley’s early work, situating him, like 
Windelband, as a link between Locke and Hume.91 According to Lindsay, Berkeley 
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attempts to correct Locke’s theory of ideas by accepting that our knowledge derives only 
from sense impressions, but  then denying that these include general abstract ideas that 
cannot be directly perceived. Lindsay makes several objections to Berkeley’s 
immaterialism, leading to the concluding observation that Berkeley introduces the 
concept of notions in order to account for the knowledge of our own mind, other spirits, 
and of course God. Notions then become an additional type of knowledge, contrary to the 
original assertion that all we know derives from ideas based on experience.92 Berkeley’s 
attempt to account for knowledge of the self and other minds is thus singled out as a 
weak point in his system, an issue that is important for Beckett’s engagement with 
Berkeley which constantly returns to the question of self-perception. 
An additional and so far overlooked source for Beckett’s understanding of Berkeley 
is the writings of the other philosophers Beckett read. Thanks to the Beckett Digital 
Manuscripts Project it is possible to see that Beckett was not reading each philosopher in 
isolation, but was attuned to the relations between different thinkers. As van Hulle and 
Nixon explain, Beckett “tried to understand… philosophies by contrasting or comparing 
them with other philosophies”.93 Beckett marked passages referring to Berkeley and the 
nature of idealism in three different authors — Fritz Mauthner, Ernst Cassirer writing on 
Kant, and Arthur Schopenhauer. In Mauthner’s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache 
Beckett marked two passages, both reflecting unfavourably on Berkeley. The first 
passage criticises Kant for placing the real world, the thing in itself, outside the reach of 
human reason. Mauthner claims that Berkeley, Fichte and Max Stirner94 — all of whom 
he understands to have denied the existence of external reality — are refuting their own 
theories every time they eat food to assuage their hunger, because they are effectively 
putting something of the external world into their own body.95 The image of Molloy 
violently throwing away the tea and toast offered to him by a social worker may be seen 
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as a reaction to this philosophical attitude.96 The second marked passage is much shorter 
and mentions Berkeley as preparing the way for Hume’s critique of causality, criticising 
Berkeley’s philosophy as “idealism ad absurdum”.97 
The marks in the two other books also situate Berkeley as a precursor of Kant who 
proposed an idealist system that Kant adopted and expanded. In Cassirer’s 1921 book, 
“Kants Leben und Lehre” [Kant’s Life and Teaching], Beckett marks Berkeley’s name in 
a list of philosophers that Kant studied with care.98 Schopenhauer also mentions Berkeley 
as a precursor of Kant in a passage that compares him unfavourably to the German 
philosopher who is the main subject of this passage which praises his achievements.99 
However, given that Beckett marked a large section of this paragraph, it is probable that 
his main interest was the connection between Kant and Schopenhauer, not necessarily 
Berkeley.  
The list of philosophical assessments of Berkeley would remain incomplete without 
the famous anecdote related by Boswell in Life of Johnson which must have been familiar 
to Beckett who studied Johnson passionately and planned to write a play about him.100 
The passage merits to be quoted in full: 
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of 
Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and 
that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are 
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget 
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the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force 
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, — ‘I refute it thus.’101  
The merit of Johnson’s refutation is doubtful but reading it from a Beckettian 
perspective we become more aware of the pain which striking the stone “with mighty 
force” may have caused him, making physical suffering a measure against which to judge 
a philosophical theory. The testing of philosophy through pain was very likely to appeal 
to Beckett’s sensibilities.  
 
To conclude, the accumulation of Beckett’s own pronouncements, traces of his 
reading, and the notes he kept, show beyond doubt that he read Berkeley rather 
extensively and was aware of various evaluations and criticisms of his work. We have 
therefore a good empirical basis for a study of the manner in which this knowledge found 
its way into Beckett’s writing from the mid-1930s onwards. The main strands arising out 
of the various traces of Beckett’s reading and knowledge include the denial of matter 
which leads to the suspicion of solipsism. Instead of external reality, Berkeley suggests 
that existence is in fact perception, either perceiving or being perceived, an issue that also 
concerns vision and other types of sensual perception, and the images they give rise to. 
The importance of the mind to the existence of the world then raises the question of self-
perception, rejected by Berkeley as contradictory, but an ongoing pursuit for Beckett. The 
following chapters will elaborate on these themes in Beckett’s writing for various genres 
and media, spanning the long period from the 1936 novel Murphy to the late fragments 
collected in Fizzles. 
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2: The Idealist Tar 
Berkeley scholar David Berman wrote in some disappointment that “Beckett's dismissal 
of Berkeley's immaterialism is like Dr Johnson's - any kick will show that matter is a 
plain fact”.102 The comment refers to the reservations regarding Berkeley’s idealism 
expressed in Chapter Six of Beckett’s early novel Murphy. The chapter describes the 
mind of the eponymous character Murphy as closed to the outside world, and yet “This 
did not involve Murphy in the idealist tar. There was the mental fact and there was the 
physical fact, equally real if not equally pleasant.”103 Edouard Morot-Sir reads this same 
passage as Beckett’s vow of allegiance to Descartes: “Murphy is not an idealist-
Berkeleyan type of character. He is an orthodox Cartesian, a true dualist, obsessed with 
the problem of communication between the two substances of body and mind”.104  
The prominence of Descartes in discussion of Beckett’s philosophy has been later 
criticised as being too narrow and exclusive. Already in 1982 Michael E. Mooney 
lamented that “if the ‘Cartesian’ approach provided an illuminating perspective, it had the 
regrettable effect of pre-empting other avenues of inquiry.”105 More recent research 
turned to archival materials to challenge this view and call for more nuanced 
philosophical readings. Mathew Feldman’s 2006 study of Beckett’s philosophy and 
psychology notes, Beckett’s Books, is at pains to show that “The ‘Philosophy Notes’ 
mandate a serious reappraisal of formulations on a ‘Cartesian Beckett’, and 
simultaneously point to a panorama of philosophical influences based not on a single 
system or ‘ism’, but on the system of Western philosophy itself.”106 Feldman reconstructs 
the history of Beckett’s engagement with Descartes based on archival research and 
advances the hypothesis that “Beckett’s knowledge of Cartesian philosophy was 
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superficial and anecdotal.”107 Beckett’s familiarity with Descartes was based on a few 
secondary sources and an edited selection of his writings, pointing to a limited interest in 
comparison with Beckett’s more extensive reading of complete works by other 
philosophers such as Schopenhauer (or indeed Berkeley).108 This is not to say that 
Descartes had no relevance to Beckett’s writing of course, but rather that he was only one 
of a range of philosophers Beckett chose to engage with, alongside other thinkers who 
may be more important sources for his various texts. 
This chapter revisits Murphy to take a closer look at Berkeley’s presence in the novel 
in light of the archive evidence discussed in the previous chapter, a re-examination 
motivated by the realization that the novel was written at the same time that Beckett was 
reading Berkeley’s works. It will argue that Berkeley’s philosophy plays a role in the 
novel that goes beyond an educated reference and that Beckett’s objections to idealism 
are neither casual nor simplistic as Berman implies. Looking at references to Berkeley 
throughout the novel, and contextualising them within an overall interpretation of the 
work will allow us to appreciate Beckett’s position with regards to the philosopher at this 
early stage in his writing life. 
Immaterialise or Bust: Berkeley and Murphy 
Murphy, Beckett’s first published novel, is the first work mentioned in the entry about 
Bishop Berkeley in The Grove Companion.109 The companion identifies three moments 
in the novel that relate to the Irish Bishop: Berkeley’s name coming up in a conversation 
between Neary and Wiley as an example of escapist tendencies, the reference to tar water 
already quoted, and the use of the terms percipi and percipere in the aftermath of 
Murphy’s chess game with Mr. Endon towards the end of the novel. Based on the 
evidence from Beckett’s letters expounded in the previous chapter, the relevant 
chronology pertaining to Beckett’s engagement with Berkeley and his work on the novel 
Murphy would be: 
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31 December 1932: Beckett dines with Hone and they talk about Berkeley110  
23 April 1933: Beckett is reading The Commonplace Book111 
22 September 1935: Beckett wrote 9,000 words of what will become the novel 
Murphy112 
31 December 1935: Beckett is reading Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous113 
9 January 1936: Beckett already read Principles of Human Knowledge and Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous114 
9 June 1936: Beckett completes the first draft of Murphy115 
As we shall see, Beckett’s reading is reflected in the novel and is essential to 
understanding Murphy’s difficulties and his ultimate fate.  
Murphy can be described as a novel of ideas taking its starting point from the 
distinction made by the eponymous protagonist between the big world of external reality 
and the little world inside his mind, “where he could love himself”.116 In what is probably 
the most famous passage of the novel Murphy ties himself in his chair in order to enter 
the world of his own mind. This scene sets up the main dichotomies for the novel and 
thus justifies a lengthy quotation: 
He sat naked in his rocking-chair of undressed wood… Seven scarves held him in 
position… Only the most local movements were possible… Somewhere a 
cuckoo-clock, having struck between twenty and thirty, became the echo of a 
street-cry, which now entering the mew gave Quid pro quo! Quid pro quo! 
directly. 
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These were sights and sounds that he did not like. They detained him in the world 
to which they belonged, but not he, as he fondly hoped… 
He sat in his chair because it gave him pleasure! First it gave his body pleasure, it 
appeased his body. Then it set him free in his mind. For it was not until his body 
was appeased that he could come alive in his mind, as described in section six. 
And life in his mind gave him pleasure, such pleasure that pleasure was not the 
word. (3-4) 
The passage draws a distinction between the external world of the street with its 
noise and mercantile quid pro quo and the world of Murphy’s mind which is private, 
immobile and quiet. The first is painful for Murphy, the second extremely pleasurable. 
The passage also opposes the body which must be tied down in order for the mind to be 
set free, implying that they cannot be both free at the same time.  
Murphy’s attempt to immerse himself in the inner world is disturbed by his lover 
Celia who demands that he find a job to support them. Murphy is reluctant to work 
because he feels the change will disturb his current existence, as he explains: “What do I 
have now?... You, my body and my mind… In the mercantile gehenna… one of these 
will go, or two, or all.”(27) When Murphy eventually finds a job he first loses Celia 
because he moves to the Magdalen Mental Mercyseat to work as a nurse for mental 
patients. From Murphy’s point of view, the mental patients who lost touch with reality 
are actually fortunate to be able to live in their own mind: “The issue therefore, as 
lovingly simplified and perverted by Murphy, lay between nothing less fundamental than 
the big world and the little world, decided by the patients in favour of the latter” (107). 
Murphy’s joy at being close to those who live in the little world does not last long alas. 
On his first night shift he plays a game of chess with one of the patients, Mr. Endon, and 
this brings about a form of breakdown which causes him to lose his mind for a while, as 
will be described later in more detail. Leaving the ward and his duties as a nurse, Murphy 
hurries to his room where he is killed by a gas explosion, losing his body as well. 
Other characters in the novel are also struggling with the difficulties of adjusting to 
an external world that does not treat them well. Neary, who was Murphy’s teacher, seeks 
reunion with a beloved who will be the sole figure obliterating the ground in his gestalt 
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world-view. His friend Wiley sees the world as a state of equilibrium where “For every 
symptom that is eased, another is made worse.” (38) Celia, Murphy’s lover, adopts his 
method of tying oneself in a chair, and loses herself in memories until she feels herself 
rid of history (90). The main concern in the novel thus seems to be ethical – how to 
comport oneself in a hostile world, rather than metaphysical – how does the soul relate to 
the body. The various philosophical and psychological systems adopted by the different 
characters are attempts to overcome human misery, not theoretical arguments about 
agency. In the following discussion, I will examine Berkeley’s presence in the novel 
through a study of the references to his philosophy in key moments in the text. The 
discussion will suggest that eventually the dependence of existence on perception stands 
between Murphy and the pleasures of the hermetic mind, constituting an important and 
little acknowledged influence of Berkeley in the novel. 
Neary: Figure and Ground 
The first reference to Berkeley occurs in Chapter Four when Neary, having been 
rejected by Miss Counihan, asks his friend and disciple Wylie for advice. In reply, Wylie 
expounds his theory that in human life there is equilibrium of ills and one cannot 
suppress one without giving rise to another. He illustrates this theory with the example of 
“the young Fellow of Trinity College… [who] sought relief in insulin… and cured 
himself of diabetes” (38). According to Ackerley, “insulin coma-therapy was then used at 
the Bethlem Royal Hospital as a means of controlling schizophrenia, controlled doses 
producing effects similar to electro-convulsive therapy (ECT). The relief implied is death 
by means of insulin injection.”117 It is unclear why Beckett associates Berkeley with 
insulin treatment which was not available in the 18th century. The phrase ‘young fellow 
of Dublin’ could refer to many historical figures and the specific allusion is only provided 
by Neary who identifies him as George Berkeley and answers that “I don’t wonder at 
Berkeley… He had no alternative. A defence mechanism. Immaterialise or bust. The 
sleep of sheer terror.” (38) The only relation between Berkeley and insulin seems to be 
the extremism of the treatment. Insulin injections that cause death on the one hand, and a 
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philosophical theory which denies the material world on the other. Berkeley’s denial of 
matter is understood by Wiley and Neary as a solution for unbearable situations 
comparable to not being loved by Miss Counihan. In fear of the “sweated sinecure” 
(38),118 Berkeley chooses to deny reality. In the words of Beckett’s letter to McGreevy 
from 5 March, 1936, written a short time before the completion of the novel: “the 
terrified Berkeley repudiates [his eyes]”.119 Neary, therefore, sympathises with what he 
considers to be Berkeley’s difficulty but rejects the idealist solution of denying reality 
which is compared to death by insulin overdose. Presumably, the resort to a strong and 
possibly dangerous treatment like insulin injection is called for by the terror that grips 
Berkeley in the face of existence.  
Neary cannot accept the idealist solution because of his need for external reality, 
specifically the reality of young and beautiful women, which supersedes all other 
considerations. Earlier in the novel, Neary discusses with Murphy a similar situation of 
longing for a young woman, except at that time the young woman was Miss Dwyer. In 
this earlier conversation Neary declared that “all is dross, for the moment at any rate, that 
is not Miss Dwyer. The one closed figure in the waste without form, and void!” (5) By 
Chapter Four Neary’s desire has been transferred to Miss Counihan, who like Miss 
Dwyer before her, occupies for him the whole universe: “There is no non-Miss 
Counihan… There is only one symptom… Miss Counihan.” (38) To Neary, whose only 
interest is consummating love in the material world, an idealist mind-dependent existence 
has nothing to offer. Thus, Neary makes the first gesture of rejecting Berkeley’s idealism 
in the novel, a gesture that will be emulated by his student Murphy.  
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Murphy’s Mind: Hermetically Closed 
The next reference to Berkeley appears in the famous Chapter Six which aims to provide 
a “justification of the expression ‘Murphy’s mind’” (67) by describing how it conceived 
of itself: 
Murphy’s mind pictured itself as a large hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the 
universe without. This was not an impoverishment, for it excluded nothing that it 
did not itself contain. Nothing ever had been, was or would be in the universe 
outside it but was already present as virtual, or actual, or virtual rising into actual, 
or actual falling into virtual, in the universe inside it. (67) 
This brief passage posits a closed mind without access to the outside world, thus 
raising the spectre of solipsism, a subject that occupied Beckett while he was reading 
Berkeley as was already discussed. This implication is explicitly denied in the next 
paragraph – “This did not involve Murphy in the idealist tar. There was the mental fact 
and there was the physical fact, equally real if not equally pleasant.” (67)  
The description of Murphy’s mind does not include the term solipsism but it strongly 
suggests it. Surprisingly, the term appears earlier in the novel, when the narrator 
describes Murphy as a “seedy solipsist”. The context in which this description appears is 
a reflection on Murphy’s plan to get more tea than he paid for. This petty fraud pits “a 
colossal league of plutomanic caterers” against “a seedy solipsist and fourpence.” (52) 
The term solipsist in this case seems to denote egotistic behaviour, as well as poke fun at 
the pettiness of Murphy’s fraudulent scheme. As Ackerley notes, this is a reference to 
Schopenhauer for whom solipsism is an ethical stance, which he describes before 
rejecting it. If one believes that other people do not exist then there is no need to take into 
account the needs of anyone else and there is no barrier to selfishly consulting one’s 
interest only.120 Like elsewhere in the novel, philosophical positions are considered as 
ethical injunctions to be adopted in daily life rather than all-embracing truths. At the 
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same time this justification of a petty theft puts the philosophical musings of Chapter Six 
in perspective. 
The term used in Chapter Six, however, is not solipsism but the idealist tar, a term 
that directly refers to Berkeley, as Ackerley explains in an annotation:  
The metaphor derives [from] Berkeley’s A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and 
Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tarwater (1744), the Bishop’s curious 
nostrum for ills of the material body. This came to Beckett via Fielding, as an 
entry in the Whoroscope Notebook indicates: “Dropsical: neither residence in 
dung (Heraclitus) nor Berkeley’s Tarwater (Fielding), able to dissipate watery 
accumulation.” … the second refers to the compelling account in Fielding’s A 
Voyage to Lisbon of how the writer, dying of the dropsy, turned to Berkeley’s 
tarwater and gained immediate relief but no lasting cure.121 
Ackerley adds little aside from identifying the source of the term. This brevity is 
perhaps an inescapable consequence of the commentary form that can only offer isolated 
identifications of sources rather than overall interpretations. Even so, the identification 
itself is in need of expansion since we now know Beckett was familiar with the Bishop’s 
treatise on tar water from multiple sources, including the work of Hone and the 
unidentified source from which he added information to the Philosophy Notes. 
Regardless of which source first informed Beckett of Berkeley’s essay, it is misleading to 
reduce Beckett’s familiarity with the work to a single reference such as Fielding’s journal. 
Berman and other commentators who had more room to expand on possible 
connections between this passage and Berkeley’s philosophy, however, also tend to 
downplay its significance. According to Matthews: 
The seemingly passing reference adds to the anecdotal and satiric tone with which 
the philosophizing in Murphy more broadly is treated, and suggests that Berkeley 
presents no lasting solution to the intractable dichotomies with which Murphy is 
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broadly engaged—dichotomies between mind and matter, the material and the 
immaterial, crucially.122 
For Matthews, the reference is “seemingly passing” because in his reading it 
contradicts Neary’s sympathetic view of Berkeley as one who had no alternative but to 
hide from reality. The contradiction between Berkeley’s lofty philosophy of 
immaterialism and the very material cure of tar water reflects interpretations of the 
philosopher that Beckett was familiar with.123 According to Matthews, Murphy’s 
comment about tar water is a form of response to Neary’s more complex understanding 
of Berkeley, “a more various understanding of Berkeley’s situation, one at least open to 
the context which gave to his idealizing philosophy 'no alternative,' and which is haunted 
by the nightmare which encroached upon him.”124 In my view, Neary and Murphy 
actually agree on Berkeley’s irrelevance to their search of means to handle a hostile 
world, regardless of their personal sympathy towards the philosopher.  
The choice of the word tar to refer to Berkeley is obviously motivated in part by 
Beckett’s early display of erudition and wit, yet it uncovers a more serious concern that is 
part of the main argument of the novel. The Murphy manuscript – which was unavailable 
until 2013 – does not mention tar water, only idealism, referring simply to the “the 
idealist’s position”.125 In the previous chapter it was pointed out that several sources used 
by Beckett associated Berkeley with the German idealist tradition, as a precursor of Kant 
and Schopenhauer. It is thus conceivable that Beckett has in mind here a broader 
philosophical movement, not just a single philosopher. Given that Irish authors like 
Colum and Yeats read Berkeley from a neo-Kantian perspective the conflation of 
Berkeley with later German idealism seems fairly likely. This interpretation of Berkeley’s 
idealism is poetically expressed by Yeats in the poem “Blood and the Moon” from the 
1929 collection The Winding Stair: 
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And God-appointed Berkeley that proved all things a dream, 
That this pragmatical, preposterous pig of a world, its farrow that so solid seem, 
Must vanish on the instant if the mind but change its theme126 
We have no evidence of Beckett’s appreciation of this Yeats poem, but we do have 
his reaction to the article by Colum who follows a similar interpretation. Beckett 
criticised Colum for writing that perception depends only on the will of the individual in 
Berkeley, and this criticism may easily be extended to Yeats and others. Reducing 
Berkeley’s philosophy to an affirmation of individual will was evidently unpalatable to 
Beckett and it may well be that it is this view, and not the whole of Berkeley’s 
philosophy, which is rejected by Murphy in Chapter Six since he affirms that he 
encounters an external reality that not only fails to follow his own desires, but is 
inherently inimical to him.  
At first sight, it seems surprising that Murphy, who values the mind so highly, rejects 
a philosophical position that gives it absolute primacy. The reason is that Murphy’s mind 
cannot affect the big world in which Murphy lives, and has no choice but to recognize the 
existence of external reality because it makes him suffer:  
He neither thought a kick because he felt one nor felt a kick because he thought 
one… Perhaps there was… a non-mental non-physical Kick from all eternity, 
dimly revealed to Murphy in its correlated modes of consciousness and extension, 
the kick in intellectu and the kick in re. But where then was the supreme Caress? 
(68) 
Murphy’s stance in this passage posits the independent existence of a body and a 
mind whose mode of relation is uncertain. This may be described as a Cartesian position, 
but could be equally attributed to any philosopher who subscribes to a dualistic world 
view. More than pitting Descartes against Berkeley, Murphy is arguing for a dualistic 
world-view and discards monism in general. What is most important in this passage is 
that it rejects the form of idealism Beckett was critical of – making the world depend on 
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the will of the individual mind. Beckett’s criticism of Colum clarifies that he was aware 
that ascribing such idealism to Berkeley is erroneous, since the world of ideas in 
Berkeley does not rely on the will of a single person. Consequently, Chapter Six cannot 
be taken to constitute a wholesale rejection of Berkeley’s philosophy. 
It is typical for the novel’s emphasis on ethical comportment over abstract 
speculation that the interaction between the mind and the external world remains 
unresolved and the problem is deemed “of little interest” to Murphy. (68) Yet if the text 
devotes a whole chapter to these speculations, they must hold some interest, at least for 
the author and the reader. So far, we have discussed Murphy’s opinion of the relevance of 
Berkeley’s philosophy, but his view is not the only one that needs to be considered, since 
the novel is told by a narrator who may disagree with him. We get a glimpse of the 
narrator’s view at the very beginning of the chapter, which cautions against identifying 
too closely with the way Murphy pictures his mind. The tone of the opening paragraph is 
rife with sarcasm: 
It is most unfortunate, but the point of this story has been reached where a 
justification of the expression “Murphy’s mind” has to be attempted. Happily we 
need not concern ourselves with this apparatus as it really was – that would be an 
extravagance and an impertinence – but solely with what it felt and pictured itself 
to be. Murphy’s mind is after all the gravamen of these informations. A short 
section to itself at this stage will relieve us from the necessity of apologizing for it 
further. (67) 
Unlike Murphy who is happy to contemplate his own mind at any time, for the 
narrator the task is unfortunate and requires an apology. The word gravamen means the 
subject of a complaint or appeal, implying some kind of conflict or dispute. Moreover, 
the narrator hints that Murphy’s mind “as it really was” is not the same as it imagined 
itself to be. These warning signs clarify that while Murphy rejects the idealist position, it 
does not mean that the narrator and Beckett as the author dismiss Berkeley’s “tar” 
wholesale, as will become manifest in Murphy’s encounter with Mr. Endon. 
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Mr. Endon: Amental Pattern 
For the novel’s first edition, Beckett wished the cover of Murphy to include a photograph 
of two monkeys playing chess that he found in a newspaper.127 At the time, this proved 
impossible, but the choice itself indicates that he considered Murphy’s chess game with 
the mental asylum inmate, Mr. Endon, to be an essential moment in the novel. The game 
occurs in Chapter Eleven, when Murphy – who recently started to work in the mental 
asylum – is taking on the night shift for the first time. Murphy took on the job since he 
felt close to the mental patients who are shut off in a world of their own. He envies their 
state but is unable to emulate them, a failure which he feels most acutely at night-time: 
 By day he had not felt the gulf so painfully as he did now… there was Bom and 
other staff, there were the doctors and the visitors to stimulate his sense of kindred 
with the patients. There were the patients themselves… He could mix with them, 
touch them, speak to them, watch them, imagine himself one of them. But in the 
night of Skinner’s there were none of these adminicles, no loathing to love from, 
no kick from the world that was not his, no illusion of caress from the world that 
might be. (143) 
This passage reflects the opposition between a kiss and a caress that was outlined in 
Chapter Six and highlights its irrelevance to the mental asylum. Murphy loathes the big 
world, but his expectation of a caress and a fraternity with other inhabitants of the little 
world is disappointed because it would require a relation with other people which is 
impossible in an isolated existence. In this state of mind, Mr. Endon’s invitation to play 
chess arouses in Murphy an inevitable hope “that his feeling for Mr. Endon was in some 
small degree reciprocated.” The narrator is quick to point out that this hope is unfounded: 
“Whereas the sad truth was, that while Mr. Endon for Murphy was no less than bliss, 
Murphy for Mr. Endon was no more than chess.”128 The game itself consists of Mr. 
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Endon advancing, then retracing all his pieces without making contact with any of 
Murphy’s pieces, causing the latter to concede defeat just before Mr. Endon’s King is 
returned to its original position.129 The effect of this game on Murphy is described in 
terms that are taken directly from Berkeley: 
Following Mr. Endon’s forty-third move Murphy gazed for a long time at the 
board before laying his Shah on his side, and again for a long time after that act of 
submission… Murphy began to see nothing, that colourlessness which is such a 
rare postnatal treat, being the absence (to abuse a nice distinction) not of 
percipere but of percipi. His other senses also found themselves at peace, an 
unexpected pleasure.130 
Mr. Endon’s refusal to recognise Murphy as an opponent, or in any other way, leads 
to a unique experience in which Murphy loses himself and becomes immersed in 
nothingness. He retains his ability to sense, the percipere, but for a short while he ceases 
to be because he is not perceived, he loses his percipi. By refusing to recognise Murphy, 
Mr. Endon makes him unseen even to himself, in a complex reversal of Berkeley’s esse 
est percipi. For Mr. Endon, Murphy is nothing and Murphy gets submerged in this non-
existence. However, Murphy cannot maintain this state. According to Ruby Cohn, 
“Murphy is torn between the pleasures of the senses and those of the mind—a conflict 
externalized in two of the book’s characters, the prostitute Celia Kelly… and the 
schizophrenic Mr. Endon (Greek for “within”).”131 Mr. Endon’s schizophrenia is not a 
form of dual personality, contrary to the common misconception, but should rather be 
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understood in the medical sense that Beckett is using – Mr. Endon is out of touch with 
reality, confining himself, in Murphy’s terms, to the little world. The chess game clarifies 
to Murphy that he does not belong in the internal world of Mr. Endon, or more accurately 
that inhabiting the little world of one’s mind indefinitely means giving up all human 
relations, and with them the caress that he longs for. 
Murphy is caught up in the paradox of the solipsist who feels the urge to share his 
theory with others. His situation is similar the argument advanced by Windelband’s 
History of Philosophy in order to refute the strong form of solipsism which he considers 
to be a consequence of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum: “This doctrine was at that time 
designated as Egoism, now it is usually called Solipsism. It is a metaphysical sport which 
must be left to the taste of the individual; for the solipsist refutes himself by beginning to 
prove his doctrine to others.”132 This argument is summarised by Beckett in the 
Philosophy Notes133 and may have informed his thinking about the ability of the subject 
to shut itself off from the world. In a letter to McGreevy from 16 January 1936 he quotes 
Malraux to describe Murphy’s plight: “Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne 
pas rechercher les siens (negative)” [it is difficult for one who lives isolated from the 
everyday world not to seek others like himself].134 
Murphy comes out of this trance to discover that Mr. Endon has left the cell where he 
was supposed to be confined for the night, and is wandering around the ward: “For quite 
a little time Mr. Endon had been drifting about the corridors, pressing here a light-switch 
and there an indicator in a way that seemed haphazard but was in fact determined by an 
amental pattern as precise as any of those that governed his chess.” (148) Mr. Endon’s 
nightly stroll can be contrasted with Murphy’s duty as the night guard. Murphy was also 
walking along the corridors pressing buttons, just like Mr. Endon’s aimless walk. The 
difference is that Murphy’s walking and pressing buttons followed external rules that 
were dictated to him by the big world and serve a clear purpose, whereas Mr. Endon was 
making up his own rules which are at the same time both precise and incomprehensible to 
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anyone but himself. Mr. Endon performs the same actions as Murphy – pressing buttons 
in the ward, but he follows a completely different logic which can be seen to parody the 
nurse’s solemn duty and clarifies beyond doubt how much Murphy participates in the big 
world and how far he is from being able to dwell in the little world. 
Having put Mr. Endon to bed, Murphy looks into his eyes and analyzes the situation 
as an interplay of reflections: “The last Mr. Murphy saw of Mr. Endon was Mr. Murphy 
unseen by Mr. Endon. This was the last Murphy saw of Murphy.” (150) Murphy is seeing 
himself in Mr. Endon’s eye, yet Mr. Endon does not see him, and this unseeing is the 
image of himself that Murphy will carry with him. The play of seeing and unseeing is the 
last for Murphy, as he will shortly die in a gas explosion. Murphy cannot ensconce 
himself in a little world of his own because he craves recognition from others – Celia, the 
mental patients, Mr. Endon. He cannot give up his need to be perceived by other people 
and in his last moments he decides to call Celia in the morning to resume the pleasures of 
the senses (151). Thus, Murphy’s attempts to come alive in his mind are short and 
temporary, his feeling that his mind is hermetically closed gives in to the need to be 
perceived and have meaningful relations with others.135 Earlier in the novel Murphy 
rejects idealism because in his view it cannot account for the inimical nature of the 
external world, but the novel as a whole shows that he is caught up in another aspect of 
Berkeley’s philosophy – the dependence on perception which makes the gaze of the other 
indispensable to the existence of bodies. 
 
The presence of Berkeley is felt throughout Murphy as a whole in different modes. 
The system of idealism that asserts the primacy of mind over matter is rejected first by 
Neary and then by Murphy as a model for how one should comport oneself in the world. 
It is described as a defence mechanism that attempts to ignore the problem, rather than a 
possible solution. In the final chapters of the novel, a different aspect of Berkeley’s 
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immaterialism is revealed as indispensable for understanding Murphy’s plight, namely 
the necessity of relation with another mind. This interpretation pits Murphy’s need for 
companionship against the Cartesian reading of Murphy as concerned with the relation of 
mind and body within the individual. The novel begins with Murphy rejecting the body in 
favour of the mind and ends with the recognition that relations are essential for his well-
being. In other words, Murphy’s description of his trouble is badly formulated. He treats 
the external world as the source of his suffering while what he really wants is a more 
friendly connection with the people in this world. Looking at the novel through a 
Berkeleyan perspective therefore qualifies Cartesian readings of the work in significant 
ways. As we shall see in the following chapters, the question of relation continued to 
occupy Beckett, and he would return to Berkeley’s philosophy to draw on the 
philosopher’s original thinking about relations, and their absence. 
Although Murphy’s plight stems from a need to be perceived, the novel does not 
follow Berkeley’s precepts closely but rather conflates body and mind in manner that 
Beckett will continue to use throughout his writing life. In a more faithful Berkeleyan 
world Murphy would have no need for external perception since his mind is a spirit that 
exists by the act of perceiving rather than by virtue of being passively perceived. Perhaps 
if Murphy had more faith in his own mind, he would find peace in his sense of self and 
would not have to pursue Mr. Endon for recognition.  
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3: Fruits on Plates: Beckett’s Post-war Aesthetics 
The relation between self and the world which was the onus of Murphy’s trouble 
continues to be a central issue for Beckett after the war, and nowhere more so than in his 
writing about painting and the position of the artist. As this chapter will show, Beckett’s 
writing about aesthetics in the 1940s manifests a process of development that culminates 
in “Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit”,136 a title that in itself 
reveals a Berkeleyan influence. This chapter will therefore inquire into possible parallels 
between Beckett’s theoretical writing and Berkeley’s philosophy. Since neither Beckett 
nor Berkeley ever produced a coherent or comprehensive aesthetic theory, the discussion 
cannot consist in a straight-forward comparison of two clearly formulated arguments. 
Instead, it will follow the development of Beckett’s thinking on aesthetics as reflected in 
his published work and letters, and its intersections with Berkeley’s philosophy.  
The best source for Beckett’s post-war thinking on art is a series of articles he wrote 
about painters and painting in the late 1940s. Although these texts are concerned with the 
work of other artists, they reveal Beckett’s understanding of the creative challenges and 
the role of the artist at the time. As Andrea Oppo points out, they are “thoroughly focused 
on the origin as well as the meaning, possibility, and achievements of art per se… In 
short, art as a philosophical problem”.137 The main argument of this chapter is that 
Berkeley’s philosophy was crucial for the development of Beckett’s thinking about art, 
especially in its latest form of praise for ‘inexpressive’ art. 
Writing about Modern Art 
Beckett’s writings on art or artists are scarce and mostly written before the second world 
war when Beckett was still unsure about his future occupation. These include an article 
on Joyce in 1929 (Disjecta 19-33), an extended essay on Proust from 1930,138 and several 
articles about contemporary writers and related issues, which he later described as “mere 
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products of friendly obligation or economic need”.139 Such statements need to be taken 
with a grain of salt and the early articles have justifiably attracted the attention of critics. 
This chapter, however, will concentrate on the theoretical texts written after WWII when 
Beckett was developing his mature style. These articles admittedly draw on earlier work 
but also diverge from it in important ways.  
In the late 1940s Beckett published a series of texts about the work of Dutch painters 
Bram and Geer van Velde which delineate Beckett’s post-war thinking about art and the 
development of a new aesthetic position. These texts are “La peinture des van Velde ou le 
monde et le pantalon” (Disjecta 118-132) and “Les peintres de l’empêchement” (Disjecta 
133-7) which adhere, as will be seen below, to an understanding of art as essentially 
representational, and the “Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit” 
which charts a new direction and has been accepted by critics, in Paul Stewart’s words, as 
“the closest thing we have to a manifesto of Beckett’s artistic beliefs.”140 
Beckett’s theoretical writings are commonly read as outlining his own reflections on 
art rather than an attempt to convey the artistic agenda and beliefs of the artists they 
discuss. This approach can be justified by two considerations with regards to the post-war 
articles – first, after the war Beckett only wrote about artists he appreciated as close to his 
own views and second, the lack of reference to biographical details, descriptions of the 
work, the painters’ own assessment of their work, or any other extrinsic detail that would 
indicate an attempt at an academic or objective study of these artists.141 Moreover, within 
the articles themselves Beckett often indicates that his writing about the van Veldes has 
more to do with his own thinking than with their art. For example, he opens “La peinture 
des van Velde ou le monde et le pantalon” by declaring himself to be an amateur, and 
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then goes on to enumerate different ways in which his subject can be approached, such as 
general aesthetics or a collection of anecdotes. In the end he opts for an annoying and 
confused chatter (“bavardage désagréable et confus”; Disjecta 119) because eventually all 
writing is self-description: “Avec les mots on ne fait que se raconter. [you cannot do 
anything with words except tell your own story]” (Disjecta 119). 
The main aesthetic problem explored in these texts is the relation between the artist 
and her material. Although presented as a dual relation of artist-world, there is in fact a 
third term that is a major part of the problem even though it is not explicitly mentioned, 
namely the work of art produced by the artist. As shown in the previous chapter, the 
relation of the self to the world is not a new problem for Beckett, and indeed he already 
addressed it as a specifically artistic concern in the early article “Recent Irish Poetry”, 
published in 1934 (Disjecta 70-76), shortly before beginning work on Murphy. The 
article contains a review of contemporary poets which Beckett proposes to examine 
according to their attitude towards a specific problem: 
awareness of the new thing that has happened, or the old thing that has happened 
again, namely, the breakdown of the object, whether current, historical, mythical 
or spook. The thermolaters… would no doubt like this amended to breakdown of 
the subject. It comes to the same thing – rupture of the lines of communication. 
(Disjecta 70) 
The problem Beckett formulates here is concerned with representation – the artist 
wishes to write about something, an object, but this object is unavailable, there is a 
“space that intervenes between him and the world of objects” (Disjecta 70). In this early 
article, the problem is merely stated without analysis, further explanation or suggestions 
for a way out, and Beckett moves on to catalogue contemporary Irish writers based on 
their approach to this situation.  
The question of how a subject can access an object is closely associated with the 
question of how the mind can gain access to the external world that preoccupied 
philosophers of the 18th-century. Windelband amply demonstrates this understanding of 
the period when he writes that during the Enlightenment 
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philosophy, as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the 
actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the principle, that 
prior to all metaphysical considerations and controversies the general question 
must be decided of how far human insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible 
only by exact exhibition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the 
course of development by which it is brought about, from that time epistemology, 
the theory of knowledge, was brought into the front rank of philosophical interests, 
and at the same time empirical psychology was recognised as the authoritative and 
decisive court of last resort for epistemology.142 
In the introductory chapter to The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century 
Philosophy, Knud Haakonssen formulates this common understanding of “the core of 
early-modern philosophy” in even stronger terms as “the epistemological paradigm” 
which 
sees philosophy as essentially concerned with the justifications of beliefs and 
judgements; it understands such justification in terms of events, either perceptive 
or inferential, in the mind – or, as if in the mind – of the individual person; and it 
tends to apply this idea of epistemological justification as the criterion for what is 
properly included within the discipline of philosophy.143 
Haakonssen goes on to enumerate the limitations and blind spots of this monolithic 
understanding of the 18th-century, such as ignoring non-European philosophies or 
philosophies written by women, as well as marginalising ethics, aesthetics, social 
practices and other topics that were widely discussed at the time but do not conform to 
the accepted view of modern philosophy as an individualistic pursuit of knowledge. 
While acknowledging that the view of the 18th-century as the “century of epistemology” 
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may be an oversimplification, the fact remains that from Descartes onwards, philosophers 
have been questioning the sources of knowledge and certainty with unprecedented 
urgency. Beckett’s preoccupation with the possibilities of representation is not unusual 
for a modernist writer but his choice to formulate the basic problem facing contemporary 
artists as a rupture between artist and object indicates the extent to which his thinking 
was influenced by early modern philosophy. For Beckett as for the modern philosophers, 
there is no certain way to access reality in order to represent it or discern its true nature.  
After the war, Beckett returns to this artistic question of relation between artist and 
subject matter in “La peinture des van Velde ou le monde et le pantalon” which begins 
with a witty defence of contemporary art against conservative attacks that question its 
value and the proficiency of its creators. In the second part of the article, Beckett 
describes his own appreciation of the painting of the van Velde brothers and characterizes 
Bram van Velde’s work as aspiring to “aperception” (Disjecta 125). According to Beckett, 
art was always trying to pull back objects from the grip of time to create spaces and 
bodies which remain inalterable (Disjecta 125), and each brother has found a different 
way to represent such objects. In Bram van Velde’s painting, the object is not merely 
suspended, but becomes completely stuck, immobile, a pure object wrenched away from 
the world and made to exist solely in the visual realm (Disjecta 126). In Geer van Velde’s 
work, on the other hand, Beckett finds an infinite movement, highlighting change: “Ici 
tout bouge, nage, fuit, revient, se défait, se refait.” [Here everything moves, swims, flees, 
returns, breaks down, reassembles] and Beckett summarizes “A. van Velde peint 
l’étendue. G. van Velde peint la succession” [A. van Velde paints extension, G. van 
Velde paints succession] (Disjecta 128).  
One brother creates an ideal timeless extension that can only exist as an inner sense, 
the other is completely given to the changing external appearances of things in time. Each 
brother chooses his own solution, but both are responding to the same dilemma – how to 
represent change? In the immobile medium of painting it is impossible to depict change 
directly and so each artist illustrates a partial aspect of change – Bram van Velde paints 
the object being changed, Geer van Velde conveys the cause of the change. The article 
thus revolves around the possible access to a certain object, i.e. change, which is 
incompatible with the possibilities of painting as a static medium. This problem of 
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representation is necessarily circumscribed, since other objects of representation may 
prove to be less recalcitrant. What is at stake here is a particular object that resists 
representation rather than a general situation affecting all possible objects of painting. 
Moreover, both brothers overcome this difficulty, each in his own way, thus reaffirming 
the possibility of representation and implying that even extremely resistant objects are in 
the final analysis available to the artist for the purpose of creating art. 
In “Peintres de l’empêchement”, originally published in French in 1948, Beckett 
returns to the initial question of the artist’s relation to the object, and provides a little 
more detail about its elusiveness, explaining that “L’objet de la représentation résiste 
toujours à la représentation, soit à cause de ses accidents, soit à cause de sa substance, et 
d’abord à cause de ses accidents parce que la connaissance de l’accident précède celle de 
la substance.ˮ [The object of representation always resists representation, either because 
of its accidents, or because of its substance, but primarily because of its accidents since 
knowledge of the accident precedes that of the substance] (Disjecta 135).144 Accordingly, 
Beckett distinguishes two trends in modern art. The first endeavours to express the 
“substance”, or the essential nature of the object, its innermost nature. This attempt, made 
by painters such as Matisse, Bonnard, Braque, Rouault and Kandinsky, aims to 
“experimer en quoi un clown, une pomme et un carré de rouge ne font qu’un, et du même 
désarroi, devant la résistance qu’oppose cette unicité à être exprimée. Car ils ne font 
qu’un en ceci, que ce sont des choses, la chose, la choseté.” [express the sense in which a 
clown, an apple and a red square are one and the same, and of the same disorder, 
overcoming the resistance this unity opposes to any attempt to express it. Because they 
are one only in the sense that they are things, the thing, thingness] (Disjecta 135-6). In 
other words, this group of modern artists are seeking to express what is common to all 
                                                 
144 Beckett is using Aristotle’s distinction between sensible qualities and coincidentally sensible 
qualities in De Anima, meaning the difference between qualities that directly affect our senses, and those 
that we can only infer indirectly from the immediate sensible qualities. This distinction was picked up by 
scholastic philosophers, and later adopted by Locke and other modern philosophers. See Mi-Kyong Lee, 
“Introduction,” Primary & Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate, ed. Larence Nolan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 31-34. 
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objects, the substantiality of substance as it were. This trend, according to Beckett, has 
run its course and is no longer viable.  
Another group of artists, however, seeks to “représenter les conditions de cette 
dérobade” [represent the conditions of this evasion] (Disjecta 136), expressing the failure 
of representation itself. This, according to Beckett, can be done by isolating each term in 
the subject-object relation: “l’un dira: Je ne peux voir l’objet, pour le représenter, parce 
qu’il est ce qu’il est. L’autre: Je ne peux voir l’object, pour le représenter, parce que je 
suis ce que je suis.”[one would say : I can’t see the object to be represented because it is 
what it is. The other: I can’t see the object to be represented because I am what I am] 
(Disjecta 136). In other words, the problem is double-edged as both the object and the 
subject cannot establish communication. These two attitudes characterise the work of 
Geer van Velde and Bram van Velde respectively. In this second article devoted to the 
van Veldes, Beckett explicitly advances for the first time the claim that the history of 
painting is the history of the artist’s relation to the object. Development in art can result 
either from finding new objects to represent, or from finding new ways to represent them 
– “Ce qui renouvelle la peinture, c’est d’abord qu’il y a de plus en plus des choses à 
peindre, ensuite une façon de les peindre de plus en plus possessionelle” [Renewal in 
painting results firstly from having more and more things to paint, and subsequently a 
way of painting them that is ever more possessive] (Disjecta 135). Beckett sees the van 
Veldes as taking a step forward in the continuous effort of artists to expand their 
possibilities of representation by pursuing a new object for representation, which is 
paradoxically the impossibility of representation.  
In the previous article the Dutch brothers were praised for their success in 
representing change, now Beckett reformulates their achievement as the ability to 
represent their own inability to represent. This reformulation of the value of their 
paintings attributes to them a more difficult task but yet again reinforces rather than 
challenges the conceptualization of art as representation. Despite the paradoxical premise, 
we still have the triple relation of an artist who depicts an object on canvass, the artist-
painting-object relation of representation. The elusiveness of the object becomes a new 
object for the artist to represent in his chosen medium. The confident conclusion of 
“Peintres de l’empêchementˮ becomes the main subject of inquiry in Beckett’s next 
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critical text, “Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit”. As Beckett 
himself writes to Duthuit: “To [write], as I have already been cowardly enough to do, that 
[Bram van Velde’s painting] expresses the impossibility of expressing anything is just to 
march him back in line with the others”.145  
Writing in Dialogue 
The “Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit”, dating from 1949, 
is the last critical text Beckett ever wrote. It grew out of an ongoing conversation between 
Beckett and his friend George Duthuit, an art critic and the editor of the journal 
Transition.146 Some of the exchange has been preserved in a series of letters, but they do 
not cover all of the discussion, since part of it took place face to face. Following this 
amicable exchange, Duthuit asked Beckett to write up his position as an article. In the 
final text Beckett incorporates some of Duthuit’s comments who, as Lois Oppenheim 
shows, was involved in the composition of the work and read most of the manuscript 
before publication.147 Although it takes its starting point from correspondence and 
conversations, the text of the “Three Dialogues” is not a faithful documentation of 
specific exchanges but a new composition. Beckett was asked by Duthuit to write up his 
position as an article for Transition, and he opted for the form of a dialogue, a significant 
choice that will be discussed later in the chapter. The resulting text should therefore be 
considered as his own individual work. Later in life, Beckett contributed a few short 
notes for his artist friends’ exhibitions and spoke about art in rare interviews or 
conversations with friends,148 but he never again attempted a systematic exposé of his 
thinking about another artist’s work or art in general. In a letter to Duthuit, about the 
composition of the “Three Dialogues” he calls it “my (positively final) farewell of 
                                                 
145 Martha Dow Fehsenfeld, et al., eds. The Letters of Samuel Beckett. 1941-1956 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 170. Henceforth Letters 2. 
146 On the intellectual exchange between Beckett and Duthuit see Anthony Uhlmann, “Beckett, 
Duthuit and Ongoing Dialogue”, The Edinburgh Companion to Samuel Beckett and the Arts ed. S.E. 
Gontarski (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 146-152. 
147 On the genesis of the “Three Dialogues” and Duthuit’s involvement in its writing and editing, see 
Lois Oppenheim, “Three Dialogues: One Author or Two?” Journal of Beckett Studies 8:2 (1982): 61-72.  
148 See Cohn, Foreword 15-16. 
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aesthetics”.149 His subsequent reluctance to translate “Three Dialogues” is another 
indication of a wish to distance himself from the theoretical mode.150 As he famously told 
Gabriel d’Aubarède: “I wouldn’t have had any reason to write my novels if I could have 
expressed their subject in philosophic terms.”151 
Three Dialogues is composed of three conversations between B (Beckett) and D 
(Duthuit) about the value of the work of three contemporary painters – Tal Coat, André 
Masson and Bram van Velde.152 Although the text presumes to discuss the work of other 
artists, it is clear that the opinions expounded by B refer mostly to Beckett’s own 
thoughts and aesthetic position. This is already made clear in the first dialogue when D 
comments that B’s argument is “a violently extreme and personal point of view, of no 
help to us in the matter of Tal Coat”, leaving B speechless (98). D further points out that 
B’s position reflects his personal wishes and does not describe any of the actual paintings 
– “that impoverished painting… to which you aspire” (100. Emphasis mine). He even 
wonders why the discussion is about painting at all, instead of B’s work and cautions B to 
“Try and bear in mind that the subject under discussion is not yourself” (102. Emphasis 
mine). B readily acknowledges that his opinions on van Velde’s work may be completely 
unrelated to this painter’s intentions, suggesting “How would it be if I first said what I am 
pleased to fancy he is, fancy he does, and then that it is more than likely that he is and 
does quite otherwise?” (102. Emphasis mine) and when he has finished presenting his 
argument he concedes that “Yes, yes, I am mistaken, I am mistaken.” (103)  
Unlike the congratulatory tone of Beckett’s previous articles about the van Veldes, 
the dialogues are obsessed with failure – the failure of communication between subject 
and object, the failure of artists to paint, and the failure of B to express “the thing I am 
                                                 
149 Letters 2 154. 
150 Beckett only translated the third dialogue, leaving the translation of the first two to Edith Fournier. 
See publication details in Samuel Beckett, Trois Dialogues, traduit de l’anglais en partie par l’auteur, en 
partie par Edith Fournier (Paris: Éditions de minuit, 1998). 
151 Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman, eds. Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage (London: 
Routledge and Kegan, 1997) 217. 
152 On Beckett’s interest in contemporary schools of art see Jean-Michel Rabaté, “Beckett’s Masson: 
From Abstraction to Non-Relation,” The Edinburgh Companion to Samuel Beckett and the Arts, ed. S.E. 
Gontarski (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 131-133. 
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trying in vain to say” (102). David Tucker suggests this preoccupation is related to 
Geulingian philosophy and specifically to the ethical axiom “ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil 
velis”, a loaded phrase which, as the introduction to the translation of Geulincx’ Ethics 
explains, can and have been translated in various ways: 
‘Ubi nihil vales ibi nihil velis’ has often been translated by Beckett critics as: 
‘Where one is worth nothing one should want nothing’. The Latin, ‘valeo’, carries 
the meaning both of ‘to be able to, to have force’ and ‘to be worth’. Beckett 
makes use of both senses, in what seem to be translations of this in his works. He 
uses the formula where one is ‘worth nothing’ in Murphy, and alternatively, 
where one ‘can do nothing’ in The Unnamable. Martin Wilson has translated 
Geulincx’ phrase in this edition as ‘wherein you have no power, therein neither 
should you will’.153 
According to Tucker, “This combination of impotence and obligation… resonates 
with Beckett’s critical writings of the period as regards his thinking about an art of 
failure.”154 
This valorisation of failure should be contrasted with B’s view of the history of art as 
a continuous attempt to expand the artist’s means of expression: “The much to express, 
the little to express, the ability to express much, the ability to express little, merge in the 
common anxiety to express as much as possible, or as truly as possible, or as finely as 
possible, to the best of one’s ability” (101). This striving for expression is based on a 
mediated relation between the subject who is an artist with what B calls “occasion” ,155 a 
relation that has been disrupted. This position is similar to the problem Beckett has 
identified as facing the young Irish poets almost fifteen years earlier.156 Despite the 
                                                 
153 Arnold Geulincx, Ethics with Samuel Beckett’s Notes, trans. Martin Wilson, eds. Hans van Ruler, 
Anthony Uhlmann, and Martin Wilson (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) 305. Partially cited in Tucker 18. 
154 Tucker 135. 
155 Beckett’s use of this term will be discussed below. 
156 Beckett himself made the connection with this article in his correspondence with Duthuit about 
Bram van Velde; see Letters 2 131. 
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various solutions suggested by Irish writers or Dutch painters, Beckett now sees these 
efforts as evasions that ultimately conform to a traditional view of art:  
I agree that [modern artists] have prodigious value, but a value cognate with those 
already accumulated. What we have to consider in the case of the Italian painters 
is not that they surveyed the world with the eyes of building contractors, a mere 
means like any other, but that they never stirred from the field of the possible, 
however much they may have enlarged it. The only thing disturbed by the 
revolutionaries Matisse and Tal Coat is a certain order on the plane of the 
feasible.(98) 
For B there is little difference between the realist art of the Italian masters and the 
modernist revolt against their standards. In both cases, the artists adhere to the same task 
– representing an object on canvass. 
The first two artists discussed in the dialogues are aware of the “rupture of the lines 
of communication” and are trying to overcome it through a more accurate representation 
of their sense impressions, rather than some external object, thereby making their own 
modes of perception a new object for representation. For B their attempt is doomed to 
failure because of the problematic nature of both terms of the relation: 
The analysis of the relation between the artist and his occasion, a relation always 
regarded as indispensable, does not seem to have been very productive… It is 
obvious that for the artist obsessed with his expressive vocation, anything and 
everything is doomed to become occasion, including… the pursuit of 
occasion.(102) 
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The Occasion of Painting 
Before analyzing Beckett’s arguments further, it is important to clarify what he means by 
the term “occasion”. The English original of the “Three Dialogues” offers no definition 
or explanation of this term. In earlier articles and the correspondence with Duthuit157 
Beckett consistently uses the term object.158 Moreover, ”Peintres de l’empechement” was 
originally titled “Le Nouvel objet”.159 Replacing “object” with “occasion” seems to 
indicate that Beckett felt uncomfortable with the former term and was looking for a new 
way to describe the relation of “self – the rest”,160 which for him covers both internal and 
external relations as he explains in a letter of 9 March 1949 to Duthuit: 
By relation we understand, naturally, not only the primary form, that between the 
artist and the outside world, but also and above all those which, within him, 
ensure that he has lines of flight and retreat, and changes of tension, and make 
available to him, among other benefits, that of feeling plural (to put it no higher), 
while remaining (of course) unique.161 
We can only speculate about the reasons for Beckett’s uneasiness and his choice of 
the term occasion. According to Ruby Cohn, the word occasion “seems less stable and 
solid” 162 than an object, and this indeterminacy may have been part of its attraction. 
Occasion also implies a coincidence of time and place, an event that can be fluid and 
changing instead of a static object that exists independently. This interpretation gains 
further support in the first dialogue where B explains what he understands by the term 
“nature” – “By nature I mean here, like the naivest realist, a composite of perceiver and 
                                                 
157 Beckett, Letters 2 131, 156. 
158 “[T]he breakdown of the object” in “Recent Irish Poetry” - Beckett, Disjecta 70, ”il était peut-être 
temps que l’objet se retirát” in “Le peinture des van Velde” - Beckett, Disjecta 126, or ”deuil de l’objet” 
in ”Peintres de l’empechement” - Beckett, Disjecta 135. 
159 Cohn, Foreword 14. 
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162 Cohn, Foreword 15. 
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perceived, not a datum, an experience.”(97) The meaning of the French word ‘occasion’ 
– bargain or discount – may have also played a part, as a parodic twist on the idea of a 
special situation or circumstances. 
The choice of this word was probably also motivated by Beckett’s interest in 
occasionalism which is evident from his diligent reading of Geulincx in the late 1930s.163 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Beckett paid special attention to passages in Berkeley’s 
Principles of Human Knowledge devoted to a refutation of occasionalism and added in 
the margins “against Geulincx?” In a nutshell, “Occasionalism is the doctrine that all 
creatures, finite entities that they are, are absolutely devoid of any causal efficacy, and 
that God is the only true causal agent.”164 Bodies or minds cannot affect other bodies or 
minds directly. It is only through God’s will that objects and minds are affected and He 
arranges things in such a way that they always move in a concerted manner which we 
tend to interpret erroneously as natural law. The movement of bodies or the human will 
are an opportunity for God to exercise his will. For example, when we want to raise our 
arm, God makes our arm rise, but the movement of our arm is not the effect of our own 
will, but of God’s benevolence in making the two events coincide. Thus, the term 
occasion describes a connection between two events, either mental or physical, that is 
indirect and non-causal, while still binding them together under certain circumstances.165 
The non-causal causality of occasionalism may have served Beckett in the “Three 
Dialogues” to inclusively describe an encounter between the artist and some material that 
is not necessarily a direct relation of the subject to a determined object, and has the added 
value of covering not only external entities, as implied by the term object, but also 
internal mental states. 
                                                 
163 Beckett’s interest in occasionalism was noted from very early on, see for example Cohn, 
Philosophical Fragments 170-174, and Fletcher 54-5. For a more recent appreciation, see The Grove 
Companion 116-7. Beckett’s interest in Geulincx has recently received much critical attention, see 
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164 Steven Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation,” The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, ed. 
Steven Nadler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 115. 
165 Andrew Pyle, Malebranche (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) 96-7. 
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It is important to note that the occasionalist connection between body and mind did 
not satisfy Berkeley. In the passages marked by Beckett he answers the objection that “if 
any man shall… say that he means [by matter] an inert senseless substance, that exists 
without the mind, or unperceived which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence 
whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us”.166 For Berkeley, occasionalist causality is 
too fluid and inexplicable, introducing more problems than it solves. In a passage from 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous that Beckett marked in his copy of the 
work he writes: “For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be 
perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their 
being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not.”167 
For Beckett this ambiguous causality may have actually been attractive as an analogy 
with artistic inspiration. The occasionalist position imported into a theory of art like 
Beckett’s introduces the ineffable into artistic creation, where the ‘occasion’ is 
transformed into a painting in an unexplained way, just like God’s causation cannot be 
fully understood by our limited minds. According to Malebranche, the mind is 
completely passive, and attention is a kind of prayer.168 Beckett similarly writes in his 
notes on Geulincx’s Ethics that “with my action, for example, willing to speak or wrestle, 
God in an ineffable manner conjoins certain motions, whether of tongue, or hands and 
feet, within this little body of mine, the action of my will”.169 The occasionalist believer, 
like the artist, is not in full control of her actions and has no ability to move the body or 
change the environment. Similarly, the artist has no fixed method or series of actions that 
she can follow in order to create a new work of art. The ancient Greeks prayed to the 
muses to help them in their work. Modern artists do not trust themselves to the power of 
prayer, but they are still in need of an inspiration whose source is undetermined and 
uncertain. The term occasion thus allows Beckett to describe a coincidence of subject and 
object without committing to the nature of the agent who brings about this relation. 
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It is further remarkable that Beckett added a footnote to the French translation of the 
third dialogue published 1957,170 explaining the term occasion to be “l’ensemble 
d’antécédents dont le tableau se veut le conséquent” [the sum total of precedents of which 
the painting intends/ pretends to be the consequence].171 This explication is also 
concerned with causality, this time as a historical connection with previous paintings that 
somehow results in a work which would be their consequence, or effect. In this 
perspective, the painting repeats what has been done before, making it the representation 
of a representation rather than a direct depiction of some object. In literary terms, this 
would be equivalent to intertextuality – drawing on previous texts in order to create a 
new one. This is a much more deterministic approach and seems like a departure from the 
connotations of the term in the original English version. One reason may be the passage 
of time – Beckett translated the third dialogue in 1957, almost a decade after the 
publication of the English original, even though in a 1949 letter to Duthuit he already 
calls Bram van Velde’s work “painting without precedent”.172 Unfortunately, there is not 
enough evidence for Beckett’s thinking on art in the late 1950s, so I would take this 
baffling footnote as yet another warning sign against using the “Three Dialogues” as a 
definite statement on Beckett’s thinking about aesthetics that can be unproblematically 
applied to any period in his writing career. 
Object, situation, non-causal cause, the artistic muse, or the repetition of precedents, 
it is difficult to determine just exactly what Beckett means when he writes about the 
‘occasion’ of the painting, and such inquiry, to adopt Beckett’s own phrase, threatens to 
lose “its way in disquisitions on the nature of occasion.”(102) What is common to all 
these interpretations, however, is that they describe a relation between the artist and 
something else that is necessary in order to create the work of art, replacing the object but 
retaining its place in the three-part scheme – the artist, the painting and the occasion. 
                                                 
170 The third dialogue was translated by Beckett for an exhibition of Bram van Velde’s work in the 
Galerie Michel Warren in Paris. See copyright details on the inner cover of Beckett, Trois Dialogues. 
171 Beckett, Trois Dialogues 25. 
172 Beckett, Letters 2 130. 
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The Expression That There Is Nothing to Express  
To get back to B’s argument in the “Three Dialogues”, he claims there is no alternative to 
the relation between the artist and the occasion: “Two things are established, however 
precariously: the aliment, from fruits on plates to low mathematics and self-
commiseration, and its manner of dispatch.”(103) In yet another reformulation of the 
basic problematics, the object is “an unstable term”, but no less than the artist who is 
“hardly less so, thanks to his warren of modes and attitudes.”(102-3) The modes and 
attitudes may be understood either as the variety of techniques and the artist’s reliance on 
technical skills, or refer to the artist’s mind which has many modes and attitudes. This 
second possibility seems to gain strength from the evocation of Freud in the second 
dialogue.(99) And if both ends of the relation are questioned, then “All that should 
concern us is the acute and increasing anxiety of the relation itself” leading to “attempts 
to escape from the sense of failure, by means of more authentic, more ample, less 
exclusive relations between representer and representee” (103). 
According to Beckett, Tal Coat and Masson attempt to overcome the problem of 
representation through a more faithful approximation or by conveying the conditions of 
perception, a position very close to the modern artists Beckett wrote about in “Peintres de 
l’empêchement”. However, in the “Three Dialogues” Beckett reconceptualises his 
critique by turning against representation itself – the shortcoming of the two painters is 
that they only discover new objects for painting without breaking away from the 
framework of representation. Beckett traces a different direction for the artist and singles 
out Bram van Velde as the only painter who was the ““the first to desist from this 
estheticised automatism, the first to submit wholly to the incoercible absence of relation, 
in the absence of terms or, if you like, in the presence of unavailable terms, the first to 
admit that to be an artist is to fail”.(103) This position is a turning point in Beckett’s 
appraisal of the achievement of van Velde, who was praised in “Peintres de 
l’empêchement” as finding a new object for painting. Here Beckett ignores the painting 
of Geer van Velde, and describes Bram’s painting not as a new object, but as the 
acceptance of the failure of representation. This preoccupation with failure is nothing 
new for Beckett since the text, as Ruby Cohn points out, is “circling round to the 
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Descartes of Beckett’s 1930 Whoroscope ‘Fallor, ergo sum!’”.173 However, in the “Three 
Dialogues” he extends what has previously been a personal dwelling on failure and 
defeat into a tentative artistic program, probably for the first time.  
Beckett’s new direction for art not only leads to failure, but it is also blatantly 
illogical.174 The very idea of expressing that there is nothing to express is paradoxical 
because expression is necessarily an expression of something. As D asks in the second 
dialogue: “But how can Masson be expected to paint the void?”(99) One possible way, 
suggested by D in the third dialogue, is to make the impossibility of expression itself an 
occasion for painting, which will henceforth express its own aporia. B rejects this view 
outright and suggests:  
let us for once, be foolish enough not to turn tail. All have turned wisely tail, 
before the ultimate penury, back to the mere misery where destitute virtuous 
mothers may steal stale bread for their starving brats. There is more than a 
difference of degree between being short, short of the world, short of self, and 
being without these esteemed commodities (102). 
Beckett reiterates his description of the development of art as an attempt to enlarge 
the number of objects to be painted, but unlike his position in “Peintres de 
l’empêchement”, now this effort is seen in a negative light. Bram van Velde should be 
admired not for expanding the domain of painting, but for being the first to paint in the 
absence of occasion, eliminating from the creative situation a component previously 
thought to be essential to it: 
I suggest that van Velde is the first whose painting is bereft, rid if you prefer, of 
occasion in any shape and form, ideal as well as material, and the first whose 
                                                 
173 Cohn, Foreword 15. 
174 See Stewart, Zone of Evaporation 189-191 for an analysis of the disagreement between D and B as 
between a demand for coherence and logic against an attempt to exploit the disjunction between artist and 
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hands have not been tied by the certitude that expression is an impossible act 
(101). 
Without providing a theoretical explanation of how painting can become inexpressive, 
Beckett advocates an ethical imperative which calls the artist to paint from within the 
impossibility of painting.175 He is fully aware of the impossibility of his position, 
affirming that he realizes the absurdity of his imperative and ending the text with B 
affirming “(warmly) Yes, Yes, I am mistaken, I am mistaken” (103). 
To summarise the trajectory outlined so far, although we can discern a continuity in 
Beckett’s formulation of the crisis of modern art as the rupture of the connection between 
artists and their material, his thinking about the possibilities open to the artist has 
significantly changed. Reading the three texts Beckett wrote about painters - “Le monde 
et le pantalon”, “Peintres de l’empêchment” and “Three Dialogues” - as reflecting an 
evolving conception of aesthetics can help distinguish Beckett’s unique proposition in the 
“Three Dialogues” which sets it apart from his earlier thinking despite being preoccupied 
with similar themes. This distinction is crucial in light of the tendency in Beckett 
criticism to treat his writings on art as reflecting a constant aesthetic position that has 
remained essentially the same since the beginning of his writing career.176  
 In the first two articles about the van Veldes Beckett praises art that expresses the 
conditions of its own impossibility. In the “Three Dialogues” Beckett refutes his previous 
position and advocates inexpressive art as the only (impossible) possibility for the artist. 
The most important aspect, for the purposes of the present discussion, is not so much the 
theoretical and philosophical validity of Beckett’s position, or even its consistency, but 
rather its debt to the epistemological “disquisitions” of early modern philosophy. If we 
                                                 
175 In addition to the Geulingian influence mentioned above, Mitchell Breon and Lois More Overbeck 
add that this ethical imperative has an autobiographical dimension, inspired by the artists Beckett met in 
Germany in the 1930s who struggled to work under the Nazi regime. See Mitchell Breon and Lois More 
Overbeck, eds. Word and Image: Samuel Beckett and the Visual Text, Mot et Image: Samuel Beckett et le 
texte Visuel (Catalogue) (Alabama: Emory University Press, 1999) 11. 
176 To take but one example, Matthews conflates the arguments of “Three Dialogues” with those of 
“Peintres de l’empechêment”; see Mathews 232. 
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take B to represent Beckett and believe that he really tried “two or three hundred”(102) 
ways to conceptualise the impasse of representation and find a way forward for art, then 
it must certainly be significant that in this final attempt he was using George Berkeley’s 
work as a model.  
Thinking through Berkeley 
Before comparing Berkeley’s philosophy of immaterialism and Beckett’s aesthetic 
position in the “Three Dialogues”, it would be useful to show the deep parallels between 
Beckett´s text and Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.177 To start 
with, the titles of the two texts are almost identical. The choice of the genre of 
philosophical dialogue to expound the author’s views is also unmistakable. Based on 
Beckett’s readings in the 1930s, Matthew Feldman suggests Hume (10) and 
Schopenhauer (12) as additional sources for the dialogue form, while recognising that in 
this text “we find the most explicit appropriation of Berkeley’s form by Beckett: the 1949 
Dialogues are modelled upon the 1713 Dialogues.” (11) 
Berkeley himself adopted the form of the Platonic dialogue, where one interlocutor 
asks questions of another person holding different views in order to reveal contradictions 
in their position, sometimes followed by an exposition of the “correct” view by the 
questioner. The form of the dialogue was very popular in the 18th century, as Michael 
Prince writes: “between 1650 and 1750 dialogue became a central mode of philosophical 
writing. Dryden, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Berkeley, and Hume all composed important 
works in dialogue form, as did innumerable minor figures; and dialogue became the 
object of extensive critical reflection.”178 It is therefore important to discuss the 
particularities of the Berkeleyan dialogue. Berkeley was one of the major figure to renew 
the form. As Peter Walmsley observes: 
                                                 
177 George Berkeley, “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” The Works of George Berkeley 
Bishop of Cloyne Vol. 2, Eds. A.A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, Edinburgh, Paris, Melbourne, Toronto 
and NewYork: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1949) 147-263. Beckett’s familiarity with this text was 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
178 Michael Prince, Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics, and 
the Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 12-13. 
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The style of the “Three Dialogues” is strikingly unlike that of other dialogues of 
his time. In general, Ciceronian models prevailed… [such as] Cicero's De 
republica, in which a character who holds a mistaken opinion is corrected at 
length by an opponent, but is permitted to interrupt now and again with objections 
or demands for clarification… Berkeley depicts a tight, logical wrangling: not a 
placing of a right opinion against a wrong one, but a relentless questioning… The 
model for this style of dialogue is itself ancient, its chief practitioner and apologist 
being, of course, Plato.179 
While the Ciceronian model presents an unequal exchange between an authoritative 
speaker and a counterpart who mostly listens, the Platonic dialogue assumes, at least 
outwardly, an equality between the various speakers and is open to a serious questioning 
of the views expressed by the main protagonist.  
Walmsley’s distinction between the Ciceronian and Platonic models should be 
understood as referring to the style, rather than to the content of the dialogues, since 
Berkeley differs from the Platonic dialogue by revealing, at least partially, what he 
considers to be the correct position right at the beginning of the dialogue, instead of 
pretending to reach it by mutual inquiry. In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates is claiming 
not to know the right answer from the start, but rather to establish it through the 
dialectical method together with the other participants in the conversation. For example, 
in the Cratylus, Hermogenes asks Socrates to help him understand Cratylus’ argument 
that every name has an inner meaning, necessarily connected with the object referred to. 
Socrates agrees to help, but instead of explaining what Cratylus might mean, or giving his 
own views, he begins questioning Hermogenes on his alternative suggestion that names 
are conventional. When Socrates debunks Hermogenes’ naïve nominalism, the latter asks 
in frustration what the correct opinion would be, only to learn that Socrates has no 
                                                 
179 Peter Walmsley, The Rhetoric of Berkeley’s Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) 68. On Berkeley’s close interest in Plato, see ibid. 69. For a more general account of Plato’s 
influence on Berkeley’s early writing, see Costica Bradatan, The Other Bishop Berkeley: An Exercise in 
Reenchantment (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006) 18-39. For a closer analysis of Berkeley’s 
philosophical dialogues see Prince 74-131. 
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confirmed opinion, and is just investigating the matter (391b). Later, Socrates declares 
himself open to be corrected by Cratylus (482a), and only proffers some definite 
statements at the end of the dialogue, but even then he provides no final answer and the 
dialogue ends with complete uncertainty about the nature of names (440c). Other Platonic 
dialogues, such as Euthyphro, Charmides, Theatetus and others, also feature an open 
ending, or aporia, that encourages readers to continue to speculate on their own, or 
despair of ever reaching a final truth according to their preference.180 
Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous takes a different approach 
to the rhetorical role of the conversing friends. Whether or not we believe that Socrates is 
genuinely interested in the opinions of his counterparts, or whether his ideas are 
developed through the exchange rather than preconceived, he does not admit to having a 
pre-existing view of the matter under discussion. Philonous, on the other hand, states 
right from the start “That there is no such thing as what philosophers call material 
substance, I am seriously persuaded”, then challenges Hylas to prove him wrong, “but if I 
were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason 
to renounce this, that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.” (172) Unlike 
Socrates’ open-ended inquiry, the figure of Philonous was created for the sole purpose of 
presenting and defending Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy, already published in an 
affirmative form in The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). 
Beckett’s “Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit” is closer 
to Berkeley’s form of dialogue than to Plato’s open discussion. The first dialogue already 
contains in a nutshell B’s theory of the history of art as a limited endeavour: “All I wish 
to suggest is that the tendency and accomplishment of this painting are fundamentally 
                                                 
180 The extent to which the Platonic dialogues encourage the reader to form her own opinions is a 
matter for debate. On the one hand their open structure seems, “an invitation to the reader to… investigate 
the problems raised but not solved in the dialogue.” according to Diskin Clay, Platonic Questions: 
Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000) 167. 
However, Plato is an accomplished author who mobilises multiple rhetorical devices to persuade the reader, 
as illustrated, for example, by Rossetti, Livio. « Le côté inauthentique du dialoger patonicien », La forme 
dialogue chez Platon: Évolution et réceptions (Grenoble: Jêrôme Millon, 2001) 99-118. Whatever the case 
may be, the dialogues declare themselves to engage in honest and open dicussion, without resoting to 
authority. 
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those of previous painting, straining to enlarge the statement of a compromise”(97), and 
his wish that artists will allow themselves to choose the path of failure: “Yet I speak of an 
art… weary of pretending to be able, of being able, of doing a little better the same old 
thing”(98) which will result in “The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing 
with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to 
express, together with the obligation to express.”(98) The rest of the text can be seen as a 
modulation, clarification and explication of these initial gnomic pronouncements.  
In addition to the rhetorical strategy adopted by both Berkeley and Beckett, the 
general structure of the two texts is similar. Two speakers who hold opposing views meet 
on three different occasions to discuss a given subject. In Berkeley’s text the speakers 
meet on three consecutive mornings, every time promising to “meet here again tomorrow 
morning” (207)181 in order to allow Hylas time to examine his opinions after he yields to 
Philonous’ reasoning. The setting for Beckett’s dialogues is less realistic, but at the end 
of the first one D suggests that “Perhaps that is enough for today.”(98) while the second 
dialogue ends when B “(Exit weeping)”(100). In fact, the only explicit reference to the 
passage of time in Beckett’s text occurs during the third dialogue when B takes a 
fortnight to answer one of the questions.(101) This would suggest that the dialogues 
presented as continuous at the level of discourse may be discontinuous at the level of the 
plot and have actually taken place at different times, thus highlighting the fictionality of 
the text in a typically Beckettian fashion.182 
Beckett also follows Berkeley’s division of the argument between the three dialogues. 
From the outset, B announces that he is dreaming about a different type of art, while D 
attempts to defend the originality of the artists he appreciates in the first two dialogues. 
This attempt encounters the cynical scepticism of B, for whom their work contains no 
great innovation. Only in the last dialogue does B elaborate on his initial argument and 
                                                 
181 A similar proposition is made at the end of the second dialogue, 226. 
182 According to Eyal Amiran, the overt fictionality and dramatization of the “Three Dialogues” 
undermines the validity of its theoretical claims, see Eyal Amiran, Wandering and Home: Beckett’s 
Metaphysical Narrative (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993) 6-7. This position 
seems too extreme for a text that has emerged out of earnest discussions on the nature of art but it is a good 
indication of the ambiguities embedded in Beckett’s text. 
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explains what he sees as van Velde’s unique achievement. In Berkeley’s text, Philonous, 
who speaks for the author, also states his position right at the beginning, which is 
criticised in the first two dialogues by his interlocutor Hylas, who holds the opinion that 
the external world is made of matter which exists outside of any mind.183 It is in the third 
dialogue that the author’s mouthpiece makes the case for his own theory. Philonous 
argues at length that reality is completely spiritual and defends this position against 
Hylas’ objections. Both texts dedicate the first two dialogues to the argument of the 
opponent and leave the full development of the author’s ideas to the third one. 
Furthermore, the thematic organization of the work is also common to both texts.184 
In Berkeley’s text the first dialogue is concerned with the senses and with reconciling 
idealism with the accepted view that the source of sensual impressions are material 
objects. In Beckett the first dialogue deals with Tal Coat’s attempt to capture the “fleeting 
instant of sensation” (97). In the second dialogue Philonous reveals his opinions on man’s 
position with regards to God. Beckett never mentions God, but describes Masson’s 
attempt to “break through [the objects’] partitions to that continuity of being” (99), an 
experience that connects the individual with a metaphysical realm beyond sensible reality. 
Taking a wider perspective, it is possible to say that in both texts the second dialogue is 
dealing with man’s place in the universe. 
The third dialogue is preoccupied with the uncertainty of human knowledge, but this 
doubt is treated differently by the two authors. For Berkeley it is Hylas, the proponent of 
erroneous opinions, who is haunted by doubt, claiming that “Truly my opinion is that all 
our opinions are alike vain and uncertain… We… spend our lives in the pursuit of 
[knowledge], when, alas we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us 
ever to know anything in this life.” (227) Doubt is of course perceived negatively and 
                                                 
183 Stoneham claims that we should treat Berkeley and Philonous “as different people, for that reminds 
us that what Philonous is trying to do in a particular speech might be different from what Berkeley is trying 
to do in describing that speech”. At the same time, he concedes that the reader may reasonably assume that 
Berkeley endorses Philonous’ arguments; see Tom Stoneham, Berkeley’s World: an Examination of the 
“Three Dialogues” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 21-2. 
184 Stoneham offers a handy “Quick Reference Guide to the Three Dialogues” outlining the themes 
and structure of each of Berkeley’s Dialogues. See Stoneham 42-5. 
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Philonous goes to great length to establish the certainty of the knowledge of God to 
counter such scepticism. In Beckett’s text, however, it is B, the writer’s mouthpiece, who 
is the ignorant one. When asked why van Velde is obliged to paint, B answers “I don’t 
know” and he later denies his own argument without making any specific counter-
arguments beyond the general proclamation “I am mistaken.” For Berkeley, Hylas’ 
doubts are an error to be corrected while for Beckett ignorance is an essential part of the 
argument. 
In addition to the structural and thematic resemblance of the two works, Beckett also 
seems to incorporate some textual echoes from Berkeley into his work. In the third 
dialogue Philonous complains that the belief in matter leads to “endless disquisitions” 
(258) about the relation between mind and spirit, echoed by B’s complaint that the 
“analysis of the relation between the artist and his occasion” has “lost its way in 
disquisitions” (102).185 In both works the opponents blame the author’s mouthpiece of 
propounding an absurd position. Hylas declares that Philonous “may draw as many 
absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you 
will never persuade me out of my senses.” (184) In Beckett, however, B readily concedes 
the absurdity of his position: 
D. – You realize the absurdity of what you advance? 
B. – I hope I do.(101) 
Another textual echo can be found in Hylas’ exaggeration – “I have told you so a 
hundred times.” (258) matched in Beckett by B’s “two or three hundred” (102) attempts 
to say in vain what he tries in vain to say. Taken separately, each of these textual 
similarities may be a mere coincidence, but their occurrence in such a short text seems to 
indicate that Beckett had Berkeley in mind when writing the “Three Dialogues” and that 
a close reading of this text may have left its mark on Beckett’s language. 
                                                 
185 One may wonder, indeed, what are the disquisitions on the nature of the occasion Beckett refers to, 
given his own unstable terminology. 
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The Old Thing that Had Happened Again 
Once we recognize the debt owed by Beckett to Berkeley’s text in this particular attempt 
to say what he “tried in vain to say”, we must inquire to what extent Beckett’s position on 
aesthetics as presented in the “Three Dialogues” tallies with Berkeley’s immaterialist 
philosophy. This question is especially vital since the differences between the two texts 
cannot be denied. Each of them belongs to a different discipline and pursues different 
goals. While Berkeley is addressing metaphysical questions, Beckett is concerned with 
aesthetics. Berkeley’s main motivation is to defend Christianity, whereas Beckett ignores 
all questions of religion. Berkeley is searching for a stable and dependable view of the 
world rooted in rational thinking, Beckett is preoccupied with ignorance and failure. The 
situation in which Berkeley’s dialogues take place is depicted in a natural, realistic 
manner,186 while Beckett highlights the dramatic and fictional aspects of the dialogue.187 
The list can go on and yet there is a deep affinity between Berkeley’s refutation of matter 
and Beckett’s disavowal of the occasion.  
Beckett’s rejection of representation in art can be seen to mirror Berkeley’s 
philosophical rejection of representation in ontology and epistemology. As shown above, 
Beckett conceives of the problem of representation in a manner similar to modern 
philosophy as regards the troubled relation between the mind and the world which 
prevents the artist from offering a faithful representation of objects. Representation is 
similarly most pertinent philosophically when considering the way our mind perceives 
the world, especially in vision. The question of how the mind, understood as a spiritual 
substance, can perceive material substances that are completely alien to its nature, has 
                                                 
186 By analyzing the circumstances of their meeting, Stoneham manages to deduce multiple details 
about Hylas and Philonous – according to him, they both belong to the same college, but Philonous is a 
slightly more senior member who is trying to educate Hylas; see Stoneham 17-19. The college setting was 
assumed without argumentation in Hone and Rossi 80.  
187 Barfield suggests that Beckett is constructing the “Three Dialogues” as psychoanalytic sessions, 
see Barfield 17. Thought-provoking as this reading is, it is based on meagre textual evidence and ignores 
the tradition of philosophical dialogues most other critics associate with this text. The fact that Beckett’s 
text allows such an interpretation, while not excluding competing ones, testifies to the text’s non-specificity 
as to time and place. 
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occupied thinkers ever since Descartes introduced his radical doubt. Branka Arsić offers 
a useful formulation of the Cartesian explanation of how the mind perceives external 
reality in Descartes’ 1637 treatise “Optics”, which highlights its reliance on 
representation: 
The face of the world is a map, and the projection of this map is threefold. The 
map of the visible is inscribed through the pressure by which the motion of light 
rays projects points on the bottom surface of the eye so that to every point of the 
visible there corresponds a point drawn in the eye… Once this map has been 
inscribed, the tubes [in the brain] will take over the role of light rays and, point by 
point, project the map from the eye onto the internal surface of the brain… And 
this procedure will be repeated: dark corridors of tubes lead from the internal 
surface of the brain to the pineal gland, corridors that fill the role of light rays. 
The different apertures of the tubes determine the strength of “micro-motions” of 
animal spirits, which move along the routes of this internal pipeline and thus 
enable the projection of the map from the surface of the brain unto the reflecting 
surface of the pineal gland. It is this map alone that will become the object of 
sight. We always see the map of a map of a map.188  
In Cartesian optics, a triple representation is required to enable us to see. First, light 
rays represent the material surface of the world to the eye. Second, this map is inscribed 
by the eye on the brain, and lastly, the representation in the brain is reflected onto the 
pineal gland, where the spirit can perceive it. Thus, the mind gains access to material 
reality through a series of representations that transfer information between distinct 
realms: material world – sense impressions - spirit. 189 The physical pressure of external 
                                                 
188 Arsić 27.  
189 For an analytical study of the representational theory of perception in modern philosophy, see the 
chapter called “The Representation Theory of Perception and the Problem of Perception” (which also 
discusses Locke’s version of the theory) in Georges Dicker, Berkeley’s Idealism: A Critical Examination 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 27-41. 
 84 
reality causes the formation of sense impressions in the brain, which are then conveyed to 
the spirit.  
Berkeley offers a radically different explanation of how the spirit can perceive 
material reality, and most crucially one that does not depend on representation. He 
proposes to do away with the material realm altogether so that the ideas received by our 
senses are not a representation of a radically different matter, but rather a direct 
presentation of spiritual ideas. This position has been first introduced in the Principles of 
Human Knowledge and later re-formulated in a different form in the “Three Dialogues”. 
Berkeley’s reasoning is based on the assumption that everything we know 
are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by 
attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by 
help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely 
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. (PHK 41 §1)  
If all our knowledge of the external world depends on ideas derived from sense 
impressions, then when we say that something exists, what we really mean is that we can 
sense it in some way (PHK 41-2 §3). The objects we see, hear or touch do not exist 
independently of such sense impressions: “For what are the forementioned objects but the 
things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or 
sensations” (PHK 42 §4). In fact, there is no independent existence that precedes and 
gives rise to sense impressions. According to Dicker, Berkeley’s “basic claim is that none 
of the sensible qualities that make up things like houses and mountains and trees can be 
abstracted from perception.”190 What we think of as the material world is in fact made up 
of spiritual sensations, a collection of sense impressions that can only exist in a human or 
a divine mind: 
all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which 
compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence, without a mind, 
that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are 
                                                 
190 Dicker 75. 
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not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other 
created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind 
of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving… 
absurdity… to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a 
spirit. (PHK 43 §6) 
In Stoneham’s succinct formulation: “For Berkeley the objective world is 
subjectively available in perception, so once perception occurs, there can be no further 
gap which needs to be bridged.”191 What Berkeley does, effectively, is to deny the 
existence as well as the utility of any mechanism which would represent the material 
world to the mind. Moving from a tripartite relation of spirit – sense impressions – world, 
he advances a direct mental relation between mind and sense impressions. In other words, 
he advocates a non-representational model of how our mind works.  
The structure of Berkeley’s world-view is surprisingly similar to B’s “dream” (100) 
of non-representational art where there is nothing to express in the absence of relation. 
The artist paints, she applies paint to canvass, but she has no occasion, precedent or 
object to convey or rework. Representation is short-circuited and we end up with a direct 
relation between artist and medium. Beckett’s renouncement of the occasion turns the 
tripartite relation artist – painting – world into a direct relation of artist – painting, just as 
Berkeley’s denial of matter replaces the representational model of spirit – sense 
impressions – world with the dual relation of spirit – sense impressions. The structure of 
both arguments is virtually the same. It would seem, therefore, that when Beckett was 
thinking about art and the possibilities open to the artist in the wake of the breakdown of 
the relation between subject and object, he turned to Berkeley’s philosophy to open a 
possible line of flight. 
The similarity in the structure of the argument between Berkeley’s metaphysics and 
Beckett’s aesthetics only serves to expose the gap between Berkeley’s optimistic, 
confident assertions and Beckett’s intentionally absurd and despairing confusion. This 
difference between Berkeley’s immaterialism and Beckett’s art of non-relation may stem 
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from the absence of God or any other fixed principle that can become a source of 
certainty for the artist. For Beckett, there is no God to safeguard the relation of the artist 
to her world so she could represent it. In J.E. Dearlove’s words “all sense of assurance, 
completion and fixity disappear.”192 The only way for the artist to continue and make art 
in this situation, according to Beckett, is to face the canvass in the absence of any 
dependable standard to guide her hand, or divine inspiration to ensure the outcome of her 
action. This is why the situation of the artist is “that of him who is helpless, cannot act” 
(101) and the position of B who aspires to non-representational art is “unenviable” (103). 
The painter Avigdor Arikha, a close friend of Beckett, expressed the predicament of the 
artist in similar terms: “In fact nothing can be illustrated. Forsaking the haven of the 
imaginary, the code of modernism, the arsenal of the avant-garde, I find myself, like 
Diogenes throwing away his bowl, disarmed before the visible.”193 In the same vein, 
Bram van Velde himself is quoted in the same issue of Transition as asking “I have 
nothing in my pockets, nothing in my hands. Where shall I find what I need?”194 
What kind of art is this impossible art? How can the artist who cannot express still go 
on to create art? She cannot, and therefore art is for Beckett first and foremost a failure, 
or in his own words “to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail, that failure is his world 
and the shrink from it desertion, art and craft, good housekeeping, living.” (103) The 
failure of the artist is not a failure to create art, because van Velde goes on painting and 
Beckett goes on writing, it is rather an art of failure. From the 1940s onwards Beckett 
takes failure as his starting point, working from the impossibility of writing. The next 
chapter will explore the role that Beckett’s “anti-representational” position plays in his 
own literary creation. 
                                                 
192 J.E.Dearlove, Accommodating the Chaos: Samuel Beckett’s Nonrelational Art (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1982) 3. 
193 Quoted in Breon 23. 
194 Bram van Velde, “Some Sayings of Bram van Velde,” Transition (1949) 104. 
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4: Three Novels: The Undoing of Representation 
Beckett’s theoretical understanding of the position of the artist has left its mark on 
the fiction he was writing at the time. This chapter will examine how the anti-mimetic 
stance of the “Three Dialogues” is expressed in Beckett’s literary work of the 1940s and 
draw out some additional affinities with Berkeley, suggesting that Berkeley’s influence 
went beyond the shaping of arguments. Given the wealth of Beckett’s writing at the time, 
and the extensive research devoted to it, the discussion will focus on the undoing of 
fictional narrative in the Trilogy, one of Beckett’s most important achievements and the 
main prose work of the period. I will address mainly the aspects of representation and 
anti-representation that form part of the change in Beckett’s writing of the period.  
Misuse of Language: The Early Work 
As a young writer and Joyce admirer, Beckett has steered away from the genre of literary 
realism which strives to represent reality along the lines of Stendhal’s famous image of 
the novel as “a mirror you turn this way and that as you go down a path”.195 In a 
canonical study of realism, S/Z, Roland Barthes challenges the realist presumption to 
represent reality objectively, or in an unmediated manner, through a close reading of 
Balzac’s story “Sarassine”, considered to be a masterpiece of literary realism. Barthes 
points out that the mirror itself can only reflect a part of reality, and contends that 
framing is the most fundamental act of the artist: “To describe is thus to place the empty 
frame which the realistic author always carries with him before a collection or continuum 
of objects which cannot be put into words without this obsessive operation.”196 Seen 
through the frame, a certain section of reality is turned into a two-dimensional fixed 
surface that can be scrutinised like a painting, and then copied by the writer’s words.  
Realism therefore does not possess a privileged access to reality, but is rather caught 
up in a play of reflections : 
                                                 
195 Stendhal, The Red and the Black, trans. Catherine Slater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
210. 
196 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1974) 54. 
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Thus, realism (badly named, at any rate often badly interpreted) consists not in 
copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy of the real: this famous reality, 
as though suffering from a fearfulness which keeps it from being touched directly, 
is set farther away, postponed, or at least captured through the pictorial matrix in 
which it has been steeped before being put into words: code upon code, known as 
realism.197  
The reflection of a reflection of the real world in literary realism is thus structurally 
similar to the way Beckett explains the history of painting. The realist writer isolates an 
‘occasion’ to describe verbally just as the painter finds an occasion to depict on the 
canvass. 
What Barthes challenges theoretically, modernist writing has been challenging 
artistically since the beginning of the 20th-century, including the young Beckett. This 
challenge already appear in Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Beckett’s first written 
novel which was finished in 1932 but only published posthumously. The novel criticizes 
Balzac for the mechanical workings of his plots and characters, which are hardly life-like 
in his opinion: “Balzac … has turned all his creatures into clockwork cabbages and can 
rely on their staying put wherever needed or staying going at whatever speed in whatever 
direction he chooses.”198 Not only is Balzac’s rendering of human beings too limited and 
mechanical, but his presumption to represent reality is unfounded: “We all love and lick 
up Balzac, we lap it up and say it is wonderful, but why call a distillation of Euclid and 
Perrault Scenes from Life? Why human comedy?”199 For Beckett, Balzac’s art is closer to 
geometry than to real life, being too abstract and deterministic. Even as a young writer, 
therefore, Beckett was evidently searching for an alternative to realist representation.  
                                                 
197 Barthes, S/Z 55. 
198 Samuel Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011) 104-5. 
199 Beckett, Dream 105. Beckett’s dissatisfaction with Balzac is also apparent in the parody of 
Balzac’s narratives of the advent of brilliant young men in the story of Saposcat and the Lamberts in 
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Beckett’s first publication, the 1930 poem Whoroscope,200 amply displays an anti-
mimetic attitude. The poem is based on the historical figure of Descartes, but its framing 
highlights mere trivialities – Descartes’ predilection for eggs hatched a specific number 
of days or his habit of rising late. The internal monologue Beckett attributes to him 
verges on the nonsensical and cannot in any way be mistaken for the actual speech or 
internal reflections of the venerable philosopher. The notes at the end of the poem 
underline the work’s reliance on previous texts and create an intertextual link with T.S. 
Eliot’s The Waste Land, positioning the poem within the world of textual constructs, 
rather than any kind of objective reality. For Barthes, calling upon external semiotic and 
linguistic codes in any text belies possible claims to represent reality directly – “to write 
can no longer designate an operation of recording, of observing, of representing, of 
‘painting’”, as the text is “a space of many dimensions, in which are wedded and 
contested various kinds of writing, no one of which is original: the text is a tissue of 
citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture.”201 
One of Beckett’s strategies for highlighting fictionality in the early work is 
multiplying citations. Dream of Fair to Middling Women is highly intertextual. As 
Knowlson points out, Beckett’s style at this stage is “very Joycean in its ambition and its 
accumulative technique”, bringing together “hundreds of quotations from other works of 
literature, philosophy, and theology.”202 Enoch Brater identifies among the sources cited 
in the novel “Dante… Baudelaire, St Augustine, Schopenhauer, Balzac, Mallarmé, 
Ruskin, Horace, Hölderlin, Homer, Matthew Arnold, Lord Byron, Racine, Keats, Virgil, 
Ronsard, Dickens, Einstein, Freud, Nietzsche, Pushkin, Leopardi, Confucius, Plautus, and 
‘Bernard Pygmalion’”, a list that he admits is necessarily partial.203 The very title Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women echoes Lord Tennyson’s early poem “A Dream of Fair 
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Women”, which in its turn cites “The Legend of Good Women” by “the first warbler” 
Geoffrey Chaucer who is praised as the epitome of the power of poetry.204 This 
invocation of the English literary tradition, together with the Dantean protagonist 
Belacqua and a myriad of borrowings from French, German and other traditions, serve to 
convey the amount and range of the literary codes embedded in this text.  
Beckett employs a variety of linguistic and stylistic techniques to undermine any 
assumption of an objective, reliable representation of events. In the oft-quoted letter to 
Axel Kaun, Beckett reflects on his intention to misuse language along the same lines: 
It is indeed becoming more and more difficult, even senseless, for me to write an 
official English… language appears to me like a veil that must be torn apart in 
order to get at the things (or the Nothingness) behind it… Let us hope the time 
will come… when language is most efficiently used where it is being most 
efficiently misused… To bore one hole after another in [language], until what 
lurks behind it – be it something or nothing – begins to seep through; I cannot 
imagine a higher goal for a writer today.205  
The letter expresses a dissatisfaction with the medium - the language of literature that 
veils or hides something from the reader. The task of the writer, paradoxically, is to 
transcend the language that defines him as an author. Being unable to reach this trans-
linguistic ideal, he “must be satisfied with little… somehow finding a method by which 
we can represent this mocking attitude towards the word… this dissonance between the 
means and their use”.206 The tone of narration and the stylistic virtuosity in Dream 
manage to convey this attitude and dissonance to a high degree, interjecting the narrative 
with sarcastic comments. To take just one example, this is how the narrator describes 
Belacqua after he breaks up with the Smeraldina: 
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Explicit, he said aloud, and gratias tibi Christe. And so it was. For once in his life 
he was correct in what he said. Except of course, that certain aspects of her abode 
in his heart, like wind in a dyspeptic's stomach, and made themselves felt from 
time to time in the form of a sentimental eructation that was far from being 
agreeable. She continued to bother him as an infrequent jolt of sentimental 
heartburn, nothing to write home about.207 
The passage mixes together heart ache and digestion problem in a satirical mode that 
debases the lofty romantic sentiments Belacqua might have felt. The affirmation that he 
was correct for once in his life, casts doubt on the protagonist’s ability to correctly judge 
other situations. The intricate metaphor and the use of Latin make the passage difficult to 
interpret, forcing the reader realise that language is not a transparent description of reality. 
 
Little or not, Beckett’s attempt to tear away the veil of language in the early work 
still relies on, and thereby reinforces, the model of literature as representation. The 
metaphor of language as a veil that hides reality implies a triple relation of subject-
medium-object, even if this object is really the Nothingness, spelled with a capital N. 
Language, the medium, is seen as an obstacle standing between the artist and the 
‘occasion’ she wants to express, an obstacle that must be overcome, or at least, as Beckett 
says, brought into disrepute. In the language of the “Three Dialogues”, these early efforts 
can be seen as “a thrusting towards a more adequate expression of natural experience, as 
revealed to the vigilant coenaesthesia”, a mere “straining to enlarge the statement of a 
compromise.”(97) By increasing the distance between the speaker and the events of the 
story, irony and parody call upon the reader to distinguish between the events and actions 
of the characters, presumed to exist independently, and the voice of the narrator which 
represents them as an independent layer of commentary or perspective. Beckett’s 
intertextual practice and heightened artificiality in the early work draw attention to the 
constructed nature of the text, but they do not break away from the basic assumptions that 
narrative fiction is a form of representation. In John Pilling’s more poetic formulation, 
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“Beckett is continually chafing against the boundaries of ‘the field of the possible’ 
without finally transcending them”.208  
In the Darkness You Don’t Know: The Post-War Period 
“Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and George Duthuit” was written in 1948 – in 
the middle of one of the most prolific periods in Beckett’s life. In a few short years he 
published the three novels of what is now often called the Trilogy, i.e. Molloy (written 
1947, published 1952), Malone Meurt (written 1948, published 1952), and L’innomable 
(written 1949, published 1953), as well as his most famous play, En Attendant Godot 
(written 1949, published 1952).209 This “frenzy of writing”210 was triggered by a vision 
Beckett had when he was staying with his mother in Foxrock in 1946, as he described to 
James Knowlson: 
I realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, 
[being] in control of one’s material. He was always adding to it… I realised that 
my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in 
subtracting rather than in adding.211  
The rhetoric of impoverishment is mentioned briefly in the “Three Dialogues” among 
the hundreds of ways B was trying to convey his thoughts: “The pathetic antithesis 
possession-poverty was perhaps not the most tedious”, only to be immediately rejected: 
“But we begin to weary of it, do we not?” (102) In an interview with Tom Driver Beckett 
chose a different way to describe the change: “Molloy and the others came to me the day 
I became aware of my own folly. Only then did I begin to write the things I feel.”212 
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These explanations should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, an 
attempt to come to terms with a change of perspective that was complicated and 
pervasive, extending also to a change of language from English to French. Berkeley’s 
philosophy, as suggested in the previous chapter, also contributed to the growing 
resistance to representation that characterises this new kind of writing.  
The three novels Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable constitute a progressive 
unravelling of the representational assumptions of narrative fiction, culminating in the 
complete dismantling of any attempt to reconstruct a possible object of representation in 
The Unnamable. In the words of J.E. Dearlove: “Beckett [had to] discover strategies and 
structures by which his medium may be induced to suggest its antithesis.”213 The relation 
between textual constructs and the characters and events that they represent has been 
studied in depth by the discipline of narratology, which developed at least partly in 
response to the attempts of the modernist writers to “bring language into disrepute”. It 
therefore constitutes a useful theoretical framework to analyze representation in fiction 
and I will be drawing on the work of Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan who wrote one of the 
clearest and most comprehensive accounts of narratological theory in her 1983 book 
Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics.214 She opens the discussion with drawing a 
distinction between story and text: 
‘Story’ designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text 
and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in 
these events. 
Whereas ‘story’ is a succession of events, ‘text’ is a spoken or written discourse 
which undertakes their telling. Put more simply, the text is what we read. In it, the 
events do not necessarily appear in chronological order, the characteristics of the 
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participants are dispersed throughout, and all the items of the narrative content are 
filtered through some prism or perspective (‘focalizer’). 215 
This classification portrays literary texts as a representation of events, where events 
that are seemingly independent of their narration are described by a narrator. In the three 
novels, Beckett endeavours to obliterate this distinction and create a text that does not 
represent any events that can be reconstructed as preceding it.  
All three novels feature homodiegetic narrators, that is, narrators who participate in 
the story they are telling, 216 and the circumstances of narration are meticulously 
described. In Molloy there are two narrators who begin their discourse by explaining why 
they are producing a text – Molloy is writing at the behest of unknown “they” who pay 
him for writing (7), while Moran is writing a report for his employer (92 and 175-6). 
Malone in Malone Dies is telling stories as he lies in bed waiting for death,217 and The 
Unnamable continuously attempts to make up stories about himself.218 All of these 
narrators indulge in commentary on their narration, which according to Rimmon-Kenan, 
“is concerned not with the represented world but with the problems of representing it,”219 
and these problems seem to increase for each consecutive narrator. By foregrounding the 
circumstances of narration, Beckett undermines it from within, and mercilessly attacks 
the distinctions and constructs that enable a sequence of letters to be seen as a 
representation of plausible events in a possible world. 
It Was Not Raining: Undoing Representation 
The central strategy for undermining representation in Molloy is what Brian Richardson 
has called ‘denarration’ – “a narrative negation in which a narrator denies significant 
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aspects of her narrative that had earlier been presented as given.”220 Richardson’s prime 
examples of a “sustained and relentless deployment of denarration”221 derive from 
Beckett’s Molloy. One is taken from the first part of the book, where Molloy spends six 
pages on describing the chance meeting of two characters, complete with speculations 
about the travellers’ goals and habits, their possible past, descriptions of nature and 
musings on the behaviour of Pomeranian dogs (8-14), only to cast a doubt on the entire 
story by writing: 
I am perhaps confusing several different occasions, and different times, deep 
down… And perhaps it was A one day at one place, then C another at another, 
then a third the rock and I, and so on for the other components, the cows, the sky, 
the sea, the mountains. I can’t believe it. No I will not lie, I can easily conceive it. 
(14)  
In this passage Molloy suggests that the encounter has never taken place at all, 
refuting his own words. Molloy’s method here – taking elements experienced at different 
times and in different places and combining them in a new way to produce a new fiction, 
is similar to the operation of the human mind according to Berkeley. The mind produces 
new objects of knowledge from its previous experiences “with the help of memory and 
imagination, by compounding or dividing or simply reproducing ideas” (PHK 41 §1). 
Talia Mae Bettcher explains that for Berkeley “the only mental actions are (or at least 
reduce to) the production and destruction of ideas.”222 The act of thinking is nothing else 
than the creation and combination of ideas within the mind of the thinker. Moreover, this 
activity is fully conscious – “According to Berkeley, whenever we think, we make ideas. 
And whenever we make ideas, we are conscious that we make ideas.”223 Similarly, 
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Molloy is aware that he is creating the scene that he is describing by combining various 
elements and this awareness is just as important to Beckett’s text as the details of 
Molloy’s description which are being questioned by this awareness. For Berkeley, the 
creation and combination of ideas is a way to create and improve knowledge, but with 
Beckett they serve to prevent the creation of knowledge. 
Molloy abounds in such instances of overt prevarication. Richardson goes on to list 
other disavowals in the novel, which together with Molloy’s confused perception and 
memory leave the reader only with the assurance that “what really happened was quite 
different” (88; qtd. Richardson 170). Perhaps the most striking and well known act of 
denarration frames Moran’s narrative in the second part of the book. Moran embarks on 
his story by writing that “It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows” (92) and 
concludes it by stating the exact opposite – “Then I went into the house and wrote, It is 
midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining.” 
(176; qtd. Richardson 171) Although the text refutes its first two statements, it is 
uncertain to what extent the rest of the report is false. According to Leland de la 
Durantaye, “this last line reverberates like a thunderclap through all that preceded it… for 
we have to wonder if it was just the weather and the time of day that was altered, or every 
single line.”224 For example, in both the opening paragraph and the end of the novel 
Moran’s son is asleep in the house (92 and 175). This detail may indicate that the report 
is being written at night, so perhaps it is the act of denarration that is the false statement. 
Maybe it was indeed midnight and raining and Moran is just being contrary. The effect of 
denarration is to make it impossible to tell whether the closing lines of the novel amount 
to a complete disavowal of the whole narrative, or only of some parts of it, or none at all. 
They do not support any conclusive judgement, only suspend the narrative in a state of 
ambiguity.  
Some narratologists have attempted to account for narrative uncertainties through the 
concept of the unreliable narrator – “one whose rendering of the story and/ or 
commentary on it the reader has reasons to suspect” (Rimmon-Kenan 103). According to 
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Rimmon-Kenan, possible reasons for unreliability include the narrator’s “limited 
knowledge, his personal involvement, and his problematic value scheme.” (103) To 
illustrate how a narrator can be suspected of telling lies she gives examples of narrators 
who are too young, vindictive, or morally reprehensible. These examples are all modelled 
on narrators who present their narrative as true, while discrepancies in their story, or the 
personality of the narrators reflected in their text, make the reader aware that there may 
be gaps or falsities in their version of events. The reader is urged to think of narrators as 
people and use common knowledge of the way people tell stories in order to judge the 
reliability of the narration, looking for signs of a faulty memory or hidden interests. 
Matthews, in fact, suggests that Molloy in this passage was too distant to see the events 
clearly, comparing his situation to Berkeley’s descriptions of the processes of seeing in A 
New Theory of Vision.225 This explanation, however, seems unfounded, since the 
narrators of Molloy explicitly discredit their own story on numerous occasions, and 
blurred vision due to distance can hardly explain why Molloy is unsure of how many 
people he saw – two persons walking towards each other, or a solitary figure. There is no 
need for suspicion or second-guessing the narrators’ motives when they willingly declare 
that the text they have been producing is a false account. They should therefore be 
considered as constituting a different category of narrators, who are unreliable and 
reliable at the same time. We can trust their assessments that their accounts are false.  
Iser offers a different perspective on this special kind of narrators. For him, their 
stories are unreliable not because of any shortcomings on their part, but rather because of 
the nature of the events that they are trying to narrate. Molloy understands well the 
difficulties inherent in making language represent reality and therefore his narration is 
self-questioning and approximative. His inability to deliver a trustworthy account, 
is embedded in a process which Molloy would like to narrate but he has to falsify 
because the convention of narration has its own laws, that have little or no bearing 
upon actual reality. Narration sets out to convey something which cannot possibly 
be conveyed by it, and so any narrative representation must inevitably be a lie… 
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The first-person narrator can only bring this knowledge [of narration] to bear by 
offering the reality he has observed as the mere product of his mode of 
presentation, which is unlikely to coincide with whatever may be the true nature 
of that reality.226 
In his discussion of Molloy, Iser repeatedly highlights the gap between the novel’s 
discourse and the unattainable reality it fails to account for. His interpretation is useful 
for understanding the challenge that Beckett’s novel poses for narratological analysis 
since this reality is unattainable except through the text, and moreover has no 
independent existence since Molloy and his consciousness, impressions and adventures 
are all fictional constructs. The unavailability of reality can be seen as analogous to the 
philosophical discussion of matter that Berkeley criticizes. Like the philosophers who 
believe in the existence of matter that they can neither perceive nor know anything about, 
Iser evokes a reality that is neither available to us, nor necessary for our reading of the 
text. We may say with Berkeley that “if there were external bodies [or reality in the 
novel], it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might 
have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now.” (PHK 49 §20) 
The explicit denial of one’s own narrative constitutes a much more radical act than a 
misleading storytelling or an approximation of lived experience. The radical denarration 
in Molloy dispels the illusion that the text represents any kind of event that would be 
external to it, as Richardson explains: 
there will not be much recoverable story at all, but rather a general, 
undifferentiated conglomerate of past events which may or may not have occurred, 
within an inchoate temporality that cannot be analytically reconstructed into any 
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sustained order. All that is left for the narratologies to work with is the 
discourse… we are left with discourse without a retrievable story.227  
Using Beckett’s terms from the “Three Dialogues”, the writing of Molloy is “[t]he 
act is of him who, helpless, unable to act, acts, in the event [writes], since he is obliged to 
[write].” (127) Instead of a tripartite structure of representation, event-text-narrator, we 
are left to ponder a text that may not be said to refer to anything besides itself.  
Nevertheless, there are two stable instances in Molloy, namely the narrators 
themselves. Fallible and unreliable as they may be, we can still treat them as a unified 
locus of narration and understand them as subject to whom our knowledge of psychology 
and human behaviour may be applied. The last novel in the Trilogy, The Unnamable, sets 
out to dismantle this unity of character by staging a futile attempt by the narrating voice 
to give a satisfactory account of itself through a persistent questioning of its mode of 
existence. 
Who Now? The Unnamable 
In Molloy denarration operates at the level of passages or a whole narrative, but in 
The Unnamable it is employed in every sentence. The speaking voice comments on this 
strategy, saying that “I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me… how 
proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations invalidated as 
uttered, or sooner or later?... There must be other shifts” (291). The speaker in the text is 
a fictional voice that is completely incapable of revealing or inventing any kind of 
biography for himself. It claims it was Basil, later renamed Mahood, who “told me stories 
about me, lived in my stead, issued from me, came back to me, entered back into me, 
heaped stories on my head.” (309) The stories arrive from outside, from a commanding 
voice that erases the Unnamable’s own: “his voice continued to testify for me, as though 
woven into mine, preventing me from saying who I was”. (309) Given that in a written 
text we cannot distinguish between different voices, it becomes impossible for the reader 
to differentiate the voice of the Unnamable from the external voice of Mahood the teller 
of stories, if indeed they are external. Consequently the stories that rise through the 
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narrative – the one-legged creature hopping towards his family home, the stump in the jar 
and the unfeeling Worm – may all come from Basil, or Mahood, and not the from the 
‘real’ Unnamable, however we conceive of him. Alternatively, the stories could also be 
told by the Unnamable who is trying to mask his own involvement in them.  
Like other Beckett texts, The Unnamable evokes modern philosophy as a domain of 
knowledge to be exhausted and dismissed. It transforms the Cartesian doubt it opens with 
– “Where now? Who now? When now?”, into a questioning of the speaker’s being – “I, 
say I. Unbelieving.” (291)228 Beckett’s radical questioning of subjectivity and narration in 
this novel draws on many philosophical sources. To take one example of a general 
interpretation, The Grove Companion suggests, within the space of four pages, Descartes, 
Leibniz, Locke, Schopenhauer, Fritz Mauthner, Plato, nominalism, scholasticism, and 
atomism as useful philosophical systems to understanding the novel.229 This list should 
be expanded to accommodate some distinctly Berkeleyan concepts, specifically the 
reliability of sense impressions and the complicity of perception and existence. 
In the History of Philosophy Windelband explains that for Berkeley a “body is what 
one sees, touches, tastes, smells, and hears: its esse is percipi. Body is then nothing but a 
complex of ideas.”230 In the Philosophy Notes Beckett has transcribed this last sentence 
and summarized the next paragraph of Windelband’s argument: “If we abstract from a 
cherry all the qualities which can be perceived through any of the senses, what is left ? 
Nothing. The idealism which sees in a body nothing farther than a bundle of ideas is the 
view of the common man; it should be that of philosophers also.”231 Beckett’s shorter 
rendering of this argument is ““Body therefore is a complex of ideas—nothing real. What 
remains when the real qualities are abstracted? Nothing.”232  If the Cartesian certainty is 
founded on knowledge of the self, then certainty for Berkeley is found in the senses. 
Having refuted the existence of Malone, the others, the voices he heard and the lights 
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around him, the Unnamable returns to the question of his own existence, rejecting self-
knowledge in favour of sense impressions which seem at first to be more reliable:  
I, of whom I know nothing, I know my eyes are open, because of the tears that 
pour from them unceasingly. I know I am seated, my hands on my knees, because 
of the pressure against my rump, against the soles of my feet, against the palms of 
my hands, against my knees. (304. Emphasis mine ) 
In the Berkeleyan world view this enumeration of sense impressions is useful 
because a body is nothing but a collection of ideas, separate impressions that are held 
together by association: “by our senses, we perceive sensible qualities and ‘bundles’ of 
sensible qualities, but cannot perceive the underlying substance to which they supposedly 
belong”.233 The Unnamable also echoes Berkeley’s theory that we orient our 
interpretation of visual impressions through the internal tactile pressure of our muscles: 
“But what makes me say I gaze straight before me, as I have said? I feel my back straight, 
my neck stiff and free of twist and up on top of it the head” (304).234 Predictably, these 
bodily impressions are refuted on the next page of the novel: “Organs, a without, it’s easy 
to imagine, a god, it’s unavoidable, you imagine them… I’m a big talking ball, talking 
about things that do not exist, or that exist perhaps, impossible to know” (305). 
Berkeley’s reliance on sense impressions is discarded, but it was evidently important 
enough to merit serious consideration before being rejected like all other systems of 
thought. 
An additional Berkeleyan theme that will become increasingly important to Beckett 
is being perceived as a warranty of existence. The speaking voice repeatedly refers to the 
idea of being watched, whether by God or by authoritative others. For example, the head 
in the jar avatar can turn its gaze until it meets “the statue of the apostle of horse’s meat, a 
bust. His pupilless eyes of stone are fixed upon me. That makes four, with those of my 
creator” (327). The eyes of the statue are a set of non-seeing eyes, made of stone but also 
“pupilless”. The head in the jar is not satisfied with these looks, and requires that other 
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people look at him in order to “have some kind of assurance that I was really there” (342). 
This is a Beckettian version of the dictum esse est percipi since for Berkeley the self is an 
active spirit that does not rely on perception to exist, as already pointed out in Chapter 2. 
The narrative of the head in the jar ends when the woman who took care of it, the only 
human being to acknowledge its existence, has lost faith and stopped paying attention to 
its needs, after which the story dissipates –“Nothing has happened” (344). 
Both Berkeleyan themes are woven together in the introduction of Worm: 
Worm, to say he does not know what he is, where he is, what is happening, is to 
underestimate him. What he does not know is that there is anything to know. His 
senses tell him nothing, nothing about himself, nothing about the rest, and the 
distinction is beyond him. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, he exists 
nevertheless, but not for himself, for others, others conceive him and say, Worm 
is, since we conceive him, as if there could be no being but being conceived. 
(346) 
Worm, another of the narrator’s avatars, does not exist for itself, being unable to feel 
or distinguish between this ‘self’ and the rest of the world. He exists for others according 
to a formulation that closely resembles the Berkeleyan principle ‘to be is to be perceived’. 
In Berkeleyan terms, Worm is not a spirit but an object whose existence is dependent on 
the perception of others, even as they perceive him as a subject. The description of Worm 
is strangely fused with the ontological argument for the existence of God, which 
originated with Anselm in the 11th-century and then was revived by Descartes. It states 
that if we can conceive of a perfect being then the attribute of existence must be included 
in this concept, and therefore “existence be thought of as part of the definition or essence 
of a supremely perfect being.”235 This interlacing of Berkeley’s formulation with a 
theological argument illustrates that while Berkeley is not the main source for The 
Unnamable, his philosophy informs at least some of its language and stories. In Beckett’s 
later works, the conflict between perception and existence will be further elaborated 
through the creation of images for page and stage, as will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6.  
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Sense impressions and external observation are just two of the many ways in which 
the Unnamable tries to vouchsafe an existence to no avail. The indeterminacy of the 
speaking voice wavers on the verge of fiction and constitutes, according to Cohn, a 
“change of focus from a fiction of a fiction to a highly charged prose that wavers between 
fiction, prose poetry, and dramatic monologue, which is spoken by a kaleidoscopic and 
indeterminate voice.”236 The Unnamable is Beckett’s most radical departure from the 
mimetic assumptions of narrative fiction. Carnero-González describes it as “[breaking] 
up all the schemes of the scholar of linguistic discourse; the most basic and simple logic 
is missing.”237 Its language frustrates any attempt to tear apart the veil of words and reach 
beyond it. As Rabaté also writes: 
The Unnamable teaches us, again and again, by changing points of view and 
arguments, by endlessly contradicting itself, that the speaking voice is nothing but 
language... Moreover, this language is not “his,” that is it does not belong to the 
Unnamable because, in many senses, it is the language of others.238 
The novel thus completely debunks the voice of the narrator, leaving the reader with 
a sequence of statements and fragments of stories that can in no way be assigned to a 
unified origin. 
A Hatchet Job: The Limits of Refutation 
Beckett’s non-representational art in the Trilogy progresses through a negative approach 
that repeatedly denies the validity of the object of representation. This strategy can be 
equated to a certain extent with Berkeley’s style of philosophical writing which also 
preferred counter-arguments and refutation to positive presentation. The very name of the 
doctrine most associated with Berkeley’s philosophy – immatterialism – indicates an 
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emphasis on negation. Although refuting alternative arguments is an integral part of 
every philosophical work, Berkeley pursues it to a greater extent than most others. He 
puts unusual emphasis on dismantling the claims of his opponents, an effort which takes 
up the larger part of his two attempts to expound his philosophical system, Principles of 
Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. The fact that he 
never published the second part of Principles of Human Knowledge which was supposed 
to elaborate his world view in positive terms contributes to the overall impression that his 
work is mostly preoccupied with attacking other doctrines at the expense of developing 
its own. In the introduction to Berkeley’s works, the editors explain that  
[The 2nd] Part was to deal with what Berkeley called Moral Philosophy, taken to 
include Metaphysics. It was to treat of the distinction between the corporeal and 
the mental, the nature of God, the freedom of man, the commonplaces of ethics, 
and apparently a nominalist logic of demonstration239 
The manuscript of Part 2 was lost when Berkeley travelled in Italy and he never 
attempted to reconstruct it with the result that he “has given us not a system, but only the 
skeleton of a system, though clothed upon here and there with living flesh, and by a 
miracle of philosophical vision and literary art already informed with a soul.”240 
Berkeley’s emphasis on negative arguments caused many writers to label him as a 
sceptic and his contribution to philosophy is often considered to be his critique of 
materialism rather than the positive content of his theories. Windelband, for example, 
summarizes Berkeley’s philosophy as “the nominalistic denial of abstract ideas”.241 John 
Russell Roberts affirms that Berkeley’s “attack on material substance provides us with an 
excellent model of the analytic hatchet job.”242 This term is justified by the observation 
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that “when Berkeley is done one feels that he has left one with nothing to embrace. What 
Berkeley gives us is what we might call a ‘negative metaphysics.’ The great bulk of his 
effort is directed toward a negative point, i.e., establishing that reality in no way consists 
of material substances.243 This may be one of the reasons why Berkeley’s denial of matter 
was said to “admit of no answer and produce no conviction”,244 in the famous assessment 
by David Hume. 
For Berkeley, demolishing the belief in matter is a necessary preliminary to 
establishing the true nature of things, whereas uncertainty and doubt are essential to 
Beckett’s novels. In both cases, however, readers are tempted to fill in the gaps on their 
own. In the case of narrative fiction, the figure of the narrator is a necessary function that 
allows the text to be unified and understood, even when this function is as disturbed as in 
The Unnamable. The narrator who denies his (or her) own capability to narrate a story 
only spurs the reader to devise ever more intricate ways of understanding the role of the 
narrator and its complex manifestations.245 As Rimmon-Kenan observes, “Exceptions can 
only be discerned against the background of the rule, and narratology formulates some of 
the regularities which specific narratives gloriously defy.” (150) 
Beckett’s vicious attacks on the underlying representational assumptions of literary 
texts still, inescapably, evoke these very assumptions at the same time that they deny 
them, leading the reader to search for ways to understand the narrative despite its 
unbridgeable gaps. In The Implied Reader, Iser analyses literary texts from various 
historical periods to study the diverse ways in which they invite the reader to interact 
with them. The point of departure for this process is negation: 
The reader discovers the meaning of the text, taking negation as his starting-point; 
he discovers a new reality through a fiction which, at least in part, is different 
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from the world he himself is used to; and he discovers the deficiencies inherent in 
prevalent norms and in his own restricted behaviour. (xxiii) 
Readers go through a process of discovery with every work of fiction they encounter, 
in order to bridge the gap between their own world and the world described in the text. In 
the Trilogy, however, the world of the novels is constantly cancelled out, calling for a 
different kind of engagement. Iser describes them as “irritants, for they refuse to give the 
reader any bearings by means of which he might move far enough away to judge them. 
The text forces [the reader] to find his own way around, provoking questions to which he 
must supply his own answers.” (175) Readers may attempt to supply their own answers, 
but the novels refuse to support any specific interpretation, making the reader’s solutions 
highly subjective. They only serve to distance the reader from the text. When we become 
aware of this constantly renewed distance, according to Iser, we start scrutinising our 
own assumptions and preconceptions, entering an endless process of self-discovery — 
“Whenever this occurs, the reader approaches the level of consciousness of Beckett’s 
characters… If he enters into the movement of the text, he will find… himself 
increasingly drawn into the exposure of the conditions that underlie his own judgment.” 
(177)  
Iser’s interpretation is a good illustration of both the strengths and the weaknesses of 
the anti-representational impulse of the Trilogy. On the one hand, he argues persuasively 
that the novels cannot be read as a representation of reality or even be unified into a 
single narrative. On the other hand, the fragmentation of the text is judged to be a better 
representation of lived experience. Reality, our world, our life, are not experiences that 
can be adequately formulated in words, even to ourselves: “Though we are alive, we do 
not know what it means to be alive. If we try to find out what it means to be alive, we are 
forced to seek the meaning of something we cannot possibly know.” (267) In order to 
grasp these realities we must turn them into a story, but this story is always a fiction. If 
the nature of life is necessarily open-ended, then realising the impossibility of enclosing it 
within a fiction may actually be more realistic than coherent narratives. The 
contradictions and self-cancellations of the protagonists in the novels are not just an 
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arcane writing strategy, but a faithful representation of the contradictions and aporias that 
we encounter in our own lives. According to Iser, 
Without the production and subsequent negation of fictions, this open situation 
could not possibly be established. But this, in turn, means that even in cases such 
as the Unnamable is concerned with, the usefulness of fiction cannot be dispensed 
with. That is to say, even the unmasked fiction cannot destroy itself. A great 
comfort for literature and a great nuisance for ideology! (268) 
In the end, all the negations and resistance turn out to be a roundabout way of 
affirming the power and utility of fictions as a privileged access to reality. In this reading, 
the Trilogy is more representative of life than Balzac’s realist novels, they present reality 
in its confusion and abundance without the framing of the Stendhalian mirror. Iser 
concludes that “the negativeness of Beckett’s texts, then, consists in the technique he uses 
in order to involve us in the complex process of manufacturing fictions and to open our 
eyes to the nature of fiction itself.” (273) The progressive breakdown of narrative 
conventions in the novels of the Trilogy turns the disruption of literary norms into a new 
object of representation, making it “expressive of the impossibility to express” (Three 
Dialogues, 101),246 as D suggests in the “Three Dialogues”, or “a thrusting towards a 
more adequate expression of natural experience, as revealed to the vigilant 
coenaesthesia”, a mere “straining to enlarge the statement of a compromise.” (97). In 
response to which we might conclude with B of the “Three Dialogues” that “No more 
ingenious method could be devised for restoring him, safe and sound, to the bosom of 
[the literary equivalent of] Saint Luke.” (101) Beckett’s rejection of a similar assessment 
of the van Veldes, as discussed in the previous chapter, clarifies that his goal in the 
Trilogy was not drawing attention to the nature of the predicament of the artist. 
 
The attack on representation in the Trilogy was inspired by a conception of art that 
resembles Berkeley’s immaterialism and utilised certain elements of Berkeley’s 
philosophy. Like Berkeley’s attack on the existence of matter, it is caught up in a 
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negative polemic that gives it its impetus, but also has its inherent limitations. The 
spectacular achievements of the Trilogy, nevertheless, led Beckett into an impasse, out of 
which emerged new ways of writing for page and stage which can be related in some of 
their aspects to Berkeley’s work on vision and the image. These will be discussed in the 
next two chapters. 
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5: Paranoid Perception: The Image 
In Knowlson’s biography the title of the chapter dealing with the years following the 
publication of the Trilogy, Waiting for Godot and Endgame is “Impasse and 
Depression.”247 It was a time when Beckett “began to experience renewed doubt about 
whether there was any way out of the dead end into which The Unnamable and Fin de 
partie had led him.”248 In a letter to A.J. Leventhal of 6 August 1953, Beckett writes that 
“Inertia, literary, continues, haven’t the least desire to put pen to paper”.249 The 
impossible art promoted by the “Three Dialogues” powered the self-cancellation of 
representation in the Trilogy, but its energy seems to have been completely spent.  
The Unnamable’s questions at the beginning of the novel have remained unanswered 
– “what should I do, in my situation, how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by 
affirmation and negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later?” (291) By the end of 
the final novel of the Trilogy, the unnamed narrator is uncertain whether the future holds 
a story for him, or only silence: “perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my 
story, before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if it opens, it will 
be I, it will be the silence” (414). As in Franz Kafka’s parable “Before the Law”,250 an 
unnamed protagonist stands before a door that he is unable to open in order to pursue his 
destiny, even though it was created personally for him. Unlike Kafka’s man from the 
country, however, Beckett’s creature has no hopes of finding anything desirable beyond 
the door, nor any wish to go in, and yet death will not come to him, nor silence.  
From within this impasse Beckett gradually began to create images and chart lines of 
flight that allowed him to go on, albeit in a different direction. This chapter will two of 
these interrelated new directions that revolve around visual images and the relations of 
the one who sees to the one being see. It will open with a theoretical discussion of the 
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image in Berkeley and Beckett, and then move on to discuss several pertinent examples 
from Beckett’s work in more depth. 
The Philosophical Image 
Both Gilles Deleuze and Anthony Uhlmann have contended that Beckett’s way forward 
after the crisis caused by the search for non-representational art in The Unnamable was 
found in turning to the image as a non-relational form of expression, an argument that 
serves well a Berkeleyan reading of Beckett’s later writings. According to Deleuze, 
Beckett’s work can be seen as a progression by means of exhaustion. In the 1993 essay 
“The Exhausted”251 he distinguishes three languages in Beckett: a language of names, a 
language of voices and a language of images. Each of these languages attempts to 
exhaust all available possibilities – the language of names enumerates objects, the 
language of voices exhausts the sources of possible fictional worlds and the language of 
images concentrates and then dissipates the very energy of the work.252 Deleuze’s 
tripartite classification may be too schematic to account for the complexity of Beckett’s 
texts, but his conceptualisation of the use of images is a productive and convincing way 
to look at Beckett’s later work.  
In Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image (2006) Uhlmann develops Deleuze’s 
observations and investigates the philosophical and literary sources and implications of 
Beckett’s use of images. I will be relying on his analysis for a preliminary definition of 
the image: 
sights, sounds, smells, tastes and things touched all produce ‘images’ to the sense 
organs which are interpreted by the brain… As images, firstly, they are 
‘something’ which requires interpretation, secondly they are interpreted by the 
brain as meaningful sensations and brought into contact with sign systems, 
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including language… Rather than creating or structuring thought, [the image] 
induces thought. It also precedes thought and exceeds thought. It can be 
understood to be a sign but is not always or only a sign (that is, one can fail to 
understand an image, one can find multiple and shifting sense in an image, and 
the meaning of an image can exceed the meanings assigned to it by signifying 
systems).253 
Thus, the image bridges between the sensual-physical world and the mind. This is a 
psychological process that is intimately related to thinking and has a complex relation to 
philosophy. Images operate as signs – they stand for, or replace, an intangible meaning, 
but their expressiveness may extend further, “not always or only a sign”. As indicated by 
Uhlmann’s title – some images are philosophical in the sense that they are inextricable 
from the attempt to rationalise them into articulate language as ideas or arguments. They 
call for a philosophical interpretation, but they cannot be subsumed by it. 
The interaction between input from the senses and its interpretation by the mind was 
a main concern for Berkeley who calls the sense impressions as conceived by the mind 
‘ideas’ rather than ‘images’. As already discussed, for Berkeley the external world is 
composed of ideas rather than of material objects, making them essential to his 
philosophical system. Berkeley devoted his first published book, A New Theory of Vision 
(1709)254 to an inquiry into how the mind perceives and interprets sense impressions, 
especially the interpretation of visual data and its correlation with tactile impressions to 
create the illusion of external bodies. This work paves the way for the immaterialist 
philosophy of the Principles of Human Knowledge published a year later (1710) where 
ideas derived from the senses are central to the argument. Berkeley considered his views 
on vision to be an essential part of his philosophical position and later re-published A 
New Theory of Vision, more than twenty years after its original publication, together with 
the first edition of Alciphron (1732). 
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In “Philosophical Intuition,” a lecture given in 1911 and later collected in The 
Creative Mind, Henri Bergson turns to Berkeley’s philosophy in order to elaborate a 
concept of an image of thought, which is “almost matter in that it still allows itself to be 
seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allows itself to be touched,--a phantom which 
haunts us”.255 The image of thought hovers between the world and the mind, a liminal 
and indefinable state of being in-between. According to him, every philosopher develops 
a system from a simple intuition that can never be put into words by either the 
philosophers themselves or their readers, but the attempt to approximate such a 
formulation generates philosophical writing. In Berkeley’s work Bergson identifies four 
strands that derive from contemporary philosophical systems but are interrelated in a new 
and original way, concluding that: 
What Berkeley's idealism signifies is that matter is coextensive with our 
representation of it; that it has no interior, no underneath; that it hides nothing, 
contains nothing; that it possesses neither power nor virtuality of any kind; that it 
is spread out as mere surface and that it is no more than what it presents to us at 
any given moment. (95) 
The complexity of the ways matter, representation, and the surface are woven 
together in Berkeley’s thought is seen as stemming from a much simpler intuition that is 
only accessible through a visual image - the image of the veil: “Berkeley perceives matter 
as a thin transparent film situated between man and God. It remains transparent as long as 
the philosophers leave it alone, and in that case God reveals Himself through it.” (97) 
This image is later formulated even more succinctly as “matter is a language which God 
speaks to us.” (98)  
Despite the designation of the image as philosophical, it is not a representation of a 
logical argument, but rather a visual given that the philosophical treatises attempt to 
explicate and interpret within a rational discourse. Bergson’s assumption of the existence 
of an initial intuition which the philosophical image attempts to represent has the same 
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structural function in his argument as the belief in the existence of matter rejected by 
Berkeley. In both cases a hidden source is supposed to give rise to the image, whether 
visual or philosophical, but this source can never be accessed directly. As such, 
Bergson’s initial intuition would be vulnerable to the same criticism that Berkeley directs 
against the existence of matter which is equally inaccessible and unfathomable. And yet, 
if we foreclose the search for an originary intuition, then Bergson’s formulation of the 
image as that which is partly material and partly spiritual can be useful for understanding 
Beckett’s images as well.256 
Deciphering the Image 
If the image is understood as a sensual given which requires interpretation, then it 
logically follows that in some cases interpretation will be easier than in others. Berkeley 
was mostly concerned with the usual conduct of human behaviour, and therefore with the 
way certain interpretations are made so readily that they come to seem natural to us to the 
extent that we don’t even notice the interpretive stage. In A New Theory of Vision 
Berkeley explains that the visual input we receive through our eyes is strictly two-
dimensional and does not resemble the way we normally experience the world. What 
allows us to perceive distance, size and orientation is in fact a normative way of 
interpreting visual data that we learn from experience through the conjunction of visual 
with tactile data. For example, we are able to judge the distance of close objects by the 
movement our eyes must make to focus on such objects. The need to squint in order to 
bring a close object into focus is felt as a sensation of touch, as the muscles of the eye 
contract to shorten the distance between the pupils. It is this sensation that tells us that the 
object is close to us, rather than a purely visual clue: 
it is certain by experience that when we look at a near object with both eyes, 
according as it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, 
by lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. This disposition or turn 
of the eyes is attended with a sensation, which seems to me to be that which in 
this case brings the idea of larger or lesser distance into the mind. (NTV 174)  
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The section on orientation adds a striking application of the principle that experience 
teaches us how to relate visual images to tactile ones where Berkeley attempts to account 
for the reason visual images appear to be upside down on the retina and yet we 
experience them as aligned with the orientation of our body. Instead of assuming that the 
mind somehow corrects the image, Berkeley claims that we simply learned to associate a 
certain area of the visual image with being close to our feet and the earth, and the 
opposite direction as being far from them, and that orientation is exclusively conceived 
by touch (NTV 217-9). The image on the retina, therefore, would be completely correct 
with regards to visual sensation alone, i.e. there is no reversal of the visual image at all. 
At the same time, our interpretation of the image as reversed in relation to our own body, 
with the upper part closer to our feet and the lower part in the direction of our head, is 
also absolutely correct with regards to touch. Initially, these two realms of sensation are 
perceived separately, but once we learn to inter-relate them in the proper manner, we will 
encounter no difficulty in orienting ourselves.  
Berkeley is mostly interested in images that allow us to negotiate our external 
environment correctly. We learn to decipher them in infancy, and afterwards accurately 
interpret them without difficulty. As the examples above show, the act of interpretation 
goes beyond the visual realm by conflating it with tactile experience to create a 
conception that would be useful for the conduct of daily life. Errors in interpretation are 
an inherent possibility in this account, resulting in visual illusions. Three Dialogues 
between Hylas and Philonous includes a well-known example of such a discrepancy - the 
illusion that the moon on the horizon seems bigger than it is in the meridian. Without 
going into the intricacies of Berkeley’s explanation of this phenomenon, suffice it to say 
that it is based on the principle that “the judgment we make on the magnitude of a thing 
depends not on the visible appearance alone, but also on divers other circumstances” (21), 
reiterating the distinction between what the retina registers and what the mind perceives. 
As Margaret Atherton explains, it establishes “a distinction between the immediate 
objects of sight, the ones we undeniably see, and the mediate objects, suggested by the 
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presence of the visible objects although not in themselves visible”.257 The image as 
conceived by the mind, therefore, is not the immediately perceived raw data, but a 
mediated construct that is partly visual and partly conceptual, and most importantly, 
relies on context for interpretation.  
It is this distinction between visual input and image that accounts both for the 
usefulness of the system and for its possible errors. Berkeley compares the 
expressiveness of visual data to linguistic symbols: “Faintness, as well as all other ideas 
or perceptions which suggest magnitude or distance, doth it in the same way that words 
suggest the notions to which they are annexed.” (31) Interpreting such signs can lead to 
error but may also become a source for artistic and intellectual exploration. When writing 
about the philosophical image, Bergson, on the contrary, is interested in images that are 
difficult, or even impossible, to fully interpret. According to Uhlmann, the creation of 
novel images that challenge the way we interpret the world and give rise to philosophical 
questions is the special provenance of art. Through a conjunction of Bergson and Deleuze, 
he develops a distinction between representation – images that are readily interpreted 
because they stand in a clear relation to other images, and presentation – “an image which 
requires interpretation and thus strikes us with its power.”258 The specificity of this type 
of artistic image is the absence of relation or context, as Uhlmann clarifies when 
contrasting it with metaphors:  
An image is both more and a little less than a metaphor. It is more because it 
belongs to a philosophical conceptual lineage that relates it to immediate 
perception, to a plenitude of sensory information that is only later filtered by 
conscious perception. It is less because it does not necessarily include a point of 
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relation (whereas metaphors, which compare two things, necessarily involve 
relations).259 
Beckett’s late work abounds in such haunting images, as will be discussed 
throughout the rest of this chapter. 
Structural and Dramatic Convenience: Film and the Image 
Any discussion of Beckett, Berkeley and the visual image must engage with Film whose 
script opens with the maxim esse est percipi. The 1964 film is one of a kind in Beckett’s 
oeuvre. It is his only excursion into the film medium, an unusual reluctance for Beckett 
who usually produced multiple works in the media he was working in. The ‘General’ 
section of the script presents Berkeley’s maxim as a mechanism for structuring the film: 
Esse est percipi. 
All extraneous perception suppressed, animal, human, divine, self-perception 
maintains in being. 
Search of non-being in flight from extraneous perception breaking down in 
inescapability of self-perception. 
No truth value attaches to the above, regarded as of merely structural and 
dramatic convenience. 
In order to be figured in this situation the protagonist is sundered into object (O) 
and eye (E), the former in flight, the latter in pursuit. 
It will not be clear until end of film that pursuing perceiver is not extraneous, but 
self.260 
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This is quite a revealing explanation for a taciturn author like Beckett, famous for 
refusing to discuss his work. As he wrote to Alan Schneider, the Director of Film, “My 
work is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made as fully as possible, and 
I accept responsibility for nothing else. If people want to have headaches among the 
overtones, let them. And provide their own aspirin.” (Disjecta 97) Beckett’s short 
explanation of the film plot is a rare glimpse into the way he was structuring this work 
around the central image of self-perception.  
The protagonist O, played in the film by Buster Keaton, is attempting to evade 
perception by hiding from the possible looks of other people, then from animals, and 
finally from the image of a gaze in a picture of a God. Beckett reverses the direction of 
being in Berkeley’s maxim – if to be is to be perceived, then not to be perceived amounts 
to non-being. In other words, the protagonist’s escape from perception is not just a desire 
for solitude, but a pursuit of non-being, i.e. it constitutes a suicide attempt. With this in 
mind, the protagonist’s constant checking of his pulse may be read as a further indication 
that he equates not being perceived with the physical death of the body. Every time he 
believes that he has escaped perception, he checks his pulse to ascertain whether he still 
maintains in being. The reasoning that a person’s existence depends on being perceived 
treats the protagonist as an object, an idea that in Berkeley’s philosophy is completely 
passive. Beckett thus pointedly ignores Berkeley’s description of the soul as a spirit that 
is independent of perception. Jean-Michel Rabaté further points out that Beckett’s 
reversal of Berkeley’s formulation from being to non-being reveals a pursuit of 
nothingness that brings it closer to the Democritean maxim – nothing is more real than 
nothing. In Beckett’s reimagining of philosophy the first materialist in Western thought 
and the first immaterialist end up saying the same thing.261 Eventually, the effort proves 
fruitless, as suicidal schemes often do in Beckett, since the protagonist finds out at the 
end of the film that the camera that was pursuing him is actually his own gaze.262 
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As Dan Watt observes,263 the theme of a frustrated suicide may be related to 
Berkeley’s biography through an episode purported to have happened in his student years. 
The incident was probably known to Beckett through Joseph Hone, who reports it in his 
book on Berkeley: “The story is that he attempted, with Contarine’s assistance, to hang 
himself in order that he might know the sensation of death. Cut down in the nick of time, 
his first words on recovering were: ‘Bless my heart, Contarine, you have rumpled my 
band’. (22) In an indignant footnote, Hone & Rossi add that “The first edition of the 
Bibliographia Britannica denied the truth of the execution story on the ground that 
Berkeley ‘had no chums’.” (22) True or false, Beckett probably found the story of a 
failed suicide at least of “structural and dramatic convenience”, since Film brings 
together the Berkeleyan world of ideas and the theme of a protagonist attempting to leave 
this world, but unable to do so. 
According to Branka Arsić, Film is an image of Berkeley’s ‘divine optics’ (49). For 
Berkeley, as was already noted, human vision is two-dimensional, turning the world into 
a flat surface, on which images appear, much like the screen on which Film is projected. 
The flat surface is both the medium on which we see the film, and the wall that protects 
the protagonist’s flank in the first scene. In her interpretation, the pursuing E is the eye of 
God, changed from benevolent guarantor of consistency and order in the world, into a 
relentless pursuer (49-50). This reading encounters the obvious problem that it 
contradicts Beckett’s own explanation that the pursuer is O himself, who moreover 
persists after he has extinguished divine perception in the form of a picture of the deity, 
but it does highlight Beckett’s paranoid rendering of the ubiquity of perception in 
Berkeley’s philosophy. 
Deleuze also views Film as an image of Berkeley, but as the individual personality 
rather than the abstraction of a philosophical argument: “We might imagine that the 
whole story is that of Berkeley, who had enough of being perceived (and of 
perceiving).”264 His reading is rather more positive, since there is a ‘General Solution’ to 
the invasive perception problem: “When the character dies, as Murphy said, it is because 
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he has already begun to move in spirit.”265 I have argued elsewhere266 that both Deleuze 
and Arsić overlook a central discrepancy between Berkeley’s view of the self and the 
basic premise for Beckett’s plot. I contend that the introduction of self-perception goes 
directly against Berkeley’s distinction between ideas and minds and his position that 
minds, or souls, cannot be perceived at all.267 In the Principles of Human Knowledge 
Berkeley explicitly rejects the possibility of self-perception. In Chapter 1 I already noted 
Beckett’s familiarity with Berkeley’s contention that the soul can only perceive ideas, but 
does not constitute one in itself, and therefore it cannot be perceived. He marked several 
passages touching upon this subject in his copy of the work, including the following: 
CXXXVIII: For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and 
perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If, 
therefore, it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented 
in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.268 
The soul can only perceive ideas, but does not constitute one in itself, and therefore it 
cannot be perceived. This kind of self-perception is exactly the goal of the pursuing 
camera in Film. The film unfolds a double plot – the story of the pursuing eye – E and 
that of the pursued object – O. As viewers our perspective is that of the camera, which 
remains unseen as it allows us to see. The gaze of the camera is not neutral, but rather a 
frightening look as befits its description as “pursuer”. Its threatening nature is made 
evident in contrast to the calm exchange of looks between the couple on the street. Only 
when the camera is turned on them do they react with terror, implying that there is 
something special about the pursuing gaze of E. Although Beckett never explains why E 
is so frightening, one possibility is that its terror stems from its impossible pursuit of self-
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perception that can never be fulfilled, neither in philosophical speculation nor through 
cinematic technique. E’s desire aspires to a state of full presence that can only be called 
madness, which may explain its horror. 
When Beckett introduces self-perception into Berkeley’s world of perception-
dependent existence, he creates a contradiction that cannot be resolved. In Ulrika 
Maude’s formulation, “If autonomy is based on the fact that the subject is the agent rather 
than the object of perception, by focusing perception on the self, Beckett collapses the 
categorical distinction and shatters the illusion of autonomous subjectivity”.269 This can 
be seen in the final scene when E is revealed as the inner perception of O, but the only 
way to convey this encounter on screen is by using shot-counter shot of Keaton looking 
at himself from two different angles that stand for the different points of view of the 
perceiver and the perceived, but also imply a different position in space for each of them 
which cannot be reconciled within a single body.270 If at the end of the film O becomes 
“an impersonal yet singular atom that no longer has a Self”,271 it is because self-
perception has sundered, to use Beckett’s term, the stable self-knowledge of the 
Berkeleyan self.272 In fact, as Illeana Marculescu273 observes, the character in the film 
seems rather more intent on obeying the Geulingian dictum inspectio sui, calling for an 
inspection of the self that only teaches us “the spirit’s impotency of probing into the 
abyss of matter and of itself.”274 
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The Observing Eye 
The terror associated with the pursuing eye of O may also be related to the role of 
surveillance in the modern state. According to Michel Foucault, “Full lighting and the 
eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is 
a trap.”275 Foucault is commenting on the architectural innovation proposed by Jeremy 
Bentham for the better management of public structures including prisons, hospitals, mad 
houses and schools. Bentham’s paradigmatic ‘panopticon’ structure imposes discipline on 
its occupants by creating a central observation point that allows guardians to clearly see 
all inmates without being seen themselves. In consequence, the inmates internalise the 
surveillance mechanism and control their actions at all times even in the absence of an 
actual supervisor.276 Bentham’s essay on the panopticon is mentioned in Beckett’s 
Philosophy Notes, testifying to his awareness of the concept.277 In Beckett’s Film the 
source of the gaze is also an agency hidden from sight which exercises power, similar to 
the prison wardens looking through the panopticon, but the observed is less submissive 
(and has more freedom) than Bentham’s imaginary prisoners, and attempts to escape 
from the authoritarian gaze. Nonetheless, as Bentham has planned, the authority of the 
gaze is internalised and revealed as self-perception – the control of the self by the self. 
What is frightening about the gaze of O may thus be the power of the state embodied 
within the individual. 
According to Uhlmann, the single staring eye sequence that opens and closes Film is 
the main image of the whole film, which Beckett originally titled ‘The Eye’.278 In its play 
with the audience, the eye stares at the spectators, unseeing, while being also the unseen 
object of their gaze, both O and E at the same time.279 This image adds another layer of 
impossible self-awareness to the film, at the level of its reception by the audience. It 
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creates a discrepancy between what is seen on screen – the eye, and the common 
interpretation of this visual image – seeing. In Film, the attempt to see ends in blindness. 
O, running from his own self-perception, is blind to the self that pursues him, while the 
pursuing E is unable to see O’s face for most of the film, since he must remain behind his 
back until the final moment.  
The image of the eye in Film is impossible to interpret correctly, because it contains a 
contradictory notion, and yet it affects our perception. Gardner, evoking an analysis by 
Enoch Brater, raises the possibility that the eye of the opening sequence is Keaton’s 
defective eye, hidden behind a patch throughout the film, and adds that the eye “is also 
blind to the inevitability of self-perception”, making it doubly blind.280 Whether we 
accept this interpretation or not, it is clear that in Film the eye is sighted and blind at the 
same time. The outcome may be best described in the words that Bram van Velde used to 
characterise his own painting: “a blinded eye that continues to see, and sees what blinds 
it.”281 
The Image of God 
In the Film script Beckett mentions divine perception as one of gazes the protagonist is 
trying to run away from, practically performed by Buster Keaton tearing a printed image 
of a divinity after a close up on the eyes of the figure. The relation between man and 
personal divinity forms, as I will argue, a major theme in Beckett’s mime play Act 
without Words 1 which features the learning process of a man in an unfamiliar 
environment, a theme which carries Berkeleyan overtones. 
In 1955 Beckett responded to the request of the mime artist Deryk Mendel and wrote 
a short mime play for one actor. The mime, originally written in French, features a man 
thrown into a desert,282 where various objects mysteriously descend from above, 
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promising to ameliorate his situation by providing shade, water, and even the means for 
suicide, only to be taken away as soon as he is about to use them. Act without Words 1 
can be read as a theological comedy that parodies Berkeley’s attempt to demonstrate 
God’s personal involvement in human affairs. This short mime is also a good illustration 
of Beckett’s strategy of reworking philosophical images in a non-religious setting and of 
his use of the image on the stage. 
The mime is often read within the context of Beckett’s interest in psychology. For 
example, Knowlson writes that: 
The mime […] reflects Beckett’s readings in behavioural psychology as a young 
man in the 1930s, when he looked at Wolfgang Köhler’s book The Mentality of 
Apes, about the colony of apes in Tenerife, where experiments were conducted in 
which the apes also placed cubes one on top of another in order to reach a 
banana.283 
In a footnote, Knowlson mentions that Köhler’s book contained photographs of the apes 
successfully performing the tasks required to reach their food, adding a visual layer to the 
textual description. 
Beckett has previously referred to Köhler and his work in Murphy, in the 
conversation between Murphy and his once-teacher Neary. As Neary longs to “gain the 
affections of Miss Dwyer”, Murphy retorts with “‘And then?’ … ‘Back to Tenerife and 
the apes?’” (5) Murphy, the pursuer of the pleasures of the mind, rejects carnal desire, the 
only kind of love there is according to Neary (6). Ackerley explains that the phrase 
Tenerife and the apes is “prosaically, back to the Gymnasium and the students”,284 which 
in this context refers to the humdrum of daily life but also introduces the theme of 
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education – the apes are taught by Köhler, just as Murphy is taught by Neary. Obviously, 
an escape from drudgery through sexual desire is unacceptable to Murphy who is only 
interested in his own mind and therefore rejects Neary’s teachings. The tone of the novel 
may mock his aspirations, but the image of the apes as students subjected to a 
mechanistic learning process is clear nonetheless. 
The ability to learn how to use tools is shared by both humans and apes, a common 
trait that blurs the distinction between the species. The hesitations and mistakes of the 
mime’s protagonist cast some doubts as to his intelligence. Remarkably, he finds it 
difficult to arrange two cubes in order to climb them to reach up, exactly the type of task 
the apes have managed to master: 
He turns, sees cube, looks at it, at carafe, reflects, goes to cube, takes it up… tries 
in vain to reach carafe, renounces, gets down, carries cube back to its place, turns 
aside, reflects.  
A second smaller cube descends from flies, lands… 
He turns, sees second cube, looks at it, at carafe, goes to second cube, takes it up, 
carries it over and sets it down under carafe, tests its stability, gets up on it, tries 
in vain to reach carafe, renounces, gets down, takes up second cube to carry it 
back to its place, hesitates, thinks better of it, sets it down, goes to big cube, takes 
it up, carries it over and puts it on small one, tests their stability, gets up on them, 
the cubes collapse, he falls, gets up immediately, brushes himself, reflects.285 
The man in the mime goes through every possible mistake before finding a 
practicable way to arrange two cubes of different sizes in order to grab the carafe, a skill 
that we expect every normal person to have.  
If the man in the mime is not far superior to an ape, then the entity responsible for the 
arrangement of objects is much more vicious than Köhler the scientific observer. 
Whenever the man is about to enjoy the smallest comfort, this invisible agency deprives 
him of it. Köhler was examining the learning skills of the apes by attempting to teach 
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them new ways to reach food, but the unseen agency that sends objects to the man in 
Beckett’s play can only teach him to resign to suffering and the futility of all endeavour 
that may alleviate it, since none of his ventures is successful. And the man eventually 
learns resignation – when a third, even smaller cube, descends from the flies he refuses to 
even try to make use of it (204), and by the end of the play he is completely immovable:  
The carafe descends from flies and comes to rest a few feet from his body. 
He does not move. 
Whistle from above. 
He does not move. 
The carafe descends further, dangles and plays about his face. 
He does not move. 
The carafe is pulled up and disappears in flies. 
The bough returns to horizontal, the palms open, the shadow returns. 
Whistle from above. 
He does not move. 
The tree is pulled up and disappears in flies. 
He looks at his hands. (206)286 
Whether the man’s apathy is a lesson successfully taught or a form of resistance to 
the behaviourist scheme of reward and punishment is unclear. David Tucker relates the 
cruel treatment of the man, previously criticised for being too easy to interpret in an 
existentialist vein, to Geulincx’s postulation of life as a ‘guignol world’287 where “God 
brings humanity into the world to act here, connected invisibly to and conducted entirely 
at the mercy of this unknowable, unspeakable, ‘ineffable’ authority.”288 In this reading, 
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the final resignation of the man to his fate is the attitude recommended by Geulincx as the 
only logical response to the suffering induced by life on earth. 
Tucker’s reading should be complemented by a consideration of the structure of 
intentionality implied by the scientific experiment which he does not account for. For 
Geulincx, the Will of God is completely inaccessible to us:  
He is the Father of Men, He is ineffable, and in creating us men shows himself to 
be supreme in all things whose modality (that is, the manner of that supremacy) 
we cannot understand, but can understand only that we can never understand that 
modality; in which lies the full measure of ineffability.289 
The intentions behind God’s actions are not simply unknown, but also unknowable in 
principle. This ineffability stands in contrast to the scientist who constructs a controlled 
environment for the apes he is studying with a clearly defined purpose that may even be 
considered to be beneficial to mankind. By bringing the scientific experiment into play, 
Act without Words 1 makes us question the purpose of the experiment unfolding on the 
stage. George Berkeley, unlike Geulincx, discerns a clear purpose in the natural world, 
which can be discovered by any thinking man. In another passage summarised by Beckett 
from the History of Philosophy, Windelband writes: 
The reality of bodies consists, therefore, in this, that their ideas are communicated 
by God to finite spirits, and the order of succession in which God habitually does 
this we call laws of Nature… And finally, since the actual corporeal world is thus 
changed into a system of ideas willed by God, the purposiveness which its 
arrangement and the order of its changes exhibit gives rise to no further 
problem.290 
According to this reading of Berkeley the world has a purpose, expressed through the 
laws of nature. In Alciphron Berkeley goes as far as claiming that “God speaks to man in 
                                                 
289 Geulincx 84. 
290 Windelband 470. Beckett summarised this passage in TCD MS 10967 196r-196v. 
 127 
the same clear and sensible manner as one man doth to another”291 using the language of 
visual images through which “we are taught and admonished what to shun, and what to 
pursue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and how to act with respect to 
things distant from us, as well in time as place”.292 For Berkeley, God’s directions are 
constantly active in guiding our steps in the conduct of daily life and thus his philosophy 
is a great safeguard against theism. Although it is extremely unlikely that Beckett ever 
read Alciphron, it is helpful in understanding some of the ways in which arguments from 
Berkeley’s earlier work can be developed. 
 The mysterious agency offering and then withdrawing comfort from the protagonist 
in Act without Words 1 also directs the behaviour of the man by enticing him to find 
relief by changing his position, climbing on cubes, etc. However, unlike Berkeley’s 
benevolent God, this entity is clearly malevolent, and its directions only mislead the 
protagonist. Instead of guiding him towards relief from the heat, it only brings him 
frustration and futility. Yet again, Beckett renders Berkeley’s philosophical statements in 
a paranoid manner. The God who observes man and helps him negotiate his world turns 
into a frightening pursuer who maliciously offers false hopes in order to add misery to an 
already deplorable situation. 
Perceiving the Other, Perceiving the Self 
The paranoid aspect of esse est percipi and God’s involvement in human life are also 
pervasive in Beckett’s theatre which abounds in unbearable looks and skewed vision, 
particularly in the earlier plays. Beckett’s characters often refer to the other’s gaze, 
sometimes desiring and sometimes dreading it.293 The need of Estragon and Vladimir in 
Waiting for Godot to be perceived has already been researched in connection with 
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Berkeley,294 especially since Lucky’s speech in the English version of the play mentions 
the philosopher by name (43). At the end of Act I Vladimir asks the boy twice if he 
observes him, first if he heard and then if he saw him (50), and demands that Estragon 
look at him when they meet at the beginning of act II (54). Later in the play, it is 
Estragon who wonders if God sees him (71). Beckett also explores the meta-theatrical 
aspect of perception, since the players on stage exist only for the sake of the audience. 
When Vladimir and Estragon look out to the audience, they describe the theatre as a 
charnel house and the spectators as skeletons and corpses, a spectacle from which the two 
vagabonds cannot turn away (60). Didi and Gogo need each other, therefore if one of 
them commits suicide, the other will be left alone. In a roundabout way, their mutual 
perception keeps them in being, similar to the inability of the protagonist of Film to 
disappear from being because he is perceiving himself. Yet again, it should be noted that 
Beckett wilfully neglects Berkeley’s theory of spiritual beings in order to reduce the 
characters to the material existence of their body.  
A similar trope can be found in Happy Days when Winnie feels that “Someone is 
looking at me still. [Pause.] Caring for me still. [Pause.] That is what I find so 
wonderful.”295 Unlike Winnie, who feels herself being watched, Woman 2 in Play asks 
“Is anyone looking at me? Is anyone bothering about me at all?”.296 The Man, on the 
other hand, seems to desire the light, wondering “Have I lost… the thing you want? Why 
go out? Why go –” (315). The light, like the eye of the camera in Film is felt as a menace 
by the mere fact of its existence, being watched is experienced as an inquiry. The camera, 
or the spot light, are neutral, impersonal, described by the Man as “Mere eye. No mind. 
Opening and shutting on me. Am I as much… Am I as much as… being seen?” (317) 
Woman 2 in the play finds her situation unbearable as well, wondering what she needs to 
do in order to make the light abandon her (314).  
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The role of the spot light in Play is more complex however. Whenever it shines on a 
character it brings it into the perception of the audience. Their being is literally being 
seen. As described by Anna McMullan, “Play self-consciously refers to those operations 
of sight and judgement essential to the establishment of truth according to logocentric 
rules… The Light is… associated both with revelation and with judgement.”297 As the 
characters are revealed to the audience, they speak their lines, often abruptly interrupted 
when the spot moves on to the next character. This compulsion to act, whether imposed 
by the light or an attempt by the characters to placate it, can also be seen as a cruel 
interrogation, so much so that the light was called “an instrument of torture” by Billie 
Whitelaw.298 As Steven Connor points out, the spotlight is subject to the same 
compulsion as the players who are forced to speak: “the effect of the repetition is to 
reveal that the light is no freer than they are, but is itself forced to repeat the inquisition, 
having learned nothing, or with no more knowledge than its victims of what has already 
passed.”299  
As in Waiting for Godot, the audience themselves become important observers, as 
they witness the suffering of the figures and the spot light, played for their entertainment. 
This situation results in an endless series of observers and observed: 
The audience are therefore crucial to Play, for it is they, and they only, who 
realize what is happening, as the light, identified as scrutineer in the first half of 
the play, becomes the object of scrutiny the second time through. This transfer of 
position is not a permanent transfer of power, because the self-consciousness 
induced by the awareness of repetition may also bring about an embarrassed sense 
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in the audience that they themselves are being observed, perhaps by some other 
audience.300 
Who is the observer scrutinising the audience? It may be the critic who writes about 
the play, it may be a camera documenting the performance, or it may be, to adopt a 
Berkeleyan stance, God who observes all things at all times to guarantee their existence. 
This latter possibility brings out, yet again, the threatening and dominating nature of 
Berkeley’s divine perception that haunts Beckett’s writing. 
The Eye that Speaks: Ill Seen Ill Said 
In the prose work and late plays, perceiving and being perceived remains a major strand 
in an exploration of the transition from the visual input to its processing that carries a 
different emotional quality. Some of the late works consist entirely of description of 
visual data, such as Imagination Dead Imagine301(orig. French 1965) and Ping (orig. 
French 1966),302 as well as in the novel The Lost Ones (orig. French 1970).303 Perception 
plays an important part in the construction of imaginary worlds in these texts, too 
numerous to be dealt with comprehensively within the scope of this thesis. For the 
present discussion I will focus on two individual late works - Ill Seen Ill Said which 
configures the issues of the visual image, language, and power in a new way, and 
Rockaby which stages a renunciation of both perception and self-perception. Taken 
together, these texts convey a different quality of observation as a relation between seer 
and seen with a spirit of resignation and conciliation. 
In the texts discussed so far in this chapter, the pursuing gaze is always silent. If the 
image is a composite of sense impressions and their interpretation, as Uhlmann writes, 
then these works are preoccupied with perception only. The Unnamable and the 
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characters in Play speculate about the nature and intentions behind their interrogation 
from the point of view of the objects of perception. In Film we see through the point of 
view of the pursuing camera, while it remains invisible to us as it prevents us from seeing 
the perceiving eye itself. Even when the camera is identified as O, his facial expression 
remains fixed, inscrutable. In Ill Seen Ill Said304 the technique of seeing through a 
camera-like point of view is accompanied by a verbal description which often refers to 
itself, as its gaze pursues an old woman. According to Rabaté, the novel describes an eye 
encumbered with a speaking voice which doubles it and interferes with the act of seeing: 
Cet oeil qui parle, et qui parle, mal, comme il voit, mal, s’acharne, surveille sans 
relâche, fouille, guêtte pendant des jours et des nuits, figure un nouvel avatar de la 
caméra indiscréte et terrifiante de Film, mais il se double d’un énonciateur… dont 
les hésitations, les redoublements, les associations incongrue de mots finissent par 
créer un comique très particulier.  
[This eye that speaks, and that speaks, badly, of what it sees, badly, striving, 
surveying without cease, searching, watching day and night, figures a new avatar 
of the indiscrete and terrifying camera of Film, but it is doubled by a speaker… 
whose hesitations, repetitions, incongruous association of words eventually create 
a distinctive comedy.] 305  
The encounter with the image in this novel is portrayed as confusing and uncertain 
for the perceiver. If the visual according to Berkeley is a kind of language, then it is an 
alien and torturing language:  
“Esse est percipi, oui mais with a vengeance : tout le malheur d’être adhère à la 
cornée, envahit la chambre noire de la rétine, et parasite le cerveau de son langage 
universel déréglé qui ne laisse aucun répit.  
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(London: John Calder, 1989) 
305 Rabaté, Berkeley entre Joyce et Beckett 73. 
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[Esse est percipi with a vengeance: all the misery of being attaches itself to the 
cornea, invades the dark chamber of the retina, and colonizes the mind with its 
deranged universal language without respite.]”306 
As the title indicates, the difficulty in Ill Seen Ill Said is twofold – a difficulty to see 
and a difficulty to say. In the case of the image, the two difficulties are interrelated. The 
image is not the raw visual data that meets the eye, but a combination of this input with 
an interpretation as has been discussed above. It is ‘ill seen’ because there is no ready 
made interpretation for this image, or, to use Uhlmann’s terms, the visual image has not 
yet been transformed from presentation to representation. This difficulty of interpretation 
can account for the difficulty in ‘saying’ the image – a necessarily failed attempt to 
describe what is difficult for the mind to conceive.  
Comparing the novel with Film, it is possible to trace a similar structure of a trailing 
gaze. The eye in Film was determined to pursue the protagonist and confront him. The 
eye of Ill Seen Ill Said, on the other hand, seems tormented by the act of seeing, much 
like O and other Beckett characters who suffer when exposed to the gaze in earlier works. 
Ill Seen Ill Said reveals the vulnerability of the perceiver who encounters an image that 
becomes unbearable. In his paradigmatic interrogation of the power relations established 
by the structure of observation, Foucault describes a hierarchy of gazes within the 
physical architecture of the panopticon. In the panopticon prison, jailers ensconced in a 
central position watch inmates in cells organised in a cylinder around them. Since the 
jailers are invisible, the inmates feel constantly watched and consequently internalise the 
discipline, watching over their own behaviour even in the absence of jailers. The proper 
function of the panopticon is to dissociate “the see/ being seen dyad: in the peripheric 
ring [of prison cells], one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one 
sees everything without being seen.”307 In Beckett’s novel a woman is being ‘ill seen’, 
while the narration that accompanies it exposes the seer to the scrutiny of the reader. In 
the panopticon the observing position of the jailers is accessible to the public who can 
visit and observe both the inmates and the prison guards, adding a measure of public 
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307 Foucault, Discipline and Punish 201-202. 
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oversight to the workings of the prison. This observation of the observers, often neglected, 
adds complexity to the gaze of the observer, a complexity which the narration of Ill Seen 
Ill Said exposes. The anonymous narrating voice follows the woman, while readers 
follow both what it sees, and its attempt to understand what it sees. The decoupling of the 
roles of seer and seen allows us to understand the process and its implications. 
Crucially, the observers, whether prison guards, narrating voice, or people in general, 
are affected by their contact with the visual field. In Arsić’s reading of Berkeleyan optics, 
“the disappearance of the labour of mediation between the eye and the visible means that 
the eye is never distant from what it sees for it always sees by being affected by… the 
collection of sensations.”308 What the eye sees affects it immediately, thus leaving it 
vulnerable to the action of the object of vision upon it. The position of the seer is just as 
dangerous as that of the seen, as the seer in Ill Seen Ill Said makes evident:  
What remains for the eye exposed to such conditions? To such vicissitude of 
hardly there and wholly gone. Why none but to open no more. Till all done. She 
done. Or left undone. Tenement and unreason. No more unless to rest. In the 
outward and so-called visible. That daub. Quick again to the brim the old nausea 
and shut again. On her. Till she be whole. Or abort. Question answered. (80) 
Ill Seen Ill Said can be read as looking at the Berkeleyan esse est percipi from a new 
and different angle. The seer and the object of seeing are tied to one another, “She shows 
herself only to her own. But she has no own. Yes yes she has one. And who has her.” 
(62) The eye seems trapped in the domain of the woman, its field of vision limited to the 
hut, its occupant, the surrounding zone of stones, and the surrounding pastures. When the 
woman goes away, there is an interval of waiting until she reappears (64-5). The eye is 
coerced to see the woman, as if against its will: “Not endurable. Nothing for it but to 
close the eye for good and see her. Her and the rest. Close it for good and all and see her 
to death. Unremittent. In the shack.” (74) The plight of the eye disturbs the implied power 
structure between pursuer and pursued, and illustrates how both are trapped in their 
respective positions, yet without obliterating the distinction between them. This mutual 
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torment can only be resolved in Ill Seen Ill Said by exhausting the visible: “Illumination 
then go again and on return no more trace. On earth's face. Of what was never. And if 
mishap some left then go again. For good again. So on. Till no more trace. On earth's 
face.” (96)  
All Eyes: Rockaby 
The late play Rockaby (1981),309 a play published the same year as Ill Seen Ill Said, is 
another elaboration of the theme of self-perception, but this time it is the attitude of the 
observed that has changed. A figure in a rocking chair appears repeatedly in Beckett’s 
work, associated with contemplation and self-perception in Murphy, discussed in Chapter 
2, as well as Film where the camera manages to confront O when he is relaxing in a 
rocking chair. Rockaby concentrates this motif into a single image – a woman in rocking 
chair, alone on stage, being rocked mechanically throughout the duration of the play. The 
figure sitting in a chair in this late play also evokes Murphy who tied himself to a rocking 
chair in order to come alive in his mind, except that the intentionality of Murphy is 
reversed – Murphy is actively seeking the life of the mind, whereas the woman is sitting 
passively while the chair is rocking her on its own. Although both sitters die in the 
armchair, Murphy goes out with a bang in an unintended accident while the unnamed 
woman is being gently rocked to death with her own consent.  
Another echo from Murphy appears in the text spoken by the voice in the play.310 The 
disembodied voice repeats a very similar text four times, each time introducing a new 
motif for repetition and permutation. In the second repetition, the new motif specifies that 
the woman is sitting “at her window… facing other windows” (437). According to 
Knowlson, the woman in the armchair draws on two biographical sources: “There was 
the frail figure of his maternal grandmother, ‘little Granny,” Annie Roe, dressed ‘in her 
best black,’ sitting in a rocking chair… [and] Beckett himself sat, often for hours on end, 
                                                 
309 Samuel Beckett, “Rockaby,” The Complete Dramatic Works (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 
1986) 431-442. On the process of composition, see Knowlson, Damned to Fame 582-3. 
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staring at the rows of Santé prison cell windows.”311 The spatial arrangement of a 
window opening unto other windows also evokes the opening of Murphy who lives in “a 
medium-sized cage of north-western aspect commanding an unbroken view of medium-
sized cages of south-eastern aspect.” (3) The contemplative Murphy draws the curtain to 
avoid external sounds and sights which “detained him in the world to which they 
belonged.” (4) The woman in Rockaby, on the contrary, is searching for such evidence of 
external beings, looking “for another… another like herself/ a little like/ another like 
herself” (437) driven by a Berkeleyan need “to see/ be seen” (439), but the windows are 
opaque: “all blinds down” (438).312 The blinds might be drawn because the inhabitants of 
these houses are unwilling to look out, but they may also carry a more sinister note. In 
Krapp’s Last Tape the tape recorder plays Krapp’s description of his mother’s death in 
which the moment of her passing away is marked only by the drawing of the blind in her 
hospital room.313 In a way, the drawn blinds already pre-figure the death of a woman at 
the end of the play.  
Beckett re-actualises the cliché of the eye as a window into the soul by reversing its 
direction from eyes to windows. The woman in the chair is seeing “all eyes/ all sides” 
(435), she is the only one who “let up the blind” (437), but the other windows/ eyes are 
still blind and do not perceive her. The image of a row of blind eyes, staring back at the 
woman, resembles the eye of Buster Keaton in Film who stares from the screen, unseeing, 
at the audience. Like the camera in Film and the narrator of Ill Seen Ill Said, the woman 
wants to become a pursuing eye, but she can find no object to pursue, there is no O to her 
E. The eye becomes the site of desire for the other which is also the self at the same time, 
as McMullan writes: “The desire to perceive the other seems to be the desire for a 
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reflection of the self, or rather, the desire to recognize the desire of the ‘self’ in the desire 
of the other.”314  
The woman, however, could not find an object to direct her gaze at and so she herself 
becomes an object, both for the audience watching her in the theatre, and for herself. 315 
The woman turns her gaze upon herself, sits down in the rocking chair, and gives herself 
up to self-perception. This is presented on stage through the division of her voice and 
image. Unlike the man in Film she is not frightened by her own perception or tries to 
evade it, but rather revels in it, asking four times for “More”.316 There is no conflict 
between perceiver and perceived in this play, creating an atmosphere of resignation and 
acceptance that rock her gently unto death. In Jane Alison Hale’s succinct summary, “the 
woman of Rockaby retreats from the outer world to the sanctuary of her rocking chair, 
where she descends into the depths of self-perception in an attempt to reach the end of 
her compulsion to perceive.”317 
In Ill Seen Ill Said the compulsion to see ends with the erasure of a trace by 
exhausting it: “Illumination then go again and on return no more trace. On earth's face. 
Of what was never. And if mishap some left then go again. For good again. So on.” (96) 
In a similar manner, Rockaby repeats a text, each time expanding it with a new motif, 
until the traces “left” are all exhausted. The refrain “Time she stopped” is reiterated 
throughout the play, but the ‘action’ of the play only partially fulfils this statement. The 
phrase first appears at the beginning of the monologue as the woman is rocking in the 
chair, listening to her own voice speaking to her (435). Both the rocking and the speaking 
continue until the end of the play, with several breaks. With each repetition, the woman 
verbalizes the refrain together with the voice in an increasingly softer tone (434). Each 
time the woman goes on and asks for more and the spectator can imagine her being 
rocked on interminably without ever actually stopping, like other Beckett characters who 
seem unable to die. Only the last repetition that evokes the mother who died in the same 
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chair breaks the pattern and the woman passes away. Significantly, in this final repetition 
there is a recognition of self-perception reminiscent of the concluding moment of Film in 
an embryonic form: “time she went down/ down the steep stair/ time she went right down 
was her own other/ own other living soul” (441). Both mother and daughter resign from 
the world in favour of the rocking chair, but in contrast to the famished eye of the 
daughter, the mother’s eyes are closed: 
rocked 
with closed eyes 
closing eyes 
she so long all eyes 
famished eyes (441) 
In the end the daughter closely imitates the mother, not only by sitting in the same 
chair, but also by renouncing her desire to see: 
saying to the rocker 
rock her off 
stop her eyes 
fuck life 
stop her eyes 
rock her off 
rock her off (442) 
Giving oneself up to the rocking of the chair is another image of self-perception – 
sought after in Murphy, rebelled against in The Unnamable, dreaded in Film and 
appeasing in Rockaby. The woman’s repetition of the refrain “time she stopped” clearly 
marks her desire to be “stopped”, which in the context of play would indicate a wish for 
death. In Film, the desire to see keeps the eye open, and the protagonist from 
disappearing from percipi, and hence keeps him alive. The Unnamable also speculates 
that he might be in a similar inward-looking situation: “Can it be... that one day I simply 
stayed in” (291) and yet he continues to generate discourse – to stop the motion of the 
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body is not enough, since self-perception keeps the subject in being. In Rockaby the eyes 
are described as stopped, closely associated with the decision to give up life, as the 
rocking motion and the voice come to a stop together. The observer of Ill Seen Ill Said 
delights in perceiving and its passion is satisfied at the end of the novel – “Lick chops 
and Basta… Grace to breath that void. Know happiness.” (97) The woman in Rockaby, 
who could find no object to pursue, chose a different path and became the willing object 
she was looking for, delighting in the self-perception that eases her out of being.  
 
The power of the image, the act of perception and the state of being perceived return 
again and again in Beckett’s writing across all genres and media. These interests closely 
align with, and reflect on, Berkeley’s most central tenets. Even as Beckett deliberately 
misinterprets them, he is often referring or alluding to Berkeleyan concepts and precepts 
in these works, making Berkeley’s philosophy a source that needs to be considered even 
in those works that do not mention him by name or obvious allusion. Beckett interprets in 
an emotional and pessimistic manner philosophical content that was conceived of as 
neutral, logical arguments. This emotional value transitions across the works discussed 
here from threat and paranoia to attachment and reconciliation. Like Uhlmann’s 
philosphical images which generate whole systems of thought, Beckett may be said to 
repeatedly turn to the relation of perception in order to create works of art that can never 
quite exhaust it.  
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6: Blind Seers: Vision and Blindness 
The previous chapter was concerned with the theoretical implications of the image as a 
composite of the intellectual and the sensual. The current chapter looks more closely at 
the process of seeing and its corollary – not seeing, i.e. blindness. Since various aspects 
of vision in Beckett’s work have been well studied, I will begin by briefly reviewing the 
existing research. This will be followed by a study of blindness in Beckett and Berkeley – 
an issue that keeps recurring in both authors. Blindness and impaired vision are a 
constant motif in Beckett from the blind beggar in Beckett’s first written novel Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women318 to the very title of Ill Seen Ill Said. His work, moreover, 
features many blind characters, both on stage and in the prose. In Berkeley’s writing, 
blind men are a recurrent trope used to illustrate the nature of vision. My purpose is to 
show that both Berkeley and Beckett think of blindness in similar ways, as well as argue 
that the former was a source of inspiration for at least one of the latter’s blind men – the 
unnamed A in Rough for Theatre 1. 
Beckett and the Visual 
In her seminal work, The Painted Word: Samuel Beckett’s Dialogue with Art,319 Lois 
Oppenheim argues that Beckett´s imagination was primarily visual. Beckett’s interest in 
art and artists has been well documented, and numerous artists found rich materials in his 
work to inspire visual creation. Oppenheim distinguishes four paradigmatic aspects of the 
specular in Beckett’s writing: explicit references to art, breaking the relation between self 
and world, a thematic figuration of the act of seeing, and visual effects.320 In the 
following review I will address the first and last aspects, since the previous chapter 
addressed the thematisation of seeing and being seen, while Chapter 3 of this thesis dealt 
extensively with Beckett’s art of non-relation. 
In the preface to his biography of Beckett, Knowlson singles out music and art as 
areas that had been “least explored” in Beckett criticism and notes that Beckett “was a 
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passionate connoisseur of painting and sculpture, and his startling post-modern images 
appear to have been influenced by his love of the Old Masters: Dürer, Rembrandt, 
Caravaggio, Mantegna, Antonello, Giorgione, Blake, Jack B. Yeats.”.321 In the years that 
passed since the biography was published in 1996, Beckett’s interest in painting and the 
visual arts received much more critical attention and the list of painterly influences has 
been further expanded.322  
Beckett began to attend galleries regularly during his years at Trinity, and he kept an 
interest in art throughout his life.323 When travelling in Germany in 1936-7 he kept a 
diary where he wrote at length about the paintings he saw. According to Mark Nixon, 
“The descriptive detail and the sheer volume of notes that Beckett took on the paintings 
he saw in German art galleries testify to his passionate interest in the visual arts, an 
interest that extended to sculpture and architecture.”324 Beckett also took a keen interest 
in, and formed close friendships with, several contemporary artists, most notably Jack B. 
Yeats, Bram van Velde, Henry Hayden and Avigdor Arikha.325 Later in life he was 
generous with permissions for artists to illustrate his work.326 
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One of the most remarkable ‘painterly’ effects of Beckett’s work is his use of colours 
on page and on stage. It is important to note that colours were also central to 18th-century 
discussions of vision and optics. Early modern philosophy took it for granted that light 
and colours were the proper objects of sight, inaccessible to any other sense. For example, 
Simon Ockley, who translated the 12th-century Muslim philosopher Ibn Tufayl into 
English in 1708,327 was outraged by the suggestion that a blind man will be able to 
understand the nature of light and colour, writing that “‘tis very improper, because ‘tis 
utterly impossible to give a Man that is born Blind, the least notion or idea of Light or 
Colours.”328 Berkeley concurs that colour is the most basic unit of information that can be 
absorbed by our sense of vision – “By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with 
their different degrees and variations.” (PHK 41 §1) What was considered to be a 
secondary quality by previous philosophers, is for Berkeley the most certain and 
necessary attribute of visual ideas, alongside shape: 
I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated 
from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have 
some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, 
must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or 
a low, or a middle-sized man. (PHK 29) 
Oppenheim traces the development of Beckett’s use of colour from vibrant variety in 
the early work to muted colours and grey-scale in the late work.329 She especially notes 
                                                 
327 Ibn Tufail (Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Tufail al-Qasi), The Improvement of Human Reason 
Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan, trans. Simon Ockley (London: Edm. Powell, 1708). Ockley’s 
was the third translation into English, preceded by George Keith in 1674 and George Ashwell in 1686. The 
multiple translations testify to the work's popularity at the time. For a timeline of Ibn Tufayl’s influence in 
the west, see Samar Attar, The Vital Roots of European Enlightenment: Ibn Tufayl's Influence on Modern 
Western Thought (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto & Plymouth UK: Lexington Books, 2010) xv-
xviii. 
328 Ibn Tufayl, The Improvement of Human Reason Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan, trans. 
Simon Oakley (London: Powell, 1708) 9 (translator’s note). 
329 Oppenheim, The Painted Word 41-43. 
 142 
that “black and white, and the grays that lie between, suffice to render the nonvisible 
visible”.330 The absence of vivid colours is apparent in the late dramatic and prose works. 
The grey scale of Beckett’s drama is the subject of a whole chapter in Enoch Brater’s Ten 
Ways Of Thinking About Samuel Beckett. His main argument is that: 
In Beckett’s work grey, the colour grey, becomes a vast serial motif in a wide 
range of genres. Mixtures of black and white, shades of the colour grey bring a 
variety of tonal values to his writing, and the different properties he assigns to 
them display a subtle coordination of rich textual and theatrical effects.331 
The instructions for the staging of Footfalls (1976), for example, describe the 
protagonist May as having “dishevelled grey hair, worn grey wrap hiding feet, trailing”, 
pacing in a “dim” light.332 The short prose text “Lessness” (1968) describes a similarly 
grey body in a grey landscape: “Grey sky no cloud no sound no stir earth ash grey sand. 
Little body same grey as the earth sky ruins only upright. Ash grey all sides earth sky as 
one all sides endlessness.”333 Fragment number 8 in Fizzles (1976) describes how a skull 
creates a world that is revealed by a grey dawn: “By degrees less dark till final grey or all 
at once as if switched on grey sand as far as eye can see beneath grey cloudless sky same 
grey.”334 The grey tones of Beckett’s work create a world of shadows, where the figures 
are hardly distinguishable. This is brought into relief in his TV work, where low 
resolution and small screens made the plays border on the invisible according to Luz 
María Sánchez:  
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these productions are in black and white or, to be precise, a range of greys. Their 
fades to black, fade ups, and cross dissolves, as a result of their duration and the 
characteristics of lighting, make very difficult the act of ‘seeing’ these TV 
productions. Taking into account TV sets between 1965 and 1985, these short 
pieces that emerge from total blackness to a grey space already speak of the 
difficulty intrinsic in the act of trying to see.335 
Amidst the general dim and gloom of the late work Beckett also offers glimpses of 
primary colour. One of his peculiar uses of colour is as a means of differentiating 
between otherwise indistinguishable figures such as the three women Flo, Vi and Ru in 
Come and Go336 (1966) or the four dancers in Quad I.337 In both plays, the figures on 
stage wear a full body costume that hides the personal traits of the actors or dancers – 
long coats and large hats in Come and Go and “Gowns reaching to ground, cowls hiding 
faces” (452) in Quad I (1982). Each figure is dressed in a different colour, thus allowing 
the audience to distinguish between them, but this distinction is formal rather than 
personal, reminiscent of Berkeley’s view of humanity as “white or black or tawny”. The 
different colours therefore provide visual interest, at the same time as they erase 
difference and individuality. This erosion of personality is evident in Quad II (1982) 
where the variously coloured costumes which distinguished the figures are replaced by 
“four identical grey gowns” (454), turning the play into a grey-scale world of reduced 
visibility. 
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The Act of Blindness 
Beckett’s interest in colour and visual effects is complemented by an equally prominent 
interest in invisibility and blindness, a subject that remains relatively unexplored in his 
work. For Beckett, visual impairment was a close and personal topic. He never enjoyed 
good eyesight and according to Knowlson, when he was volunteering with the UN in 
post-war France, “his eyesight was so bad that some of the unfortunate nurses whom he 
drove back from Cherbourg or Dieppe at great speed were terrified.”338 Later on in life he 
had to undergo cataract operations several times.339 Eye problems and blindness are 
frequently mentioned in Beckett’s work.340 This section will review some of Beckett’s 
best known blind figures, and the connections between visual impairment and art. 
In Memoirs of the Blind341 Jacques Derrida meditates on blindness and painting 
through a discussion of drawings of blind figures hosted in the Louvre. He proceeds from 
the hypothesis that “the drawing is blind, if not the draftsman or draftswoman. As such… 
the operation of drawing has something to do with blindness, would in some way regard 
blindness”.342 The blindness is later explained as, among others, the result of a paradox of 
representation – the artist can never see the model and the drawing at the same time: 
at the instant when the point at the point of the hand (of the body proper in 
general) moves forward upon making contact with the surface, the inscription of 
the inscribable is not seen… even if the model is presently facing the artist, the 
trait must proceed in the night.343 
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The artist, like the blind man, must draw on memory and imagination in order to 
represent the world, even if for the brief moment in which the eyes move from the model 
to the paper. The artist can either look at the model to be painted, or at the page on which 
it is drawn, but not at both at the same time, forcing a choice between blindness to reality 
and blindness to the work of art. 
This intimate connection between drawing, the art of visual representation, and 
blindness can be assimilated to a certain conception of the artist. The figure of the blind 
poet, from Homer to Milton and beyond, was influential in propagating the idea that 
blindness is compensated by a sort of inner vision. The extinction of light in this 
perspective, reveals a hidden truth that lies beyond the phenomenal world, and thus 
“perhaps the Chaos and Darkness which were antithetical to [Milton’s] Heaven were 
truer representations of the universe” than his youthful dreams of a new political order. 344 
In Milton’s case, inner vision is gained at the price of disappointment and the discovery 
of a bleak truth, themes that resonate with Beckett’s depictions of the artistic creations of 
the blind in Waiting for Godot and Endgame. 
Angela Moorjani evokes inner vision when she writes about blind characters in 
Beckett as “the blind half pictured as an ironic image of the artist (looking inward)”.345 
She observes that Pozzo who turns blind in the second act of Waiting for Godot and 
Hamm, the blind protagonist of Endgame both compose texts of a literary nature. The 
image of these blind men as artists can be seen as directly parodic rather than discreetly 
ironic - both Pozzo’s and Hamm’s so-called poetic production is hackneyed and undercut 
by the speaker’s prosaic turn of mind and plain viciousness. Katharine Worth describes 
one of Pozzo’s speeches as “a dismal sample of his powers, creaking between the utterly 
prosaic and an affected lyricism.”346 In a letter to Schneider Beckett explains that Pozzo 
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is plainly insane: “He is a hypomaniac and the only way to play him is to play him 
mad.”347 Pozzo’s mad oscillation between the poetic and the prosaic is evident when he 
launches into the twilight speech Worth refers to, by inviting his audience to look at the 
sky with him: 
[He looks at the sky.] Look. [All look at the sky except LUCKY who is dozing off 
again, POZZO jerks the rope.] Will you look at the sky, pig! [LUCKY looks at 
the sky.] Good, that’s enough. [They stop looking at the sky.] What is there so 
extraordinary about it? Qua sky. It is pale and luminous like any sky at this hour 
of the day. [Pause.] In these latitudes. [Pause.] (37) 
Pozzo’s invitation to look at the sky plays off the cliché of the poetic description of 
the beauty of the twilight and nature in general. He undermines this cliché by asking that 
his audience look at the sky directly which would make the description superfluous. This 
observation is performed mechanically for a limited amount of time and results in a 
generality that annuls the value of looking at the sky at that moment. Pozzo’s attitude 
towards the sky is more akin to science than to poetry, for if the sky is typical for the 
latitude, what is the benefit of observing it on this specific day? Furthermore, Pozzo’s 
coarse treatment of Lucky undercuts any presumption to refined feelings.  
In Endgame, Hamm gives an equally non-convincing performance as regards 
poetical production, albeit in a different manner. According to Katherine Weiss:  
The audience sees Hamm acting the tyrant throughout even to the point of 
insisting that all listen to him while he tells a story that he has been constructing, 
presumably, for some time… He is not only an author but also, as his name 
suggests, he is a ham actor; his text as well as his performance of it are 
overdone.348  
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In the “Three Dialogues” Beckett equates the scrutiny of inner feelings with 
depictions of the external world, showing no preference for looking inwards over looking 
outwards, as discussed in Chapter 3. Pozzo describes the outside world in a mechanical 
and careless manner, making his subsequent blindness seem like an expression of his 
attitude towards the world. Hamm is blind from the beginning of the play, so we have no 
knowledge of his attitude while still sighted, but it appears that losing his eyesight has 
brought him no insight. As Daniel Albright observes about Endgame: “Hamm is a sour 
blind Prospero, his staff broken, his book drowned, a Prospero of dead imagination.”349  
The Moral Blind Spot 
One of the consistent aspects of Beckett’s representation of blind persons is the power 
they yield over their fellow human beings, as Pozzo and Hamm do. As early as Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women, Belacqua is watching a blind man begging in the street: 
Across the way, under the arcades of the Bank, the blind paralytic was in his place, 
he was well tucked up in his coverings, he was eating his dinner like any working 
man. A friend, not even a friend, a hireling, would come for him at the appointed 
hour and wheel him home through the dark streets. He would be put to bed. He 
would be called for punctually and wheeled gently, for he was a power in the 
Coombe.350 
The blind beggar in this early novel shares many characteristics with blind characters 
in Beckett’s later writings. Despite his physical disabilities – the man is both blind and 
crippled – he is “a power” in the neighbourhood, to be feared rather than pitied. He earns 
his own living by begging, and even has enough money to afford to pay an assistant to 
get him to and from his place of work. We find a similar arrangement with an aide in All 
that Fall where blind Dan Rooney, who earns his living by doing unspecified work in an 
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office, pays a young boy to help him get to and from the train station, so he can travel to 
the city.351 As Moorjani pointed out, blind men in Beckett’s work are instead often 
accompanied by a younger aid: 
Many generational pairs are split into one blind and one seeing party, as in Gall 
Senior and Junior, Pozzo and Lucky, Hamm and Clov, Dan and Jerry, with the 
blind half pictured as an ironic image of the artist (looking inward) while acting 
out an imperious form of neediness and dependence on the seeing half (looking 
outwards).352  
These blind men and their helpers form pseudo-couples that are inter-dependent on 
each other. The blind depend on the assistance of the sighted aides, and in return they 
share some of their material wealth with them in the form of salary or food. This relation 
of mutual dependence is highlighted in Watt (pub. 1953) where it is the only indication 
that Gall Senior is, in fact, blind:  
They were two, and they stood, arm in arm, in this way, because the father was 
blind, like so many members of his profession. For if the father had not been blind, 
then he would not have needed his son to hold his arm, and guide him on his 
rounds, no, but he would have set his son free, to go about his own business. So 
Watt supposed, though there was nothing in the father’s face to show that he was 
blind, nor in his attitude either, except that he leaned on his son in a way 
expressive of a great need of support.353 
It is important to note that in all these couples, the blind man is the partner who has 
money and power, whether being able to earn it like the older Mr. Gall in Watt and blind 
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Dan, or possessing wealth from an unknown source as Pozzo or Hamm. Despite their 
physical disability, Beckett’s blind men can be seen as the privileged partner in these 
relationships.  
The blind men in Waiting for Godot, Endgame354 and All that Fall are all lacking in 
empathy and moral sense despite, or maybe because, of their disabilities. From the 
experience of their own limitations, we might expect them to show empathy towards 
other people in need, but instead they exhibit a marked lack of compassion. Blind Dan in 
All that Fall is particularly imperious and vicious, especially towards children. The radio 
play suggests that he may have pushed a child off the train to its death, or at least 
contemplated killing a child, as he confesses to his wife: “Did you ever wish to kill a 
child? [Pause.] Nip some young doom in the bud. [Pause.] Many a time at night, in winter, 
on the black road home, I nearly attacked the boy.”355 Dan’s dubious morality is 
questioned in the Grove Companion: “Does blind Dan fantasize about nipping “some 
young doom in the bud,” or was he involved in the child’s having “fallen” from the 
train?”356 Mr. Rooney not only admits that he thought of killing a child, but this 
murderous desire is so strong it is difficult for him to keep it in check, even while he is 
being led by the boy on whom he depends in order to reach his home. Whether the child’s 
death on the train journey was Dan’s doing or not, he comes across as a threatening 
figure rather than a pitiful invalid.  
In Endgame, similarly, Hamm treats his aging father as a nuisance: 
NAGG: Me pap! 
HAMM: Accursed progenitor! 
NAGG: Me pap! 
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HAMM: The old folks at home! No decency left! Guzzle, guzzle, that’s all they 
think of.357 
Instead of caring for his ageing and crippled father, Hamm begrudges him the food 
that keeps him alive. Throughout the play Hamm treats the other characters on stage and 
in his story with obvious disdain and often, sadism.358 Hamm, like Tiriel the eponymous 
hero of William Blake’s poem,359 has mistreated his children and is now left, old and 
blind, to wander the world, figuratively speaking, where he encounters his senile parents. 
Tiriel, an “early personification of tyranny”,360 fails to see that the laws he tried to impose 
on his children were unsuited for their needs and incited them rebellion. Like Hamm, he 
is blind to the way his actions might affect other people. Seán Kennedy has suggested 
that Hamm’s refusal to assist the peasants dying of hunger may be viewed as a figurative 
reference to the Protestant Ascendancy and a critique of the “betrayal of W. B. Yeasts’s 
suppression of the darker aspects of the Ascendancy’s Irish history, in particular the Irish 
Famine of 1845-1852”.361 This refusal to acknowledge past crimes is another kind of self-
imposed blindness that testifies to an unethical position.  
In Western culture the figure of a blind man is often associated with ethical 
deficiency. One of the foundational sources for this conception is alluded to in All that 
Fall  when Mr Rooney asks Mrs. Rooney: “Are you in a condition to lead me? [Pause.] 
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We shall fall into the ditch.”362 The warning evokes the biblical condemnation of the 
Pharisees: “And he spake a parable unto them, Can the blind lead the blind? shall they 
not both fall into the ditch?” (Luke 6: 39, King James version). Derrida comments that in 
the New Testament, “It is always the other who did not yet see…Here is a symbol: the 
blindfolded synagogue. The Pharisees… are blind. They see nothing because they look 
outside, only at the outside.”363 Blindness is thus being treated as the result of a moral 
decision, an affliction that one brings on oneself by refusing to see things from the point 
of view of the believers.  
In a famous painting by Pieter Brueghel the Elder, The Parable of the Blind Leading 
the Blind, the biblical allegory is given literal interpretation. It depicts the allegorical 
figure of the blind man as a series of realistic blind individuals suffering from diverse 
afflictions, concretising the parable and tying moral values to physical disability, but at 
the same introducing ambiguity and realism into the biblical parable.364 According to 
Knowlson, the painting is “recreated in the second act [of Waiting for Godot] (with 
reduced numbers in Beckett’s play) by Pozzo following his guide, Lucky, on a shorter 
lead than in the first act.”365 Mrs. Rooney similarly takes the allegory literally, adding a 
typical sexual innuendo in reaction to the threat of falling into a ditch: “Oh, Dan! It will 
be like old times!”366 
The series of vicious blind men in Beckett’s work comes to an end with blind Dan 
and the blind beggar A in Rough for Theatre I, a play that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Blind characters as such do not appear in subsequent works, but the interest in 
visual impairment persists. It is not always clear whether the persons described are 
sighted or not. For example, in The Lost Ones the environmental conditions within the 
cylinder in which a group of people live affect their ability to see. The narrator wonders 
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about the “Consequences of this light for the searching eye. Consequences for the eye 
which having ceased to search” (183) and later on the narrator explains that the light “not 
only dims but blurs into the bargain.” (192). This makes the sense of vision much less 
useful, even if it was not affected by the extreme conditions of the cylinder resulting in 
“nothing short of blindness” (196). For those who search for relatives or friends “The 
gloom and press make recognition difficult.” (184) Inside the tunnels, they “crawl 
blindly” and when it comes to the vanquished who gave up the search “it would be more 
correct to speak of the blind and leave it at that.” (192) The visual difficulties of the 
searchers within the cylinder result from an environment which affects their eyes on the 
one hand, and obstructs vision on the other. It is a generalised impairment forced on all 
dwellers, regardless of their own attitudes or social standing. Blindness is no longer a 
personal marker, but a limitation of the world. The blind characters in the plays discussed 
above may be seen as allegories of moral deficiency, but the blindness of the cylinder 
dwellers generalises the disability to the conditions of existence itself. 
A similar situation appears in fragment no. 1 in Fizzles, which describes a man trying 
to find a way out of a dark maze. The absence of light is so constant and inviolable that 
he gives up any attempt to use his sense of sight: 
Do his eyes, after such long exposure to the gloom, begin to pierce it? No, and 
this is one of the reasons why he shuts them more and more, more and more often 
and for ever longer spells. For his concern is increasingly to spare himself 
needless fatigue, such as that come of staring before him, and even all about him, 
hour after hour, day after day, and never seeing a thing.367 
The dark environment imposes blindness, yet the man is criticised for giving in to the 
gloom: “but perhaps he was wrong not to persist, in his efforts to pierce the gloom… The 
moon may appear, framed at the end of the vista, and he in no state to rejoice or quicken 
his step”.368 In this more complex scenario, blindness is both a condition of existence and 
a personal choice, since the pressure of the environment influences his will over time. 
                                                 
367 Beckett, Fizzles 200. 
368 Beckett, Fizzles 200-201. 
 153 
There is no indication that the situation will change in the future, but the man can still 
choose to keep his eyes open, if only for the sake of keeping hope alive.  
The Light of Enlightenment 
For Berkeley and early modern philosophers in general, sight was not only a physical 
ability or an allegory of morality, but first and foremost a way of perceiving and 
understanding the world. The following section will discuss the primacy of vision in 
Berkeley’s time, and Berkeley’s nuanced position towards it. Unlike most of the 
discussions in this thesis, there is no direct evidence to suggest that Beckett was familiar 
with the details of Berkeley’s theory of vision. There are no reading marks in the work 
Towards a New Theory of Vision included in the volume of Berkeley’s works left in 
Beckett’s library at the time of his death. Nevertheless, Berkeley discusses the main 
tenets of his theory of vision in his other works, including all three works read by Beckett 
– The Commonplace Book, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues 
between Hylas and Philonous. Beckett was therefore familiar with the outline of 
Berkeley’s theory. Given the importance and originality of Berkeley’s philosophy of 
vision, a comparison with Beckett’s attitude to the subject will be valuable since it 
involves similarities in outlook even in the absence of direct influence. 
D. A. Caeton states that in the Enlightenment period “blindness became fetishised in 
debates among both rationalists and sensualists.”369 Fetishisation is made apparent in the 
emergence of vision, after Descartes, as a key metaphor to describe human understanding. 
This emphasis on vision is often termed ‘oculocentrism’. In his seminal 1993 study, 
Downcast Eyes : The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-century French Thought, Martin 
Jay argues that: 
Descartes may thus not only be responsible for providing a philosophical 
justification for the modern epistemological habit of "seeing" ideas in the mind, 
but may also have been the founder of the speculative tradition of identitarian 
reflexivity, in which the subject is certain only of its mirror image. In addition, he 
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is also often seen as legitimating a mode of scientific investigation through visual 
observation of evidence (from the Latin videre), which could lead in a decidedly 
empirical direction.370 
The privilege of vision in both idealist contemplation and empirical data dominated 
philosophy in the 17th and 18th centuries, and justifies a literal application of the term the 
‘age of enlightenment’. Jay shows the central role played by light and visibility and 
contrasts it with a critique of visual metaphors in 20th-century French thought, which 
could have been discerned in Derrida’s choice to focus on drawings of the blind in the 
essay discussed above.  
The centrality of vision goes hand in hand with a privileging of the sense of sight, as 
explained by James Hill: 
Generally, philosophical oculocentrism, in Descartes and elsewhere, involves two 
steps. Firstly, sight is taken to be pre-eminent among the bodily senses. It is 
treated as the peculiar sense of knowing when compared with the other four 
senses. In particular, it is thought to be superior to touch ― a vaguely-defined 
sense modality which… often includes such things as the awareness of our own 
posture and of our bodily movement. Secondly, with the pre-eminence of vision 
established, philosophers are then led to employ visual metaphors in making sense 
of the higher cognitive faculties, particularly of the intellect itself.371 
While the primacy of vision in Descartes and other early modern philosophers is 
uncontested, some qualifications must be made with regards to this broad generalisation. 
In Blindness and Enlightenment, Kate E. Tunstall proposes that the reading of the 18th-
century oculocentrism by Jay is missing the important literary and philosophical 
                                                 
370 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-century French Thought 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993) 70-71. 
371 James Hill, “Berkeley against the ‘Despotism of the eye,” unpublished manuscript. 
 155 
preoccupation with blindness and the figure of the blind man at the time.372 This concurs 
with Foucault who identified “two great mythical experiences on which the philosophy of 
the eighteenth-century had wished to base its beginning: the foreign spectator in an 
unknown country, and the man born blind restored to light.”373 Sudden vision serves as a 
metaphor for the discovery of hitherto unknown truth, and the blind man who regains 
sight was viewed like a child learning a new lesson, or a scientist making a discovery. 
The state of blindness was regarded as a state of ignorance which should be overcome in 
order to reach the truth without preconceptions.374 Tunstall’s discussion of blindness can 
therefore be understood as adding nuance to Jay’s basic argument, rather than 
contradicting it.  
Another important reservation about oculocentrism in the 18th-century is that 
Cartesian optics were not universally accepted. Most notably, George Berkeley’s theory 
of vision stands out in its insistence on touch as a necessary sense that allows us to 
understand visual input, as discussed in the previous chapter. Our understanding of visual 
data necessitates the input from the sense of touch to make sense for our practical 
purposes. Atherton adds that the basis for Berkeley’s theory of vision is “that for each 
sense organ, there is a range of sensations we become aware of by virtue of possessing 
that sense organ”375 so none of the senses have an advantage over any other. The result is 
a reduction in the content of the sense of sight, since it is limited to light and colours only 
and is thus significantly more restricted in comparison with Cartesian optics where sight 
covers all spatial features. For Berkeley, the combination of coloured blotches can only 
be understood as objects and distances when we learn to correlate them with our past 
experience of touching other objects after advancing a certain distance before reaching 
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them – “We learn to see distance by associating our kinesthetic sense of distance with 
small and faint colour blobs, because we have learned that when we see something small 
and faint, it will take a good time to get there.”376 In Berkeley’s account of vision, 
therefore, what we perceive by sight is far less important and autonomous than what was 
assumed by Descartes, and furthermore it requires additional input from other senses in 
order to be understood. 
Berkeley’s theory of vision, then, treats sight as one sense among others, but still 
accords it usefulness and importance. This is made apparent in Berkeley’s description of 
a seeing man in a land of the blind in Alciphron. The story appears in the Fourth Dialogue 
at a point when Euphranor is describing sight as divine language. Euphranor, another 
mouthpiece for Berkeley’s philosophical ideas, explains that visual input is God’s direct 
communication which helps us find our way in the world, as already mentioned in the 
previous chapter. His opponent, the eponymous Alciphron, objects that we do not find 
sight such a miraculous faculty that induces a sense of wonder in us. Euphranor then uses 
the story of a seeing man among a nation of the blind in order to convey the wonder of 
sight through a comparison with people who do not possess it:  
But let us suppose a nation of men blind from their infancy, among whom a 
stranger arrives, the only man who can see in all the country; let us suppose this 
stranger travelling with some of the natives, and that one while he foretells to 
them that, in case they walk straight forward, in half an hour they shall meet men 
or cattle, or come to a house; that, if they turn to the right and proceed, they shall 
in a few minutes be in danger of falling down a precipice; that, shaping their 
course to the left, they will in such a time arrive at a river, a wood, or a mountain. 
What think you? Must they not be infinitely surprised that one who had never 
been in their country before should know it so much better than themselves? And 
would not those predictions seem to them as unaccountable and incredible as 
prophecy…?377 
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According to Euphranor, we are so used to the ability to predict what objects we will 
encounter if we walk forward, or foresee possible negative consequences if we move in a 
another direction that we never appreciate this almost miraculous ability. A nation of 
blind men, according to this reasoning, would react with amazement when encountering 
such ability for the first time, especially if they were not previously aware of its existence. 
In this account, the sense of vision is at once understood and appreciated by the blind 
men, who would be amazed by this superior knowledge. Thus, although Berkeley does 
not go on to tell us that the traveller becomes king, we may assume that these clear 
advantages would guarantee for him an important position in that country. 
In Alciphron, then, it is taken for granted that the blind nation will find the sense of 
sight useful and admirable. At first sight, Euphranor’s argument would seem to diverge 
from Berkeley’s previous demotion of sight and its dependence on touch, but in fact it 
can easily be reconciled with A New Theory of Vision. When the sighted stranger arrives 
at the country, the blind are already familiar with their environment and can verify the 
truth of his observation by referring to their own experience that is based on the sense of 
touch, making touch a guarantee for sight. The stranger’s vision is superior because he 
knows in advance what they can find out for themselves only by walking to the object 
and touching it which will take both time and exertion. Vision thus has the advantage of 
predicting what will happen, hence its comparison to prophecy, but touch is the sense 
used to verify its forecasts since, to use Hill’s formulation, it has “epistemic priority in 
our acquaintance with qualities of external, extended things.”378  
King and Knave 
There is no indication that Beckett ever read Alciphron and it seems highly unlikely 
that he engaged with it, given that it was considered unimportant for most of the 20th-
century. “The generally accepted view,” writes Berman in 1993, “is that Alciphron is a 
work of Christian apologetics that has little significant connection with Berkeley’s 
distinctive philosophy”.379 Nevertheless, studying attitudes towards blindness in Berkeley 
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may be instrumental in teasing out the philosophical implications of Beckett’s work even 
in the absence of direct engagement. This section will examine the power relations 
between sighted and blind characters in Beckett from the point of view of cognitive 
superiority, as expressed in the proverb ‘in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is 
King’. 
The proverb was collected in The Adages, a collection of proverbs from Greek and 
Latin compiled by Desiderius Erasmus and published in 1500, and conveys a similar 
situation to Berkeley’s blind nation. According to the modern editor of a selection from 
the book, the collection was highly successful: “in the early sixteenth century, when good 
Latin style had a social important and could actually get you a job, the Adages became a 
best-seller”.380 The proverb was originally coined to denigrate the one-eyed man who 
only seems to have superb vision because he is compared with people who have no vision 
at all, just as the blind nation admires the traveller. This encounter between a nation of 
blind people and a sighted person can be seen as a thought experiment in the form of a 
narrative that can be picked up and developed in literary works. The experiment is 
premised on the existence of a nation of people who had no sight from infancy and have 
never encountered sighted persons before. In spite of this limitation, we must assume that 
they to survive somehow and develop their own culture, as well as gain adequate 
knowledge of their land in order to compare it with the observations of the stranger. To 
all intents and purposes, then, sight for this blind nation is redundant. It can be argued 
that the self-sufficiency of the blind is a necessary narrative device that serves only as a 
contrast to the abilities of the sighted person. Still, it falls in line with the tendency in 
Berkeley to assume that blind people are not helpless creatures with no knowledge of 
their environment.  
An illustration of a similar encounter that takes lays more emphasis on the self-
sufficiency of the blind than Berkeley’s parable can in fact be found in a 1904 story 
called “The Country of the Blind” by H.G. Wells which imagines what it would be like 
for a seeing man to encounter a society of blind people who have adjusted their habits 
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and material culture to their perceptual abilities. In the story, a lost traveller finds his way 
info a hidden valley where he discovers a prosperous village of people who have been 
blind for generations. In contrast to his initial expectation of becoming King, he finds that 
the wise elders of the village “would believe and understand nothing whatever he told 
them [about vision], a thing quite outside his expectation. They would not even 
understand many of his words.”381 In a reversal of roles, the blind men consider the 
traveller to have limited cognitive ability because they treat his claims to have an extra 
sense as an extravagant fantasy.  
This story has been read as a parable of social conformism and resistance to new 
ideas,382 but it can equally be read as an illustration of strict empiricism, where the elders 
refuse to acknowledge the traveller’s assertions because they can find no match for them 
in their personal experience. In this perspective, Wells’ story can be viewed as an 
elaboration of Berkeley’s thought experiment, adding psychological realism to 
Euphranor’s abstractions. Even further, the elders’ attitude uncovers a hidden 
contradiction within Berkeley’s writings. If, as Berkeley insists, people without vision 
can have no idea of sight since each sense carries a unique and incommensurable type of 
sensation, how can blind men understand the advantages of vision? If the blind nation has 
no idea of sight how can it appreciate its utility? In fact, Berkeley seems to be aware of 
this pitfall and is careful to introduce a prediction that involves a transitory event, i.e. 
meeting people or cattle which are mobile and therefore their being at a certain place 
cannot be predicted by knowledge of fixed objects in the landscape and yet can be 
verified by the blind by going to the place and touching the people. He also emphasises 
that the traveller knows the land better than the inhabitants even though he has never 
                                                 
381 H.G. Wells, The Country of the Blind and Other Stories (Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating 
Press, 2008) 739. Digital Edition. 
382 See J.R. Hammond, An H.G. Wells Companion (London & Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 
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with Vision Loss: Understanding the Psychological, Social, and Spiritual Effects (Santa Barbara, Denver 
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visited it before: “What think you? Must they not be infinitely surprised that one who had 
never been in their country before should know it so much better than themselves?”383 
The situation of the blind nation in Berkeley’s parable is similar to some of Beckett’s 
blind characters. They are empowered and self-reliant but also able to appreciate the 
advantage of sight. The blind beggar from the Coombe and Dan Rooney require 
assistance to conduct their daily lives. The situation of Gall senior, Pozzo and Hamm is 
less certain, but they have enough power, or at least authority, to make sure their sighted 
helpers will cater for their needs. The position of power occupied by these blind men is 
similar to that of the blind elders in Wells’ story. The blind are the ones laying down the 
rules in the world of the hidden valley, exactly like Hamm in the isolated shelter of 
Endgame who calls its confined space “the world” (94-5). We could expect Clov, the 
only character who is capable of both seeing and moving,384 to be the most powerful 
figure in the play but instead he is only a servant who looks after the other characters. 
Hamm, in fact, seems to call him “my dog” (93).  
Unlike the blind elders in Wells who deny the existence of sight and cannot find any 
advantage in it, Hamm acknowledges Clov’s superior powers, and uses them to maintain 
his own life and power - the seeing man in the land of the blind is a slave rather than a 
king: 
HAMM: How are your eyes? 
CLOV: Bad. 
HAMM: How are your legs? 
CLOV: Bad. 
HAMM: But you can move. 
CLOV: Yes. 
HAMM: [Violently.] Then move! (95) 
                                                 
383 Berkeley, Alciphron 103. 
384 These superior capabilities are emphasised in the opening tableau, as Clov walks around the stage 
looking at the other sleeping figures and out through the windows; see Beckett, Endgame 92-3.  
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Berkeley’s optimistic assumption that cognitive superiority will be appreciated by the 
blind is disappointed in both Wells and Beckett by exclusive attention to material needs, 
narrow-mindedness and conservatism. The ‘one-eyed man’ in the land of the blind 
discovers that a better understanding of the world does not necessarily give him an 
advantage over his fellow men.  
It is further important to note that Hamm also fantasises about a superior creature 
who would have an additional sense that will allow it to perceive himself and Clov better 
than they can themselves, much as a traveller to the land of the blind will have a better 
knowledge of it than the inhabitants: 
HAMM: We’re not beginning to … to … mean something? 
CLOV: Mean something! You and I, mean something! [Brief laugh.] Ah that’s a 
good one! 
HAMM: I wonder. [Pause.] Imagine if a rational being came back to earth, 
wouldn’t he be liable to get ideas into his head if he observed us long enough. 
[Voice of rational being.] Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I understand 
what they’re at! [CLOV starts, drops the telescope and begins to scratch his belly 
with both hands. Normal voice.] And without going so far as that, we ourselves … 
[with emotion] … we ourselves … at certain moments … [Vehemently.] To think 
perhaps it won’t all have been for nothing! (108) 
The rational being who would know what Hamm and Clov “mean” is a clever jab at 
the audience who are struggling to make sense of Beckett’s opaque play. At the same 
time it creates a hierarchy between the being whose superior rationality enables him to 
understand the supposedly irrational Hamm and Clov, which is structurally similar to the 
superiority of the sighted man over the blind nation. Clov’s ability to see gives him an 
advantage over the blind Hamm, but both are equally lacking in cognitive powers 
compared to the ‘rational’ being. The prospect of such knowledge meets with complete 
indifference on the part of Clov and is soon forgotten by Hamm as well. The ability to 
make sense would change nothing in their world. Berkeley’s confidence in human 
knowledge is disappointed and rejected by Beckett, even while using the same tropes. 
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The Gift of Sight 
Religious revelation, sensory power and the ability to conduct oneself in the world come 
together in Beckett’s play Rough for Theatre 1, which reworks the trope of the blind man 
made to see, so central in the Enlightenment discussion of blindness in general and 
Berkeley in particular. The one-act play was written in the late 1950s and so far received 
limited critical attention. Knowlson writes that an early version of the play was “probably 
thematically too close to Fin de partie and may well have seemed too personal and 
sentimental as well.”385 Both plays feature a blind man and a cripple in a post-apocalyptic 
world and revolve around their relationship. Ackerley and Gontarski judge the final 
version to suffer from the same weaknesses, contending that the interaction between the 
blind man and the cripple “was developed more artfully in Fin de partie”.386 The 
similarity between the two plays is certainly conspicuous. A blind man and a cripple 
feature in both of them, and their interaction generates the dramatic tension. Yet, as I will 
show, Rough for Theatre 1 stages a very specific moment in the forming of the 
relationship between the blind man and the cripple and the play as a whole explores quite 
different issues to Endgame. 
Critics have traced the sources of the play to a medieval French farce, through Yeats’ 
Death of Cuchulain and The Cat and the Moon and J.M. Synge’s The Well of the 
Saints.387 I would like to suggest another, less obvious source of inspiration for Beckett’s 
play, reading it as a dramatization of the Molyneux problem.388 The problem appears in a 
philosophical question raised by William Molyneux, founder of the Irish Philosophical 
Society and the author of the first treatise on dioptrics in English, who was married to a 
                                                 
385 Knowlson, Damned to Fame 388. 
386 The Grove Companion 763. 
387 See James Knowlson and John Pilling, Frescoes of the Skull (London: John Calder, 1979) 229, and 
Carol Fisher Sorgenfrei, “Broken Bodies: Comic Deformity in the Plays of Samuel Beckett, Kyōgen and 
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Barfoot and Cobi Bordewijk (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993) 97. 
388 I made a similar argument within the context of Irish theatre to the one presented in this section 
elsewhere; see Einat Adar, “From Irish Philosophy to Irish Theatre: The Blind (Wo)Man Made to See,” 
Estudios Irlandeses 12 (2017): 1-11. 
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blind woman. 389 Molyneux was an admirer of John Locke, to whom he sent this inquiry 
in 1688: 
a Jocose Problem, that, upon Discourse with several concerning your Book and 
Notions, I have proposed to Diverse very Ingenious Men, and could hardly ever 
Meet with One that at first dash would give me the Answer to it, which I think 
true; till by hearing My Reasons they were Convinced. Tis this. Suppose a Man 
born blind, and now adult, and taught by his Touch to Distinguish between a Cube 
and a Sphere (Suppose) of Ivory, nighly of the same Bignes, so as to tel, when he 
felt One and tother, Which is the Cube which the Sphære. Suppose then, the Cube 
and Sphære placed on a Table, and the Blind man to be made to see. Quære 
whether by his sight, before he touchd them, he could now Distinguish and tel 
which is the Globe which the Cube.390 
This problem became known as the Molyneux problem, and Berkeley quotes the 
letter and Locke’s answer in his New Theory of Vision as part of his discussion of the 
connection between ideas of sight and touch (47). It also appears in a different form in 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous which Beckett read in its entirety. Beckett 
even marked one of the arguments in favour of the heterogeneity of sight and touch in 
Commonplace Book of which is similar to the Molyneux problem: “49 2nd. One made to 
see that had not yet seen his own limbs or anything he touch’d, upon sight of a foot 
length would know it to be a foot length if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea, 
sed falsum id ergo et hoc.”391 The Molyneux problem itself appears on the very next line 
in Berkeley’s text. 
                                                 
389 For an intellectual biography of Molyneux and his correspondence with Locke see Thomas Duddy, 
A History of Irish Thought (New York: Routledge, 2002). 68-78. On Molyneux’ work in dioptrics, see 
Peter Abrahams, “When an Eye is Armed with a Telescope: The Dioptrics of William and Samuel 
Molyneux,” Analytica Chimica Acta 33 (2007): 229-246. 
390 John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, vol. 4, E. S. De Beer, ed (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979) 651.  
391 Berkeley, Commonplace Book 6. 
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As already mentioned, the blind man who regains sight was considered by Foucault 
to be a foundational trope for the Enlightenment. For Foucault, the issue is primarily 
epistemological, describing the method in which the truth about the world is revealed to a 
person who has no prior knowledge of it, and therefore no prejudice or pre-conceived 
ideas that would affect his perception of what she sees directly. This very metaphor, of a 
man discovering a new truth as a blind person seeing the world for the first time, was 
itself developed in particular historical contexts and thus carries resonances and 
associations that make the Molyneux very different from the clean slate it advocates as a 
guarantee of truth. This is especially important within the Irish context, where, David 
Berman argues, “The similitude of the blind man… is the root metaphor, as it were of 
Irish philosophy.”392 In the Irish context the similitude is mostly understood in a religious 
sense  – the relation of the blind man to the visual world stands for the relation of a 
believer to the Christian mysteries. 
According to Berman it is possible to discern a distinct philosophical school in 
Ireland between the 1690s and 1750s:  
It was born with John Toland, grew with Peter Browne, William King, George 
Berkeley and Francis Hutcheson, and died with Robert Clayton and Edmund 
Burke. This tradition was largely autochthonous or indigenous, and it engaged 
most of the outstanding Irishmen of the time, as well as a host of lesser figures393 
The blind man trying to identify the light and colours which he is seeing for the first 
time with the objects he has long known by touch is an epistemological metaphor for the 
relation between our sense impressions and external reality. In the Irish tradition, 
however, this epistemological issue was interpreted in a theological context. What to us 
may seem like a scientific or psychological problem, for the Irish philosophers “turns 
                                                 
392 Berman, Berkeley and Irish Philosophy 87. 
393 Berman, Berkeley and Irish Philosophy 79. 
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precisely on the question of representation; and at the core of the dispute lies the issue of 
our knowledge of God”, according to Terry Eagleton. 394 
John Toland’s 1696 book Christianity Not Mysterious gave, according to Berman, 
the initial impetus to the Irish philosophical school. Toland argued that since we cannot 
assign any definite meaning to the Christian mysteries, they can have no sense and cannot 
be said to exist.395 He relies on Locke’s principle that for a word to have sense it must 
correspond to a clear idea in the mind, a condition obviously impossible in the case of 
religious mysteries, for example transubstantiation or the afterlife. This requirement casts 
a doubt on any religious discourse, since man’s finite reason cannot attain the infinite 
wisdom of God, and thus we can never form a clear and distinct idea of religious matters 
such as divine grace or the afterlife. The attempt to vindicate the existence of God and the 
Christian religion against Toland’s argument gave rise to a series of direct refutations as 
well as indirect attempts to provide an account of the foundations of human knowledge 
that will accommodate a rational proof for religion.  
The Molyneux problem crystallises these concerns in the form of a practical question. 
It also relies on Locke’s empiricism to question the limits of human understanding, with 
the blind man standing for the believer who knows that God and the afterlife exist, but 
cannot form a rational concept of them. The challenge to religion posed by this problem 
which arises out of Locke’s empiricism may be gauged by comparing the Molyneux 
problem with a blind man imagined much earlier by the philosopher Ibn Tufayl. Little is 
known about the life of the influential 12th century thinker and only one of his texts has 
survived in its entirety – the story of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān, a child who grew up alone on a 
desert island. According to the book’s latest translator, Lenn Evan Goodman, “His 
Adam-like position alone on an island, his Promethean role as discoverer of fire, his 
progress and backsliding, brilliantly experimenting with fire and rashly trying to grasp “a 
piece of it,” show that he is intended to symbolize mankind, for he… must discover 
                                                 
394 Terry Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture (London & New York: 
Verso, 1995) 50. 
395 Berman, Berkeley and Irish Philosophy 82 ff. 
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everything newly for himself.”396 In the introduction to the book, Ibn Tufayl describes 
another man who must learn about his environment – a blind man: 
imagine a child, growing up in a certain city, born blind, but otherwise intelligent 
and well endowed, with a sound memory and an apt mind. Through his remaining 
channels of perception he will get to know the people as well as all sorts of 
animals and objects, and the streets and alleys, houses and markets— eventually 
well enough to walk through the city without a guide, recognizing at once 
everyone he meets. But colors, and colors alone, he will know only by descriptive 
explanations and ostensive definitions. Suppose after he had come this far, his 
eyesight were restored and he could see. He would walk all through the town 
finding nothing in contradiction to what he had believed, nor would anything look 
wrong to him. The colors he encountered would conform to the guidelines that 
had been sketched out for him. Still there would be two great changes, the second 
dependent on the first: first the daybreak on a new visual world, and second, his 
great joy.397 
Ibn Tufayl’s work has been widely read in the 17th-century and was first translated 
into English in 1674. John Locke was almost certainly acquainted with the work in Latin 
translation,398 and it may have been known to Molyneux as well. 
The Molyneux problem challenges Ibn Tufayl’s confident assumption that a blind 
man may be made to understand vision through guidance by his sighted peers, the use of 
his other senses and the application of reason. Molyneux, in other words, questions 
whether the human mind can gain knowledge of what it cannot directly sense. From this 
                                                 
396 Lenn Evan Goodman, “Introduction,” Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan: A Philosophical Tale 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 9. 
397 Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzān: A Philosophical Tale, trans. Lenn Evan Goodman 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 97. 
398 G.A. Russell, “The impact of the Philosophus Autodidactus: Pocockes, John Locke, and the 
Society of Friends,” The ‘Arabick’ Interest of the Natural Philosophers in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Leiden, New York & Köln: Brill, 1994) 224-265. The influence of Ibn Tufayl’s work on European thought 
in the 17th and 18th-century is the main subject of Attar, The Vital Roots. 
 167 
perspective, the cognitive limitation of the blind man with regards to the world becomes a 
metaphor for the epistemological limitation of any person who seeks the infinite truth of 
God. What is at stake in the Molyneux problem, within the Irish philosophical context, is 
the question whether human understanding can achieve knowledge of the divine, a 
question which Toland would have answered in the negative. Berkeley makes this 
connection explicit by writing that “allowing that knowledge and wisdom do, in the 
proper sense of the words, belong to God, and that we have some notion, though 
infinitely inadequate, of those divine attributes, yet still more than a man blind from his 
birth can have of light and colours.”399 Berkeley thus distinguishes between the 
theological and the epistemological problems, suggesting that for him the relation 
between human understanding and the truth of God is more akin to Ibn Tufayl’s 
description of a blind person who can understand the nature of vision to a certain degree 
even without possessing the actual sense. 
Berkeley dissociates himself from the theological implications of the Molyneux 
problem, even though he is evidently aware of them. Berkeley’s own answer to the 
Molyneux problem is that the blind man will not even understand the question: 
From what hath been premised it is a manifest consequence that a man born blind, 
being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by sight; the sun and 
stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in his eye, or 
rather in his mind. The objects intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth 
they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as 
near to him as the perceptions of pain and pleasure, or the most inward passions 
of his soul. For our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any distance, or 
without the mind, is… intirely the effect of experience, which on in those 
circumstances could not yet have attained to (NTV 186). 
                                                 
399 George Berkeley, “The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained,” The Works of George 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, he argues that our knowledge of distance and form is not 
achieved through direct perception, but through from the experience of combining visual 
cues and tactile memory. A man who recently gained sight will thus be literally unable to 
see a cube and a globe in front of him, perceiving only a coloured plane without depth or 
distance that he must learn to analyze in order to discern separate objects and relate the 
different colours to distance, size, and form. This solution maintains the empiricist 
position that we have no innate knowledge, but must, and can, learn from experience 
everything there is to know about the world. Berkeley is able to maintain his religious 
faith and an empiricist position on the Molyneux problem at the same time, thanks to this 
distinction between the psychological problem of how the mind understands visual input, 
from the theological question of our knowledge of God.  
The distinction, however, raises a new difficulty. If our notion of the divine is closer 
to its real nature than a blind man’s understanding of light an colour, then how was this 
knowledge acquired? God, like the self, cannot be directly sensed according to Berkeley, 
and therefore direct perception is an inadequate metaphor to discuss our understanding of 
God. Instead, he uses the term “notion”, without explaining the nature of this special type 
of knowledge. Hill has reviewed the conflicting positions of Berkeley scholars on the 
extent and value of his theory of notions, and suggested that the concept amounts to a 
unique contribution to modern philosophy.400 In Hill’s reading, a notion is a potential 
rather than a fully formed idea, and thus “the notion of God is natural to us, while also 
allowing that it is not originally present in our minds nor universal to all minds.”401 
Therefore, “The notion of God… requires reason and reflection”402 which goes against 
the teachings of mystical practices that pursue an experience that will reveal the nature of 
God all at once. Inquiring further into Berkeley’s doctrine of notions and its theological 
and philosophical implications goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to 
note that in Hill’s interpretation, notions are the result of a rational process akin to a 
scientific or philosophical inquiry. 
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The interaction between the blind man and the cripple in Beckett’s Rough for Theatre 
I reveals similar preoccupation with knowledge and mystical experience. The play evokes 
a religious context through its references to 20th-century Irish theatre, most notably 
Yeats’ The Cat and the Moon403 and Synge’s The Well of the Saints.404 In both plays a 
saint cures blind characters of their blindness with dubious results. In The Cat and the 
Moon a blind beggar carries a lame beggar on his back all the way to see a Saint who 
could cure them of their afflictions. As in Beckett’s play, the blind man is interested in 
material things and even questions the utility of gaining his eyesight, since this would put 
him at a disadvantage in begging (Yeats 308). The lame beggar is more enterprising – he 
comes up with the idea of going to see the Saint, and is also the more spiritual of the two, 
speculating that “maybe we’ll see the blessed saint this day… and maybe that will be a 
grander thing than having my two legs” (308). When given a choice between a cure and a 
blessing, the blind man chooses a cure. The first thing he notices is that the lame beggar 
was stealing from him, for which he gives him a good beating (310-11). The blind man 
leaves satisfied but the audience learns that he missed the greater gift, since the lame 
beggar is also cured after he tells the saint that he is happy to have chosen a blessing 
(311-2). In Yeats’ play the blind man remains blind to the spiritual world even after his 
eyes have been opened.  
The initial situation of the beggars in Yeats’ play becomes the goal of B in Beckett’s 
play. The play is set in a post-apocalyptic urban space, where A, a blind beggar, is 
playing his fiddle on a street corner. B, a cripple “in a wheelchair which he propels by 
means of a pole” arrives to see where the music is coming from. B’s initial impulse to 
withdraw is checked when it occurs to him that he might join forces with the blind beggar 
“and live together”.405 B wants to form a pseudo-couple with A, similar to the blind and 
lame beggars, or Hamm and Clov in Endgame who find a way to exist in a way that is 
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mutually beneficial, at least to some extent. The crucial difference is that in this play, A 
and B are not tied by such a bond. B would like to create a bond, but he to do this he will 
need to convince A.406 B offers a union couched in a discourse of courtship. He muses 
they could “live together, till death ensue” (227), asks A whether he thinks that “we could 
make a match”, and later confirms that “If you ask me we were made for each other.” 
(229) A on his part remains unmoved by B’s enterprising spirit and only the mention of 
tinned food elicits a response from him, though even this is not enough to convince him 
(227). Dramatic tension is thus generated by B’s attempt to woe A out of his apathy and 
form a couple with him. 
Unlike the blind beggar in Yeats’ play, however, A is not exclusively interested in 
material things and is asking B for more information about the world around him. A’s 
first question is “How are the trees doing?” (228) Trees are a motif that may suggest 
nature, regeneration, or even a source of food. But they are also a popular example of a 
remote object in treatises on optics. Berkeley, for example, writes that "we speak of the 
magnitude of anything, for instance a tree or a house.” (NTV 191) What may seem like a 
far-fetched suggestion is soon reinforced by the blind man’s consequent questions, which 
are concerned with light: “Is it day or night?”, and when the cripple remains non-
committal he specifies “But light?” As discussed earlier, light was considered by 
Berkeley to be the proper object of sight. A confirms that he cannot perceive light and 
colour by remarking that “It seems to me sometimes I spend the night here, playing and 
listening” (228), implying he cannot tell light and darkness apart. Later in the play he will 
ask about the colour of B’s wen and “Is there no green anywhere? (232)” A insists on 
questioning B about what he sees but B is reluctant to respond, and to A’s question “But 
you look about you?”, B responds violently “No!” (230) Finally, A says that he was 
“always” blind (228) an important premise of the Molyneux problem. 
A’s preoccupation with external appearances calls to mind the blind couple in 
Synge’s The Well of the Saints, Mary and Martin Doul who believe that they are 
extremely beautiful until their eyes are opened by a miracle-performing saint who passes 
through their village. Similar to Ibn Tufayl’s blind man, they think they know everything 
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about their environment through the descriptions of their fellow-villagers, but they were 
being deceived. The people of the village take the role of the Cartesian evil demon and lie 
to the couple about the state of affairs, telling them that they are extremely beautiful 
when in fact they are old and ugly, a truth that is quickly revealed after they gain their 
sight. In Beckett’s play, A’s aesthetic inquisitiveness remains mostly unsatisfied due to 
B’s evasiveness. In Synge’s play the Douls are roused from their imaginary dream by 
being given sight, and they resent the harsh reality that is revealed to them, refusing to let 
the saint restore their sight after it had deteriorated again.  
In Beckett’s bleak outlook the basic condition of human existence is ignorance and 
thus there can be no moment in which truth is revealed, be it the scientific truth of 
Enlightenment epistemology, a mystical truth of God, or the personal truth about one’s 
partner. And yet, B’s offer to serve as A’s eyes seems to promise an amelioration in their 
situation:  
B: …Of course if you wish me to look about me I shall. And if you care to push 
me about I shall try to describe the scene, as we go along. 
A: You mean you would guide me? I wouldn’t get lost any more? 
B: Exactly. I would say, Easy, Billy, we’re heading for a great muckheap, turn 
back and wheel left when I give you the word… I see a round tin over there in the 
gutter, perhaps it’s soup, or baked beans. (230) 
This is the first time that A responds favourably to B’s suggestions. But there is a 
difference between B’s offer to “describe the scene” and A’s utilitarian interpretation of 
the request that he would “guide” him, which B picks up immediately by describing how 
he could help A avoid obstacles and find food, an inference that brings to mind 
Berkeley’s blind nation and their wonder at the practical abilities of a sighted man. This 
transition from aesthetic description to finding one’s way in the world echoes Berkeley’s 
theory of vision which focuses mainly on utility.  
The attempt by A and B to form a pseudo-couple, however, is presented in the play 
not only as a practical arrangement, but also as involving a mystical experience: 
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A: Baked beans! [He gets up, puts down fiddle and bowl on the stool and gropes 
towards B.] Where are you? 
B: Here, dear fellow. [A lays hold of the chair and starts pushing it blindly.] Stop! 
A: [Pushing the chair] It’s a gift! A gift! (230)  
The ejaculation “It’s a gift!” conveys A’s enthusiasm in terms of a miraculous cure in 
its evocation of the stock phrase “the gift of sight”, reminiscent of the cure of the blind 
beggar by the Saint in Yeats’ The Cat and the Moon407 and the Douls in The Well of the 
Saints.408 A is still blind, but he is confident that B will serve as his eyes, effectively 
allowing him to see. The combination of A’s ambulatory powers with B’s vision creates a 
compound creature that may be described as a blind man made to see. Beckett dramatizes 
the premise of the Molyneux Problem in an altered, but still recognizable form. 
Inevitably, a Beckett play allows for no miracles and the direct result of A’s enthusiasm 
is that B changes his attitude, hitting him with the pole to stop him from madly pushing 
the wheelchair around. Like the blind man in The Cat and the Moon who gains material 
sight but cannot see the saint, or the Douls in The Well of the Saints who choose stay 
blind by the end of the play, A loses his new ability to see without getting the least 
benefit from it. The pursuit of knowledge and practical utility implied in the trope of the 
blind man made to see, together with the aspiration to transcend human knowledge, have 
failed. 
The intrepid B then makes another attempt at forming a union, this time a through a 
physical contact, by asking A to tuck his foot. Their physical encounter carries sexual 
overtones with A kneeling before the sitting B and asking him “Is all the rest there?” 
referring to the amputation of his leg, and B exclaiming “what hands you have!”. This 
second attempt at a union also evokes the concept of grace, when B is so touched by A’s 
willingness to do him a service that he wouldn’t let go of his hand , and A musing that he 
“could stay like that forever, with my head on an old man’s knees.” (231-2) Once again, 
A’s exaggerated happiness rouses B’s temper, partly because he resents A’s intensity and 
partly because he is offended by the insensitive reminder that he only has one knee. This 
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is an attempt to establish a connection between the two protagonists who can truly be 
described as having “some notion, though infinitely inadequate”409 of each other’s 
thoughts and intentions.  
What sets Beckett’s play apart from the plays of Yeats and Synge, and from his own 
Endgame, is the complete failure of the attempted union. At the moment of ecstasy when 
A grabs the chair and endows B with motion, B offers no visual description, only a blow 
with the pole. The man born blind remains as blind as ever. In return, A does not take B 
anywhere. In both The Cat and the Moon and The Well of the Saints, the blind who are 
granted sight can immediately use their new sense, just as well as seeing people, with one 
important reservation. The blind beggar in The Cat and the Moon is unable to see the 
saint with whom his lame colleague is conversing. This defect is not due to any problem 
with his eyes, but to his moral shortcomings. His physical eyes are cured, but his soul 
remains base. It might be the case that A, who is also primarily interested in material 
things, also remains blind because he lacks in moral virtue. In this possible reading he 
would continue the line of vicious old men from the earlier plays. The material interests 
of A, nonetheless, are much less offensive than the cruelty of Pozzo, Hamm and Dan 
towards the people around them. The cripple B, on the other hand, is much more 
imperious and seeks control rather than intimacy with A. The play thus opens a way of 
viewing blindness in a different way, not as moral deficiency, but simply as impairment. 
Blindness limits the ability of A to care for himself so that teaming up with another 
person clearly beneficial for him. 
The attempt of the blind man and the cripple to form a union in Beckett, however, 
requires a coordination and cooperation that they fail to achieve, giving up almost as soon 
as they attempt to compensate for each other’s disability. With more patience and effort 
they might be able to match their movements, but this requires a process that neither of 
them seems willing to undertake. The need for a process of learning and adjustment 
before the blind man can see echoes Berkeley’s answer to the Molyneux problem, as well 
as the potential for a knowledge of God which must be nurtured in order to develop. A 
and B, like so many other Beckett characters, are just unable to complete this process and 
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perhaps they were “wrong not to persist, in [their] efforts”410 as Beckett writes about the 
man who has given up hope of ever seeing again as he wonders about the maze of Fizzles 
1. A, the last of Beckett’s blind men, is a figure of transition between the literally blind of 
the early prose and plays, and more ambiguous figures whose vision is limited by 
external circumstances. His affliction resembles the earlier figures, but unlike them he is 
not seeking power over his fellow men. With him blindness can no longer be seen as an 
expression of a faulty morality, but rather as a disability that affects his eyes but not 
necessarily his heart. On the other hand, his inability to join forces with the crippled 
beggar points to a human deficiency that may be at some distance from the cruelty of 
earlier blind character, but can still be criticised. 
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Conclusion 
Having read Berkeley as a young man, Beckett continuously turned to Berkeley for 
inspiration and simulation, and the results of this preoccupation encompasses on the one 
hand most of Berkeley’s main philosophical tenets, and Beckett’s writing in different 
genres and media on the other. Combining empirical study of archival materials with 
theoretical studies and close readings in the present study facilitated a much better 
understanding of how Beckett used and abused Berkeley’s philosophy. Beckett borrowed 
many ideas from Berkeley over the years – the philosopher’s main tenets, the structure of 
the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, as well as single metaphors and 
philosophical images. These borrowings, however, go much beyond simple copying of 
ideas and situations. Beckett thinks through Berkeley’s philosophy about the questions 
that are important to him personally, including how to face a hostile world, how to create 
a new art, how to emerge out of an artistic impasse , and the moral responsibility of the 
individual. 
I Read Philonous 
Beckett’s engagement with Berkeley was considerable both in terms of Beckett’s active 
study and interest in the Irish philosopher, and in the frequent appearance of Berkeleyan 
themes and tropes in Beckett’s work. Using archival materials, it was possible to 
reconstruct a more accurate timeline of Beckett’s introduction to, and reading of, 
Berkeley than was hitherto available. The common assumption that A. A. Luce must have 
discussed Berkeley with his young student was shown to be unfounded. In fact, Beckett’s 
interest in Berkeley was awakened in Dublin social and intellectual circles, where 
patriotic feelings contributed to a small revival of the most eminent Irish philosopher. In 
1933 Beckett first read Berkeley’s Commonplace Book, which was recommended by his 
acquaintance Joseph Hone. He went on to read Principles of Human Knowledge at an 
uncertain date, and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1935. Dating these 
readings is important for any argument regarding Beckett’s familiarity with the 
philosopher, especially in the early work. Beckett’s knowledge of Berkeley extended 
even further than these readings, since he was also familiar with other interpretations of 
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Berkeley through Windelband’s History of Philosophy and his reading of other 
philosophers and writers. The archival materials, in total, point to a consistent interest in 
the philosopher and a good familiarity with his writings and their contemporary 
interpretations. 
Beckett’s early interest in Berkeley is reflected in his work throughout the years. This 
thesis showed that Berkeley’s philosophy is an important source for Murphy rather than 
serving as a passing reference inserted into the novel to display Beckett’s erudition. It 
also discussed Film and its script which takes esse est percipi as its basic premise. In 
addition to these works, whose connection to Berkeley is well known, the thesis offered 
new interpretations of texts that were informed by his philosophy without mentioning his 
name, especially the theoretical text Three Dialogues between Samuel Beckett and 
George Duthuit whose close resemblance to Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous was previously mentioned but never analysed in depth. The short plays Rough 
for Theatre 1 and Act without Words 1 were also shown to be heavily indebted to 
Berkeleyan images. Rough for Theatre 1 enacts the Molyneux problem which Berkeley 
has treated in length, while Act without Words 1 Beckett treats  a theme drawn directly 
from Berkeley – the divinity which guides man’s steps in the world.  
Finally, themes taken from Berkeley appear in many of Beckett’s texts even if they 
do not constitute the main source. Chapter 4 looked at the stylistic change in Beckett’s 
post-war writings to discern both a general anti-mimetic influence and specific 
Berkeleyan moments in Molloy and The Unnamable. Chapter 5 explored the play of 
perception between observer and observed in the theatre plays Play and Rockaby, as well 
as the late novel Ill Seen Ill Said. Chapter 6 traced parallels between blindness in 
Berkeley and the numerous blind people in Beckett’s texts, including Dream of Fair to 
Middling Women, Watt, Waiting for Godot, Endgame and All the Fall, and the late prose 
fragments Fizzles. For most of these works, the thesis proposed a Berkeleyan angle of 
interpretation for the first time, highlighting aspects that have hitherto gone unnoticed. 
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The Shape of Ideas 
Beckett once told Harold Hobson: “I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not 
believe in them.”411 This sentence may characterise much of Beckett’s reworking of 
Berkeleyan themes – he keeps the shape of the ideas while subjecting their content to 
intentional misreadings and creative distortions. It is possible to discern three 
characteristic ways in which Beckett engages creatively with Berkeley. One is 
materialistic renditions of Berkeley’s philosophy that treat people as objects rather than 
spirits, the other is attributing malevolence to divine guidance, while the third focuses on 
the difficulties of perception. 
Berkeley’s presence in Murphy can be seen as paradigmatic of the first tendency – 
Berkeley’s philosophical system is deemed by Murphy and his friends to be unhelpful in 
facing the privations of life, an attempt to ignore the problem rather than courageously 
face it. Yet one aspect of Berkeley’s work shapes the destiny of the protagonist, i.e. the 
need for perception by the other, as in Berkeley’s famous maxim: esse est percipi. The 
need to be seen is essential for Murphy but also for numerous other characters in 
Beckett’s writing for page and stage. It is explicitly connected to Berkeley in Murphy, but 
this reference is misleading. As pointed out throughout this thesis, Beckett distorts the 
maxim. For Berkeley, as Beckett was well aware, there are two types of substances –
ideas whose existence depends on being perceived, and spirits which cannot be perceived 
and whose existence consists in perceiving. The latter obviously include human beings. 
By ignoring this distinction Beckett eliminates the spiritual existence of human beings, 
reducing them to mere bodies. Murphy’s need for Mr. Endon’s approval therefore 
expresses a materialist view of humanity, a view which also appears in the theatre plays 
Waiting for Godot, Happy Days and Play as discussed in Chapter 5. It is only in the late 
work that the perspective of the perceiver begins to emerge, for example in the novel Ill 
Seen Ill Said  in which a disembodied voice talks about the vicissitudes of perceiving.   
Treating people as ideas rather than spirits opens the possibility of self-perception 
where the mind perceives and is being perceived at the same time. For Berkeley, self-
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perception is an impossible and contradictory notion, and yet it plays a major role in 
Beckett. This distinction has been the focus of my reading of Film, usually considered 
Beckett’s most Berkeleyan work, as well as Rockaby which has hitherto not been 
interpreted in relation to the Irish philosopher. The quality of self-perception is different 
in each work – in Film it is a threatening possibility that materialises a moment of horror, 
while in Rockaby it is accepted with resignation and a growing sense of inner peace. In 
both texts Beckett uses Berkeleyan tropes to render an experience that is fundamentally 
alien to Berkeley’s world view. 
Alongside the materialistic reinterpretation of Berkeley’s idealism, Beckett also 
undermines the religious optimism that informs Berkeley’s writing. This tendency can 
already be discerned in Three Dialogues where Berkeley’s anti-representational 
philosophy of matter is being harnessed by Beckett for artistic purposes. Both authors 
reject an external existence in favour of a direct relation of presentation. The difference 
lies in the certainty and constancy of the relation. For Berkeley, the denial of matter is no 
great loss since God safeguards the existence of the world and the reliability of the laws 
of nature which allow human beings to live and thrive. For Beckett, on the other hand, 
there are no certainties or rules that can be followed and the artist must work in the 
absence of determinate relations. The language of absurdity and the threat of madness 
which Beckett’s Three Dialogues conjures clearly point to the dangers of pursuing such 
aesthetics in a godless world. 
Beckett reinterprets the relation between spirits and ideas as a psychological relation 
between individuals and an unknown entity that they depend on, but tends to fail them. 
The unseen provider of objects in Act without Words 1 is a malevolent divinity who gives 
the protagonist false hopes that are disappointed time after time. In Film, the observer is a 
pursuer to be feared, while in Play the spot light is an interrogator that torments the man 
and two women who are forced to tell their stories without assurance that they are being 
heard or that their torment will ever end. A more conciliatory relation can be discerned in 
the late work, where the observer comes into focus. In Ill Seen Ill Said we look at a 
woman through the eyes of an observer who wants nothing more than to watch her. Even 
though the observation is difficult and causes suffering, the observer bears no ill-will 
towards the woman, and there is no threat in its gaze. 
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Finally, both Beckett and Berkeley were highly interested in visual images and the 
way our mind interacts with them, albeit with different emphases. Berkeley was trying to 
account for our ability to intuitively decipher the meaning of visual input, while Beckett 
creates images that are opaque and difficult to understand, as can be gleaned even from 
his predilection for dark and muted colours. Impediments to seeing and interpreting 
afflict Beckett’s numerous blind men, an interest shared with Berkeley. The blind figures 
of Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and All that Fall  
not only lack the ability to see the world, but they are also wanting in empathy and 
consideration for other people. Read alongside Berkeley’s theory of the visual as a divine 
language that God is using to guide us, Beckett’s blind men are completely without 
guidance on both the sensual and the spiritual levels.  
An important alternative is presented in Rough for Theatre 1 where two unnamed 
characters, the blind A and crippled B, attempt to form a union in order to compensate for 
each other’s deficiencies. As I have shown, this play draws on the Molyneux problem 
that asks about the ability of a blind person to understand visual input immediately after 
gaining eyesight, and Berkeley’s famous answer that he would not. This question has far-
reaching religious and psychological ramifications, which Beckett examines in 
conjunction with several important dramas of the Irish Literary Revival. The play 
ultimately questions our ability to acquire new types of knowledge. Crucially, Beckett 
presents us with a blind man who can never be made to see, since he is unable to 
cooperate with another person. The moral deficiency of the blind beggar does not consist 
in abusing the cripple he encounters, but in his failure to understand his needs and work 
together with his fellow human being for the benefit of both. 
 
The affinities between Beckett’s writing and Berkeley’s philosophy are apparent 
throughout Beckett’s work but at the same time, they can be said to be embedded within 
the atheistic, pessimist and materialist convictions of the 20th century. To what extent, 
then, can Beckett be said to be a Berkeleyan in the sense that early criticism considered 
him to be a Cartesian? I would suggest that this question misses the complexity and depth 
of Beckett’s relation to philosophy. First of all, Beckett did not adhere to the doctrines 
and main concerns of any one philosopher, but rather harnessed his broad knowledge of 
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various philosophical systems in the service of his own personal preoccupations. 
Beckett’s idiosyncratic approach to philosophical arguments is especially conspicuous in 
his reworking of Berkeleyan themes. Beckett didn’t simply copy images and arguments 
from Berkeley but re-imagined the important principles of his philosophy in a world that 
was completely alien to it, where the horrors of World War II  and other episodes of 
recent history stand in bleak contrast to Berkeley’s optimistic outlook. This 
reinterpretation brings the 18th-century concepts into our own era in an uncomfortable 
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Abstract 
Samuel Beckett has long been known as a philosophical author, who drew on 
philosophical work to create haunting images and intricate texts that are felt by later 
thinkers to express so well their own questioning of the foundations of Western thought. 
On the other hand, Beckett’s own interests lay with philosophical writers of the 17th and 
18th centuries. This thesis looks at the way Beckett infuses the tenets and metaphors of 
the 18th-century philosopher George Berkeley with new meanings that transform early 
modern theories into artistic works that continue to appeal to audiences and thinkers to 
this day. 
Research into Beckett’s philosophical sources was an important subject from early 
Beckett criticism onwards. Significant early works include Ruby Cohn’s “Philosophical 
Fragments in the Works of Samuel Beckett” (1964);412 John Fletcher’s “Beckett and the 
Philosophers” (1965);413 and Edouard Morot-Sir, “Samuel Beckett and Cartesian 
Emblems” (1976).414 What is common to these essays and other research published at the 
time is the identification of Beckett’s thinking with a Cartesian stance. The increasing 
amount of archive materials available to researchers, including letters, his personal notes, 
and the books left in his library after his death, has had a tremendous impact by showing 
that Descartes was only one of many philosophers Beckett studies and drew upon.  
Samuel Beckett’s interest in Berkeley has become common knowledge in Beckett 
studies, backed by archive materials, direct allusions and the occasional mentions in the 
criticism. There have been several attempts to provide an account of Beckett’s 
engagement with Berkeley. These include Anthony Uhlmann's chapter “Beckett, 
Berkeley, Bergson, Film: The Intuition Image” in his book The Philosophical Image415, 
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Branka Arsić’s The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett),416 an 
early article by Jean-Michel Rabaté “Berkeley entre Joyce et Beckett”,417 “Beckett and 
Berkeley: A Reconsideration”418 by Frederik Smith, and the latest contribution is Steven 
Matthews’ “‘The Books are in the Study as Before’: Samuel Beckett’s Berkeley”.419 
These studies unfortunately opted for a short form of a single chapter or magazine article, 
thus failing to give an extensive account. Moreover,  archival materials released recently 
provide many more details on what philosophical sources Beckett was familiar with, his 
engagement with different thinkers, and his evaluation of them. This thesis proves that 
Beckett spent time and effort on reading Berkeley and secondary materials about him, 
even though he mostly kept silence on his interest in the philosopher. It studies themes 
and images taken directly from Berkeley’s writings, which regularly appear in Beckett’s 
texts across different media, from the 1930s to at least the late 1960s. By following the 
different appearances of Berkeleyan themes in Beckett it is possible to see that Beckett 
read Berkeley’s text against the grain, consistently ignoring the spiritual realm and taking 
a pessimistic and paranoid view. What Berkeley advances as a praise of God, Beckett 
renders as a threat from hostile forces. In Frederik Smith's poignant formulation, Beckett 
“reads Berkeley cruelly”.420 
Using archive materials it was possible to reconstruct a more accurate timeline of 
Beckett’s introduction to and reading of Berkeley than was hitherto available. The 
common assumption that A. A. Luce must have discussed Berkeley with his young 
student was shown to be unfounded. Beckett’s interest in Berkeley was awakened in 
Dublin social and intellectual circles, where the Irish philosopher was widely discussed at 
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the time. Beckett first read a work by the famous philosopher in 1933, starting with the 
Commonplace Book  on the recommendation of his acquaintance Joseph Hone. He went 
on to read Principles of Human Knowledge at an uncertain date, and Three Dialogues 
between Hylas and Philonous in 1935. Dating these readings is important for any 
argument regarding Beckett’s familiarity with Berkeley, especially in the early work. 
Beckett’s knowledge of Berkeley extended even further than the primary texts, since he 
was also familiarized himself with other interpretations of Berkeley through his 
summaries of Windelband’s History of Philosophy and his reading of other philosophers 
and commentators. The archive materials, in total, point to a consistent interest in the 
philosopher and a good familiarity with his major works alongside their contemporary 
interpretations. 
Beckett’s interest in Berkeley is reflected in his work throughout the years. This 
thesis shows that Berkeley’s philosophy is an important source for Murphy rather than a 
passing reference inserted to display Beckett’s erudition. It also discusses Film and its 
script which takes esse est percipi as its basic premise. The span of years between the 
early novel written in 1936 and the film produced in 1964 in itself indicates a lasting 
interest. In addition to these works whose connection to Berkeley is well-known, the 
thesis proposes new interpretations of texts that are informed by the philosopher without 
mentioning his name, especially the theoretical text Three Dialogues between Samuel 
Beckett and George Duthuit whose close resemblance to Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous was occasionally mentioned but not analysed in depth before. The short 
plays Act without Words 1 and Rough for Theatre 1 were also shown to be heavily 
indebted to Berkeleyan themes and images. 
Additionally, themes taken from Berkeley appear in many of Beckett’s texts even 
when they do not constitute the main source of inspiration. Chapter 4 illustrates how the 
anti-representational stance Beckett adopts from Berkeley plays out in the Trilogy and its 
anti-mimetic strategies. Chapter 5 explores the image as an interface between the sensual 
and the mind, as well as the play of perception between observer and observed, in the 
theatre plays Play and Rockaby and the late novel Ill Seen Ill Said. Chapter 6 traces 
parallels between blindness in Berkeley and the numerous blind people in Beckett’s 
writings, including Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Watt, Waiting for Godot, 
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Endgame and All the Fall and the late prose fragments Fizzles. For most of these works, 
the thesis proposes a Berkeleyan angle of interpretation for the first time, highlighting 
aspects of the texts that have hitherto gone unnoticed. 
Following the various appearances of Berkeleyan themes in Beckett’s work it is possible 
to see a consistent of pattern of a peculiarly Beckettian interpretation of Berkeley’s 
philosophy. Beckett once told Harold Hobson “I am interested in the shape of ideas even 
if I do not believe in them.”421 This sentence may characterise much of Beckett’s 
reworking of Berkeley – he keeps the shape of the ideas while subjecting them to very 
different premises. It is possible to discern three characteristic ways in which Beckett 
creatively misreads Berkeley. One is materialistic renditions of Berkeley’s philosophy 
that treat people as objects rather than spirits, the other is attributing malevolence to 
divine guidance, while the third highlights the difficulties of perception. 
Berkeley’s presence in Murphy can be seen as paradigmatic of the first tendency. 
Berkeley’s philosophical system is deemed to be an unhelpful way of facing up to the 
privations of life, an attempt to ignore the problems encountered by the characters rather 
than courageously face them. Yet one aspect of Berkeley’s work shapes the existence of 
the main character, i.e. the need for perception by the other, as in Berkeley’s famous 
maxim: esse est percipi – to be is to be perceived. The need to be seen is essential for 
Murphy but also to numerous other characters in Beckett’s writing for page and stage. 
The need for interpersonal confirmation of one’s existence is a constant motif in Beckett, 
which tallies well with Berkeley’s philosophy.  
As pointed out throughout this thesis, Beckett distorts the famous maxim. For 
Berkeley, as Beckett was well aware, there are two types of substances – ideas whose 
existence depends on perception, and spirits which are impossible to perceive and whose 
existence consists in active perceiving. By ignoring this distinction Beckett eliminates the 
spiritual existence of human beings, reducing them to mere bodies. Murphy’s need for 
Mr. Endon’s approval therefore expresses a materialist view of humanity that reduces a 
person to his or her body. A similar view of people as objects of perception also appears 
                                                 
421 Harold Hobson, “Samuel Beckett. Dramatist of the Year,” International Theatre Annual 1 (1956) 
153. 
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in the theatre plays Waiting for Godot, Happy Days and Play as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Ill Seen Ill Said adds another perspective on the maxim – the suffering of the perceiver 
who cannot break away from the existence it perceives. 
Treating people as ideas rather than spirits opens the possibility of self-perception 
where the mind is perceiver and perceived at the same time. For Berkeley, self-perception 
is an impossible and contradictory notion, and yet plays a major role in Beckett. This is 
true for Film, usually considered Beckett’s most Berkeleyan work, as well as Rockaby 
which is not usually read in relation to the Irish philosopher. The quality of self-
perception is different in each work – in Film it is a threatening possibility that 
materialises in the end in a moment of horror while in Rockaby it is accepted with 
resignation and a growing sense of inner peace. In both texts Beckett uses Berkeleyan 
tropes to render an experience that is fundamentally alien to Berkeley’s world view. 
Alongside the materialistic reinterpretation of Berkeley’s idealism, Beckett also 
undermines the religious optimism that informs Berkeley’s writing. This tendency can 
already be seen in Three Dialogues where Berkeley’s anti-representational philosophy of 
matter is being harnessed by Beckett for artistic purposes. Both authors reject external 
existence in favour of a direct relation of presentation, with Beckett adopting a similar 
title and structure to Berkeley’s’ text. The difference lies in the certainty and constancy of 
the relation. For Berkeley, the denial of matter is no great loss since God safeguards the 
existence of the world and the reliability of the laws of nature which allow human beings 
to live and thrive. For Beckett, on the other hand, there are no certainties or rules that can 
be followed and the artist must work in the absence of stable relations. The language of 
absurdity and the threat of madness which Beckett’s Three Dialogues conjures up clearly 
point to the dangers of pursuing such aesthetics in a Godless world. 
Beckett reinterprets the relation between spirits and ideas as a psychological relation 
between individuals and an unknown entity that they depend on, but tends to fail them. 
The unseen provider of objects in Act without Words 1 is a malevolent divinity who gives 
the protagonist false hopes that are disappointed time after time. In Film the observer is a 
pursuer to be feared, while in Play the spot light is an interrogator that torments the heads 
who are forced to tell their stories without assurance that they are being heard or that their 
torment will ever end. A more conciliatory relation can be discerned in the late work 
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where the observer comes into focus. In Ill Seen Ill Said we look at a woman through the 
eyes of an observer who wants nothing more than to watch her, conveying a melancholy 
and nostalgic mood that indicates a community of suffering, without threat or ill-will. 
Finally, both Beckett and Berkeley were highly interested in visual images and the 
way our mind interacts with them, albeit with different emphases. Berkeley was trying to 
account for our ability to intuitively decipher the meaning of visual input, while Beckett 
creates images that are opaque and difficult to understand, as can be gleaned even from 
his predilection for dark and mute colours. In Ill Seen Ill Said the narrating voice attempts 
to perceive and interpret what it sees of a woman inhabiting a certain area, but its ability 
to see is limited and the interpretation is uncertain. Trouble with sight and interpreting 
visual data also afflict Beckett’s numerous blind men, an interest he shared with Berkeley. 
The blind figures of Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, 
and All that Fall  not only lack the ability to see the world, but they are also wanting in 
empathy and consideration for other people. Read alongside Berkeley’s theory of the 
visual as a divine language that God is using to guide us, Beckett’s blind men are 
completely without guidance on both the sensual and the spiritual levels.  
An important alternative is presented in Rough for Theatre 1 where two unnamed 
characters, the blind A and crippled B, attempt to form a union in order to compensate for 
each other’s deficiencies and fail. Their single moment of union can be seen as a 
dramatization of a philosophical problem that Berkeley addresses in several works – the 
Molyneux problem. An influential philosophical riddle, the Molyneux problem asks 
whether a blind man made to see would be able to distinguish by sight object that were 
known to him only by touch. Beckett’s play brings together two beggars whose union can 
allow each of them to rely on the abilities of the other, giving the blind man, in a sense, 
the ability to see. Berkeley has emphasized the need for practice and adjustment in the 
process of gaining the ability to understand visual sense impressions, while Beckett’s 
beggars fail exactly because they are unwilling to invest the necessary effort and time to 
coordinate their movements and intentions. Despite their ultimate failure, however, the 
blind beggar A remains a neutral figure, indicating a turning away from the malevolent 
blind men of the earlier plays.  
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The affinities between Beckett’s writing and Berkeley’s philosophy are apparent 
throughout Beckett’s work. They can be seen to be embedded within the atheistic, 
pessimist and materialist convictions of the 20th century. Beckett didn’t simply copy 
images and arguments from Berkeley but re-imagined his early modern philosophy in a 
world that was completely alien to it, where the horrors of WWII and other events of 
recent history stand in bleak contrast to the Good Bishop’s optimistic outlook. This 
reinterpretation brings the 18th century concepts into our own era in an uncomfortable and 
jarring manner which forms part of the haunting atmosphere of Beckett’s work. 
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Abstrakt 
Samuel Beckett je dobře znám jako filosoficky orientovaný autor. Ve své tvorbě 
čerpá z  řady filosofických děl, s jejichž pomocí vytváří znepokojivé obrazy a spletité 
texty, v nichž moderní myslitelé často spatřují vyjádření svých vlastních otázek a 
pochybností dotýkajících se samotných základu západního myšlení. Sám Beckett se však 
často zaměřuje na filosofy tvořící v sedmnáctém a osmnáctém století. Disertační práce 
zkoumá způsob, jímž Beckett dává nový význam názorům a metaforám významného 
filosofa, George Berkeleyho, a přetváří ranně novověké teorie v umělecká díla, která 
dodnes fascinují bezpočet diváků a myslitelů. 
Zkoumání Beckettových filosofických zdrojů hrálo významnou roli již v prvních 
kritických reflexích jeho díla. Mezi nejvýznamnější rané kritické studie patří práce Ruby 
Cohnové: “Philosophical Fragments in the Works of Samuel Beckett” (1964);422 Johna 
Fletchera: “Beckett and the Philosophers” (1965);423 či Edouarda Morot-Sira, “Samuel 
Beckett and Cartesian Emblems” (1976).424 Společným rysem těchto esejí, ale i ostatních 
kritických prací z daného období, je identifikace Beckettova myšlení s karteziánskou 
pozicí. Zvyšující se počet dostupných archivních materiálů – dopisů, poznámek či knih 
nalezených po Beckettově smrti nalezeny v jeho knihovně – přispěl významnou měrou 
k potvrzení faktu, že Descartes byl pouze jedním z celé řady filosofů, jejichž studiu se 
Beckett systematicky věnoval a z nichž čerpal náměty pro své díla. 
Beckettův zájem o Berkeleyho, o němž svědčí zmíněné archivní materiály, přímé 
reference či zmínky v kritických studiích, je v kontextu beckettovských studií vnímán 
jako všeobecně přijímaný fakt. Této otázce bylo v minulosti věnováno několik studií, 
mezi něž patří: kapitola Anthony Uhlmanna “Beckett, Berkeley, Bergson, Film: The 
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Intuition Image” v  knize The Philosophical Image425; studie Branky Arsić The Passive 
Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett)426; článek Jean-Michel Rabatého 
“Berkeley entre Joyce et Beckett”,427 “Beckett and Berkeley: A Reconsideration”428 
Frederika Smithe či nejnovější příspěvek Stevena Matthewse “‘The Books are in the 
Study as Before’: Samuel Beckett’s Berkeley”.429 Zmíněné studie nepřekračují rozsah 
jedné kapitoly či odborného článku a tudíž nenabízí prostor pro vyčerpávající diskusi 
dané problematiky. Nedávno zveřejněné archivní materiály navíc nabízí zcela nové 
poznatky o filosofických zdrojích, s nimiž byl Beckett obeznámen, a přináší detailní 
informace o jeho vztahu a postoji k celé řadě dalších myslitelů. Disertační práce jasně 
dokládá, že Beckett, přestože o svém zájmu zpravidla otevřeně nehovořil, vynaložil 
značný čas a úsilí na četbu Berkeleyho textů a studium sekundární literatury věnované 
jeho filosofii. Práce se zaměřuje na rozbor námětů a obrazů převzatých přímo 
z Berkeleyho prací, se kterými se lze setkat v Beckettových textech od let třicátých až po 
pozdní léta šedesátá. Důsledná analýza jednotlivých berkeleyovských témat objevujících 
se v Beckettově díle umožňuje sledovat Beckettovo netradiční čtení Berkeleyho textů, v 
němž Beckett systematicky ignoruje jejich duchovní význam a zaujímá pesimistická a 
paranoidní východiska. Beckett podává Berkeleyho chválu Boha jako ohrožení 
nepřátelskou silou a, slovy Frederika Smithe, “čte Berkeleyho velmi krutě”.430 
Práce s archivními materiály umožnila přesněji určit, kdy se Beckett seznámil 
s Berkeleym a kdy se věnoval četbě jeho děl. Obecně přijímaný předpoklad, podle něhož 
A. A. Luce diskutoval o Berkeleyho filosofii se svým mladým studentem, se ukázal jako 
nepodložený. Beckettův zájem o Berkeleyho se zrodil v dublinských společenských a 
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intelektuálních kruzích, kde byla irská filosofie častým tématem. Beckett poprvé četl 
Berkeleyho dílo – Commonplace Book – na doporučení svého známého, Josepha Honea. 
Později navázal četbou A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 
(Pojednání o principech lidského poznání) a v roce 1935 Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous (Tři dialogy). Datace Beckettova čtení těchto textů hraje zásadní roli 
v jakékoliv diskusi o Beckettově znalosti Berkeleyho filosofie a to především v kontextu 
Beckettova raného díla. Beckettova znalost Berkeleyho díla se neomezovala pouze na 
studium primárních textů. Beckett znal i další interpretace Berkeleyho filosofie, četl 
Windelbandovu History of Philosophy a studoval práce mnoha dalších filosofů a 
komentátorů. Archivní materiály souhlasně podávají svědectví o Beckettově 
dlouhodobém zájmu o Berkeleyho a o solidní znalosti jeho hlavních děl i jejich dobových 
interpretací. 
Bekettův zájem o Berkeleyho se dlouhodobě odráží v jeho umělecké tvorbě. 
Disertační práce jasně dokazuje, že Berkeleyho filosofie hraje významnou roli v raném 
románu Murphy (1936) a neleze ji tak pokládat za pouhou náhodnou referenci, jejímž 
cílem je vystavět na odiv autorovu erudici. Předmětem diskuse je i Beckettův Film a jeho 
scénář, který přijímá Berkeleyho esse est percipi jako svou základní premisu. Za důkaz 
Beckettova dlouhodobého zájmu o Berkeleyho filosofii lze považovat i téměř třicet let, 
které uběhly od prvního vydání výše zmíněného románu a jeho filmového zpracování 
v roce 1964. Vedle těchto známých berkleyovských děl se práce věnuje i interpretaci 
textů, jež byly ovlivněny Berkeleyho filosofií, aniž by v nich filosofovo jméno bylo 
přímo zmíněno. Jedná se především o teoretický text Three Dialogues between Samuel 
Beckett and George Duthuit; podobnosti mezi Berkeleyho Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous dosud nebyla věnována detailnější kritická pozornost. Vliv 
Berkeleyovských témat a myšlenek je dále patrný v krátkých hrách Act without Words 1 a 
Rough for Theatre 1. 
Náměty převzaté z Berkeleyho filosofie se dále objevují v celé řadě dalších 
Beckettových textů, přesto, že v nich nepředstavují hlavní zdroj autorovy inspirace. 
Čtvrtá kapitola se opírá o analýzu způsobu, jímž Beckett rozehrává svůj berkeleyovský 
antímimetick ý postoj v Trilogii. Pátá kapitola je věnována diskusi obrazu chápaného jako 
interface mezi smyslovým vnímáním a myslí a perceptivní hře odehrávající se mezi 
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pozorovatelem a pozorovaným v divadelních hrách Play (Hra), Rockaby a pozdním 
románu Ill Seen Ill Said. Šestá kapitola sleduje paralely mezi motivem slepoty 
v Berkeleyho filosofii a bezpočtem slepců v Beckettových textech jako jsou Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women, Watt, Waiting for Godot (Čekání na Godota), Endgame (Konec 
Hry) a All the Fall a pozdním fragmentům Fizzles. Disertační práce nabízí, v případě 
většiny z těchto textů vůbec poprvé, interpretaci opírající se o Berkeleyovské motivy 
zaměřenou na aspekty Beckettových textů, jež zůstávaly doposud nepovšimnuty. 
Studium berkeleyovských námětů a motivů v Beckettově díle umožňuje spatřit 
konzistentní kód původní bekettovské interpretace Berkeleyho filosofie. Jak Beckett sám 
svěřil Haroldu Hobsonovi: „Zajímá mě tvar myšlenek, i když s nimi nesouhlasím.“ 431 
Právě tato věta do značné míry vystihuje způsob, jímž Beckett přetváří Berkeleyho 
myšlení – zachovává tvar myšlenek a zároveň je podřizuje naprosto odlišným 
východiskům. V tomto smyslu je možné rozlišit tři základní tendence či způsoby, jimiž 
Beckett tvořivě dezinterpretuje Berkeleyho: 1) materialistické ztvárnění Berkeleyho 
filosofie, jež chápe člověka jako předmět spíše než jako ducha; 2) připisování zlovůle 
božskému vedení; 3) zdůraznění obtíží spojených s percepcí. 
Roli Berkeleyho myšlenek v románu Murphy lze interpretovat jako paradigmatický 
příklad první z těchto tendencí. Berkeleyho filosofický systém je zde vnímán jako 
neužitečný z hlediska nutnosti čelit životním strastem, a zároveň jako pokus jednotlivých 
postavy ignorovat problémy, s nimiž se setkávají, místo toho, aby jim srdnatě čelily. 
Jeden z aspektů Berkeleyho díla přesto utváří existenci hlavní postavy románu, jmenovitě 
potřeba být vnímán druhými, jež souzní s Berkeleyho slavným výrokem: esse est percipi 
– být znamená být vnímán. Potřeba být vidět je zásadní pro Murphyho i pro bezpočet 
dalších postav v Beckettových prozaických i divadelních textech. Potřeba interpersonální 
konfirmace lidské existence, jež souzní s Berkeleyho filosofií, je v Beckettově díle trvale 
přítomným motivem. 
Disertační práce zároveň důsledně zdůrazňuje, že Beckett Berkeleyho slavný výrok 
neustále deformuje a překrucuje. Beckett si byl velmi dobře vědom Berkeleyho učení o 
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existenci dvou substancí: idejí, jejichž existence závisí na vnímání, a duchů, jež není 
možné vnímat a jejichž existence spočívá v aktivním vnímání. Zavrhnutí této distinkce 
umožňuje Beckettovi ignorovat duchovní existenci lidských bytostí a redukovat je tak na 
pouhá těla. Murphyho potřeba uznání ze strany pana Endona tak vyjadřuje materialistické 
pojetí lidskosti, jež redukuje člověka na jeho tělo. Podobné pojetí člověka se objevuje i 
v divadelních hrách Waiting for Godot, Happy Days či Play rozebíran ých v kapitole 5. Ill 
Seen Ill Said toto pojetí navíc rozšiřuje o novou perspektivu – utrpení vnímajícího, jenž 
není sto odvrátit se od vnímané existence. 
Chápání člověka jako ideje spíše než ducha otevírá možnost sebe-vnímání, kdy se 
mysl stává vnímajícím a zároveň vnímaným. Vnímání sebe sama, jež je pro Berkeleyho 
něčím nemožným a vnitřně rozporuplným, hraje v Beckettově díle zásadní roli. Tento 
výrok platí nejen o Filmu, jenž je obecně považován za Berkeleym nejvíce ovlivněné dílo, 
ale i o Rockaby, jemuž se berkeleyovské interpretace obvykle vyhýbají. Kvalita vnímání 
sebe sama se v jednotlivých dílech značně liší. Ve Filmu ohrožuje možnost vnímat, jež se 
zhmotňuje na konci v děsuplném okamžiku, zatímco v Rockaby je přijímána jako 
rezignace a narůstající pocit vnitřního míru. V obou zmiňovaných dílech využívá Beckett 
Berkeleho tropy ke ztvárnění zkušenosti, jež je fundamentálně cizí Berkeleyho pohledu 
na svět. 
Vedle materialistické reinterpretace Berkeleyho idealismu podkopává Beckett i 
duchovní optimismus, jenž prostupuje všemi Berkeleyho pracemi. Tuto tendenci lze 
vysledovat již v Three Dialogues, kde si Beckett uzurpuje Berkeleyho 
antirepresentationalistický filosofii hmoty pro své umělecké účely. Oba autoři odmítají 
vnější existenci ve prospěch přímého vztahu zpodobnění a Beckett dokonce pracuje 
s podobným názvem i strukturou jakou má Berkeleyho text, rozdíl však spočívá v míře 
jistoty a stálosti zmiňovaného vztahu. Zatímco pro Berkeleyho nepředstavuje popření 
existence hmoty zásadní ztrátu, neboť nad existencí světa a jistotou přírodních zákonů, 
jež jsou předpokladem lidského života a prospěchu, bdí Bůh, pro Becketta však neexistují 
žádné jistoty ani pravidla, jež by bylo možné následovat, a umělec tak musí tvořit 
v situaci absence jakýchkoliv trvalých vztahů. Jazyk absurdna a neustálá hrozba šílenství, 
jež Beckettovy Three Dialogues navozují, jasně poukazují na nebezpečí spojené se 
snahou o dosažení takovéto estetiky ve světě bez Boha.  
 209 
Beckett reinterpretuje vztah mezi duchy a idejemi jako psychologický vztah mezi 
jednotlivcem a neznámou entitou, na níž jsou závislí, a která je zároveň velmi často 
zrazuje. Neviditelný poskytovatel předmětů v Act without Words 1 je zlomyslným 
božstvem, který hlavnímu hrdinovi nabízí pouze falešné naděje a opakované zklamání. 
Ve Filmu se pozorovatel proměňuje v pronásledovatele, jehož je radno se obávat, zatímco 
v Play se světlo reflektoru stává vyšetřovatelem, jenž mučí hlavy, které jsou přinuceny 
vyprávět své příběhy, aniž by se jim dostávalo jistoty, že budou vyslechnuty nebo že 
muka sama skončí. O něco rozporuplnější vztah je možné nalézt v Beckettově pozdní 
práci, v níž se do středu zájmu dostává sám pozorovatel. V Ill Seen Ill Said vidíme ženu 
očima pozorovatele, který netouží po ničem jiném, než ji pozorovat, a navozuje tak 
dojem melancholie a nostalgie poukazující na komunitu utrpení, jež je prosto jakékoliv 
hrozby či zlovůle. 
Jak Beckett, tak Berkeley se, byť s odlišným zřetelem, úzce zajímali o vizuální 
obrazy a způsob jejich interakce s lidskou myslí. Berkeley se snažil podat vysvětlení naší 
schopnosti intuitivně dešifrovat význam vizuálních vstupů, zatímco Beckett vytváří 
obrazy, které jsou matné a jen obtížně pochopitelné, jak lze ostatně vytušit i z jeho záliby 
v temných a tlumených barevných odstínech. Vypravěč v Ill Seen Ill Said se pokouší 
vnímat a interpretovat to málo, co je schopen zahlédnout z ženy obývající určité místo; 
jeho schopnost vidět je však omezená a jeho interpretace nejistá. Potíže se zrakem a 
interpretací vizuálních dat je charakteristická i pro řadu Beckettových slepců. Stejný 
zájem pak lze najít i u Berkeleyho. Slepcům z dêj jako Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, a All that Fall se nedostává nejen schopnosti vidět 
svět, ale zároveň postrádají i empatii a ohleduplnost vůči ostatním lidem. Prizmatem 
Berkeleyho teorie vizuálna jako božského jazyka, s jehož pomocí Bůh vede naše kroky, 
lze Beckettovy slepce vnímat jako jedince naprosto postrádající vedení a to jak na 
smyslové, tak duchovní úrovni. 
Zajímavou alternativu nabízí Rough for Theatre 1; dvě bezejmenné postavy, slepec A 
a mrzák B se pokoušejí spojit své síly, aby překonali společné nedostatky, a nakonec 
selhávají. Okamžik jejich spojení lze vnímat jako dramatizaci filosofického problému 
známého jako Molyneuxova otázka, jíž se Berkeley pokouší vyřešit hned v několika 
svých textech. Molyneuxova otázka je vlivnou filosofickou hádankou, jež se táže, zda by 
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slepec, který by získal možnost vidět, byl schopen rozlišit pomocí zraku předměty, jež 
předtím znal pouze pomocí hmatu. Beckettova hra svádí dohromady na jevišti dva 
žebráky, jejichž spojení či spolupráce by jim umožnilo spolehnout se navzájem na 
schopnosti toho druhého a umožnilo tak, svým způsobem, slepci schopnost vidět. 
Berkeley v tomto bodě zdůrazňuje, že pro získání schopnosti chápat smyslové vjemy je 
nutná praxe, zatímco Beckett nechává pokus obou žebráků ztroskotat právě proto, že 
nejsou ke koordinaci svých pohybů a úmyslů ochotní vynaložit potřebný čas a snahu. 
Navzdory konečnému selhání však žebrák A zůstává postavou celkově neutrální, což 
naznačuje Beckettův odklon od zlomyslných slepců raných her. 
Blízký vztah mezi Beckettovým dílem a Berkeleyho filosofií je patrný v celém 
Beckettově díle. Lze se domnívat, že Beckett zde vychází z kontextu ateistického, 
pesimistického a materialistického uvažování 20. století. Nelze však tvrdit, že Beckett 
jednoduše kopíruje obrazy či argumenty z Berkeleyho filosofie, ale spíše znovu utváří 
jeho raně novověkou filosofii ve světě, jenž je těmto myšlenkám zcela vzdálen, ve světě, 
kde hrůzy druhé světové války spolu s ostatními tragickými událostmi moderních dějin 
stojí v ponurém protikladu k optimistickému vidění „dobrého biskupa“. Beckettova 
reinterpretace tak do naší doby přenáší koncepty 18. století a činí tak znepokojujícím a 
nepříjemným způsobem, jenž tvoří jeden ze základních prvků jeho díla. 
